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This thesis explores factors related to private investment in education in Iran. All of the 
three empirical chapters pay particular attention to the very different findings obtained when 
considering urban versus rural contexts and the implications this has for gender in Iran. For the first 
two empirical chapters, we use data from the Household Expenditures and Income Survey (HEIS), 
while for the last chapter, we employ data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
Household/parental educational expenditure on children is one factor related to private 
investment in education. We study determinants of household/parental educational expenditure 
on children, and results in this chapter indicate two interesting findings; firstly, richer parents, 
especially in urban areas, spend more money on their children's education, which suggest possible 
existence of intergenerational mobility. Secondly, in rural areas maternal education is not 
significantly related to determining the decision to spend on education, the amount spent, and the 
proportion of household expenditure allocated, which suggest possible existence of gender 
discrimination in rural areas. Chapter 5 explores both naïve and causal returns to education in 
terms of wages by using both OLS and Instrumental Variable techniques. Our OLS results provide 
strong evidence for non-linearity, and higher returns to schooling for women, and suggest that 
returns to education are similar between urban and rural areas. Our IV estimates are higher than 
OLS estimates, and imply that returns to education are higher for urban than rural areas, and for 
women than men. Finally, we examine job mismatch in the Iranian labour market in Chapter 6; 
particularly determinants of under/over employment. Most of our findings are consistent with the 
existing studies of under/over employment. However, notably we find that marriage and education 
have different implications for men and women, and more educated women suffer from higher 
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underemployment, while the opposite is true for men. We also find that single and divorced 
women are suffering from high underemployment, while marriage is not significantly related to 
men’s probability of job-mismatch.  
Overall, studying various factors related to private investment in human capital in Iran 
suggests the possible existence of increasing intergenerational mobility, but also discrimination, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Aims and objectives 
 
This thesis examines various factors related to investment in education in Iran and the 
outcomes of such investment. The analysis focuses on factors such as the determinants of parental 
expenditure on children’s education, returns on investments in education in terms of wages, and 
job mismatches in terms of under/over employment in Iran. Like many other countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the literature on Iran’s educational economy, and specifically 
the determinants of investment in human capital, is quite scarce and underdeveloped. The thesis 
gathers the existing literature on these topics in Iran written in English or Persian language. In 
analysing the determinants of educational investment, their returns and the extent of over/under-
employment, we pay particular attention to the very different findings obtained when considering 
urban versus rural contexts, and the implications this has for gender in Iran. Considering these 
dimensions is one of the most important contributions of this thesis, because it provides key 
insights for Iranian policymakers in the areas of education, training, and the labour market.  
Observing each section separately, our first empirical chapter is on the determinants of 
household educational expenditure. To the best of our knowledge there has been only one study 
in this area by Kashi (2010), which examines the trend of household proportion of educational 
expenditure in Iran by using Household Income and Expenditure Survey data. Apart from Kashi 
(2010), most of the existing literature on this subject focuses on food, health, and housing 
expenditures in Iran. Hence, our first empirical chapter, which focuses on the determinants of 
parental educational expenditure, is innovative and new in the literature. Our second empirical 
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chapter reveals that the literature on returns to education in Iran is more extensive; however, none 
of these studies differentiate between urban and rural regions/areas, and by gender. Hence, our 
contribution to existing literature on returns to education in Iran comes from differentiating 
between these two areas; while also examining the potential for gender to impact differentially in 
these two types of regions. We also make a methodological contribution to the existing literature, 
using IV methods to get at the causal returns to education in Iran. Previous studies on returns to 
education by Salrhi-Isfahani et al. (2009) have examined estimates that do not tackle the potential 
endogeneity of education. Finally, our third empirical chapter is on the magnitude of job-
mismatches in Iran, specifically, under/over employment. This topic is also original, and to the best 
of our knowledge, no other studies exist on this important feature of Iran’s labour market. The 
focus of this final analytical chapter developed as the thesis progressed, because the study of 
under/over employment in Iran raises very different issues for rural and urban settings, particularly 
in terms of gender differences. A focus on under/over employment is also partly driven by the 
opportunities that our data source (the Iranian Labour Force Survey) presents, as it comprises 
particularly interesting and informative statistics on under/over employment. 
The first chapter of our thesis attempts to create a background for the next chapters of our 
thesis. In order to do so, in the next section (section 1.2), we briefly mention some historical 
background we believe has shaped the Iranian educational system, and the labour market 
characteristics. In section 1.3, we examine Iran’s education system. Section 1.4 provides a brief 
outline of the Iranian labour market characteristics. Finally, section 1.5 outlines the empirical aims 
and chapters in this thesis. At the end, we suggest that while demographic changes and the 
expansion of educational attainment in the 1980s could be used to promote economic growth and 
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prosperity, the persistence of existing rigidities in the labour market (such as high unemployment 
among educated youth, over-education, and low female labour participation) will present the 
greatest challenge to the Iranian government in the near future. If the Iranian government misses 
its chance to use the evolution of its population demographic, it will face a period of high 
unemployment, especially among the educated youth and women. This could create not only 
economic but also political and social crises in the near future. This thesis sheds important light on 
some of the key challenges facing Iranian policymakers and concludes with some key 
recommendations for the future.  
1.2 Historical background relevant to educational changes 
 
1.2.1 Stylised facts about Iran 
 
Iran is the second largest economy in the MENA region after Saudi Arabia. With 79.8 million 
people, Iran has the second largest population of the region. Iran owns the largest natural gas 
supply in the world, and the fourth-largest oil reserve, which means it can exercise considerable 
influence on international energy, security, and the global economy. Figure 1.1 provides a map of 
Iran with its neighbouring countries, demonstrating that it shares border with many strategically 










Source: Google map 
Although Iran is one of the most important regional powers in one of the most conflicted 
and complex parts of the world, there remains a gap in available data and economic analysis. One 
of the main reasons is the reluctance of the Iranian government to make its collected microdata 
available to the public or researchers. According to Salehi-Isfahani (2014), one justification is: 
‘[There is] the old argument that information is power, and governments prefer that ordinary 
people not have access to the same information as they do, that armed with the 
same information they might challenge government claims about the state of the economy and 
how things are changing’. (Salehi-Isfahani, 2014) 
The result of such policies for the past few years is that ‘Iranian papers are filled with not 
always accurate analyses of [its economy] by independent researchers’ (Salehi-Isfahani, 2014). 
However, it seems that the Statistical Centre of Iran (SCI) is gradually moving to avail the microdata 
it collects to a wider community of researchers. There are currently three types of microdata 
available to study the Iranian economy: the Household Expenditures and Income Survey (HEIS), 
School to Work Transition Survey, and Labour Force Survey (LFS). In this thesis, we use two of these 
surveys: the HEIS and LFS. 
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1.2.2 Population rise 
 
Probably the most important incident in the 20th century that shook the Iranian economy, 
its educational system, and the structure of its labour market was the Islamic Revolution in 1979, 
and the proceeding eight-year war with Iraq. The Islamic revolution and the war had large impacts 
on the social and educational structure of Iran. One of the important effects was large number of 
war casualties, and its effects on family structure, as more women became the head of households 
(Khoury, 2013).  According to Koolaee (2014) 55,996 women lost their husbands during the war. 
However, the most important effect of the revolution and the war was its leaders’ emphasis on 
marriage and family formation as basic Islamic virtues. As a result, the new government suspended 
all family planning programs (Mehryar, 2004). As Abbasi (2002) rightly points out ‘With the start of 
the eight-year war with Iraq, this facilitation of population increase went beyond being an ideology 
and began to be considered a matter of comparative advantage’ (Abbasi, 2002, p.6). Subsequently, 
the demographic significances of such an ideology became evident fast as the rate of population 
growth accelerated dramatically, and the population rose from 33.7 million in 1976 to 49.4 million 
in 1986 (an average annual rate of growth of 3.8% during the decade). Figure 1.2 presents the 
average annual population rate from 1966 to 2016, for urban and rural areas separately, where we 
can observe a total rise of 3.91% in the population from 1966 to 1986. We can also see that this 
population rise was higher in urban areas compared to rural areas (5.41% versus 2.39%). This could 
be explained by a higher population rise as well as migration from rural to urban areas. In addition, 
population growth has been declining constantly since 1991, especially in rural areas, where we 
observe negative population growth rates. The reverse effects of such a sharp decline in Iranian 
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population need further investigation. However, the population cohort under study in this thesis 
consists mostly of those who were born during the 1980s baby boom in Iran.  
Figure 1.2: Average Annual Population Growth Rate (%) 
 
      Source: Iranian Census (2016) 
1.2.3 Education expansion 
 
One of the most important challenges presented by the population’s drastic increase was a 
sudden increase in the demand for education. For instance, the cohorts born between 1976 and 
the early-mid 1990sentered formal schooling during early and mid-1990s, which in turn raised 
demand for primary education facilities. The government reacted by increasing its investment in 
primary education, specifically recruiting and training more teachers for this level and constructing 
schools. However, since building schools would not address shortages immediately, they started 
introducing a two-shift schooling system that allowed the use of the same premises by two 
different groups of children, teachers, and administrators. When this cohort reached the age of 12, 
the junior secondary school system experienced a similar pressure. It would happen again when 
the wave reached age 15 and a higher demand for senior secondary school facilities became 






























1976 and 1986 reached the age of higher education in the early-mid 1990s(Salehi-Isfahani, 2005). 
However, the current population decline implies that there will be many empty seats in universities 
across Iran in the near future.  
One of the most important characteristics of educational expansion was the equal 
opportunities created for both men and women, which is also evident in Figure 1.3. We see from 
this figure that while the educational attainment of both men and women increased constantly 
since 1975, the educational gap (in terms of the literacy rate) between men and women has also 
narrowed. For instance, while in 1975 the gap between the literacy rates of men and women was 
26%, this gap has declined to only 6% in 2015. 
Figure 1.3: Literacy Rate for Population Age 15 and Older (%) 
 
 
Source: UNESCO (2016) 
This dramatic improvement occurred not only in literacy rates, but also in higher 
educational levels, as we can observe from Table 1.1. Iran transformed from a country with low 



































1995 and 2015 alone, Iran’s tertiary gross enrolment rate increased from 18.29% to 71.9%. 
According to World Education News and Reviews (WENR), this is a higher ratio than countries like 
Italy, Japan, or the United Kingdom, and twice as high as the global average. We can also observe 
from Table 1.1 that the rate of female students entering universities also increased rapidly. For 
instance, while the gap between the male and female enrolment rate at the tertiary level was 
nearly 10% in 1995, in 2005, this gap was nearly 0% in 2010.As Salehi-Isfahani (2008) points out 
although the closing gender gap in education has been praised as one the achievements of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, there are concerns inside Iran about ‘women taking up precious spaces in 
universities’, aswomen have outnumbered men in the entering classes of universities for the last 
several years. Salehi-Isfahani(2008) suggests that these concerns will soon begin in other Middle 
Eastern countries where the same phenomenon has occurred.  
Table 1.1: Gross Enrolment Ratio, Tertiary Level (%) 
 
Year 1975 1980 1995 2005 2010 2015 
Total 4.10 4.49 18.29 22.87 48.52 71.88 
Male 5.66 5.94 23.09 22.23 48.56 75.89 
Female 2.43 2.93 13.46 23.52 48.47 67.65 
 
           Source : UNESCO (2016) 
1.3 Iranian Educational System 
 
In the previous section, we discussed issues that raised demand for human capital in Iran. 
In this section, we will examine characteristics of the Iranian education system such as various 
levels, organisations responsible for education, and recent related policies. Table 1.2 briefly 
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presents some current indicators of Iranian education, demonstrating very high standards in youth 
literacy rates, enrolment ratios in primary and secondary school, and adult literacy rates. We can 
see that although most of these variables show similar levels of educational attainment for women 
and men, women still lag behind men across all categories. 
 
Table 1.2: Education Indicators for Iran 
 
Indicators (%) Men Women 
Youth literacy rate  98.8 98.5 
Primary school participation, Gross enrolment ratio  108.1 106.8 
Primary school participation, Survival rate to last primary grade  98.1 96.7 
Secondary school participation, Net enrolment ratio  82.4 79.8 
Adult Literacy Rate 91.4 83.18 
 





1.3.1 Education levels 
 
Four stages characterise the Iranian education system: primary, lower secondary, upper 
secondary/high school, and higher education. In the proceeding sections, we will examine each 
level in detail. We should note that since 2014, there have been some organisational changes in 
Iran’s educational system. According to the new structure, the elementary cycle is extended to 6 
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years (instead of 5 years), lengthening basic education to a total of 9 years. Consequently, the new 
educational structure has one year less in high school (WENR, 2017). However, the cohorts this 
thesis observes studied under the previous educational system, and we hence focus in this section 
on the old structure.  
1.3.1.1 Basic education 
 
According to the old educational structure, the basic education cycle lasted eight years, and 
it is complimentary until this grade. It was divided into a five-year elementary education cycle and 
a three-year lower secondary cycle. The primary level involves 24 to 31 teaching hours per week. 
The curriculum in these two levels covers Islamic studies, Persian studies (including reading, writing 
and comprehension), social studies, mathematics, and science. These subjects are uniform for all 
schools. Provincial authorities conduct national exams at the end of each level, and if students fail, 
they will have a second chance to repeat the exam. However, if they fail twice, they need to repeat 
the whole year. Depending on the grades achieved in the relevant subjects at the end of grade 8, 
students are eligible to continue their education in the academic or vocational/technical branches 
of the secondary cycle (Iranian Education Ministry, 2017).  
There are some drawbacks to Iran’s basic education system, which were recognised by the 
Iranian Education Ministry. For instance, one of the most recent reports by the Iranian Education 
Ministry (2014) highlights the pressing need to improve enrolment rates in basic levels, especially 
in rural areas. According to this report, students in rural areas still do not have equal access to 
primary education with a remaining 2% discrepancy in favour of boys. Furthermore, the report 
stresses that in rural areas, large portions of this age cohort enrol with delays. Finally, the report 
warns of a high number of school dropouts at this level (approximately 6%), especially in rural 
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areas. It then claims that many of these students might turn into working children; while ‘the 
statistical systems for the identification and screening of out-of-school children are not fully 
operational either’ (Iranian Education Ministry, 2014.p12). 
1.3.1.2 Upper secondary 
 
Upper secondary education lasts three years (grades 10 to 12) for students aged 15 to 17, 
and is not mandatory. This level requires students to complete between 90 to 96 credits, and 
students undertake 30-32 teaching hours per week. There are three types of schools at the high 
school level: academic, technical, and vocational. Students in the academic branch follow one of 
four streams in the third year of upper secondary: humanities and literature, mathematics and 
physics, experimental sciences, or Islamic theology. On the other hand, technical and vocational 
schools prepare students to enter the job market in trade, agricultural, and industrial professions. 
Students in the technical stream follow one of three specialisations: technical (industry), business 
and vocational (service industry), or agriculture (Arani, 2012). 
 At the end of the third year, there is a national exam, and students who successfully 
complete this level will obtain a high school diploma (equivalent to a GCSE Level in the UK) and the 
right to attend a pre-university year, and take Konkur, which is a national entrance exam for public 
universities(Iranian Education Ministry, 2014). It is very competitive, and only around 10% of those 
who take the exam are admitted into public universities. The competitive nature of the Konkur has 
been criticised by many scholars of education economics in Iran and politicians (Kamyab, 2015). 
Another national examination is conducted on the day following Konkur for students with lower 
chances of getting into public universities, who choose to apply to private universities. These 
private universities charge a tuition fee, and thus admission is not as competitive as that for public 
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universities (Kamyab, 2008). Table 1.3 provides information on the educational structure of Iran 
and different stages of this system. 
Table 1.3: Structure of the education system for Iran 
 
Level of Schooling Ages Grades Number of 
Years 
Number of Sessions per 
Week 
Primary  7–11 1–5 5 years 25 (45 minutes each) 
Lower Secondary  12–14 
 
7–9 3 years 30 (50 minutes each) 
Upper Secondary 15–18 10–12 4 years1 35 (50 minutes each) 
Vocational 15–18 10–12 4 years2 40 (50 minutes each) 
 







1.3.1.3 Higher education 
 
Following the Islamic Revolution, all universities were closed between 1980 and 1983, 
during which the curriculum was revised. Upon reopening, all universities became nationalized, as 
the new Islamist government held an unfavourable view of private education. It was nearly ten 
                                                           
1Please note that this table represents the new Iranian educational system, while in the thesis(as explained in section 





years after the revolution, once the reformist government came to power and placed pressure on 
the higher education sector, when private universities reopened (WENR, 2017). 
Apart from the public universities, another semi-public university, called the Iranian Azad 
University (IAU), was also allowed to operate. IAU was managed by trusted government officials 
and was established in 1981. This semi-public university, which is financed by students’ tuition fees, 
has expanded dramatically since its establishment. It currently has 350 campuses across Iran, as 
well as international branches in Dubai, Lebanon, Oxford, Afghanistan, Tanzania, and Armenia. 
However, all courses at the IAU must be approved by the Supreme Council of the Cultural 
Revolution and recognized by the Ministry of Science, Research and Technology (Habibi, 2016). 
Figure 1.4 presents the growth of private universities in Iran over time. As the figure shows, though 
there were once many more public universities, currently, private university campuses outnumber 
public campuses across Iran. This figure also reveals a sharp increase in the overall number of 








      Source: Habibi, 2016 
1.3.2 Organisations Responsible for Education 
 
As the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) put it rightly, ‘the 
education system in Iran is a social and cultural institution that serves as the most important 
organisation for the edification, dissemination, and transfer of culture in Iranian society, helping 
students to lay appropriate foundations and develop appropriate values’ (TIMSS, 2015). Hence, it 
is not surprising that all private and public schools must conform to the Ministry of Education’s 
regulations. However, there are public and private schools at all levels, from elementary school 
through university: approximately 7% of primary schools, 10% of lower secondary schools, 18% of 
upper secondary schools, and 18% of technical and vocational institutions are private(Habibi,2016). 
Under the Iranian system, different ministries are responsible for education. For instance, 















teacher training programmes. The Ministry of Education itself is composed of several deputy 
ministries, organisations, and centres with specific administrative responsibilities, including 
developing goals and strategies, conducting and supervising educational activities, developing 
curricula and textbooks, publishing and distributing educational materials, planning and 
conducting professional development for teachers, teacher education, carrying out student 
assessment and examinations, and defining human resource policies within the ministry. 
Furthermore, The Technical and Vocational Training Organization (TVTO) is in charge of vocational 
education, while The Ministry of Science, Research and Technology is responsible for all levels of 
tertiary education. The only exception within university education is the medical education, which 
falls within the remit of the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Education (nuffic, 2010). 
1.3.3 Current and recent educational policies 
 
Since the 1979 revolution, a variety of policies were incorporated in the five-year national 
development plans to moderate the circumstances of implementing educational programs. Table 
1.4 summarises this development policy for the education sector, specifically mentioning the three 
most recent plans. As we can observe in Table 1.4, eliminating regional disparities and gender 
inequality in education have been part of objectives of all Iranian governments since 2000. The 
persistence of regional and gender inequalities in Iran highlight the importance of differentiating 
between urban and rural inequalities, and gender differences in any study of education in Iran, 
which we have tried to accomplish in this thesis.  
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and construction of schools in 
different regions 
 
Mobilizing financial resources 
in addition to state budget  
 
Improving gender equality  
Regional development and 
eliminating disparity  
 
Renovation, resilience, and 
standardization of schools  
 
Adopting legislation for 
recruiting and preserving 
teachers in less developed 
regions  
 
Extending boarding schools  
 
Developing remote and 
media learning  
 
Developing educational and 
sport spaces  
 
improving gender equality in 
educational attainment and 
eliminating girl’s drop outs in 
schools 
Regional development and 






education in humanities  
 
Adjusting the majors of 
secondary education with respect 
to social needs  
 
Teaching at least one skill to 
secondary school students  
 
promoting students’ physical and 
psychological health  
 
Eliminating the factors  
causing failure at school 




Source: Iranian Ministry of Education, 2014 
 
 
1.3.4 Critics of the Iranian education system 
 
Many researchers have criticised the current Iranian educational system for being too 
‘credentialist’ (such as Salehi-Isfahani, 2012; Assad, 2013; Babaie, 2011). Salehi-Isfahani (2012) 
argued, ‘like the rest of the Middle East, Iran has a test-based education system, which limits the 
set of skills that individuals are encouraged to learn’ (Salehi-Isfahani, 2012, p.12). Assad (2013) 
examines Iranian students’ poor results in the TIMSS (Trends in Mathematics and Science Studies) 
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exam, where only 1% of Iranian 4th graders and 2% of 8th graders scored above the ‘high 
international benchmark for mathematics’. Referring to these results, he then points out that 
‘Iran’s [educational] system disproportionately rewards the ability to absorb and retain a lot of 
information at the expense of creativity’ (Assad, 2013, p. 32). Safi (2000) also studies students who 
participated in the TIMSS test, and paid special attention to their family background. He finds that 
about one-third of the inequality in the maths and science scores of Iranian 8th graders could be 
explained by their family background and where they were raised. He then concludes that ‘Iran’s 
free and meritocratic public education system has failed to provide a level playing field for its youth’ 
(Safi, 2000, p.12). 
Babaie (2011) sought to explain the high demand for higher education in Iran. He explains 
that this is due to a type of reward that university graduates receive, that is, ‘escaping low-wage 
work’, arguing that due to the low quality of higher education in Iran, ‘more education will not 
mean greater productivity for most youth, but simply an escape from working at a lower wage than 
they are comfortable with’. He argues that ‘this is well-known to afflict oil-rich countries; the 
downside of a rent-based economy that supports a high standard of living above what national 
productivity can achieve’ (Babaie, 2010, p.31). 
Peivandi (2012) criticises Iranian educational institutions for ‘becoming a place of political 
and ideological propaganda’. He supports his argument by presenting the first legislation 
conducted by the Islamic government in 1987 regarding the objectives of education in Iran. He 
argues that this legislation outlines 14 main objectives for the Iranian education system, of which 
nine directly address religious, ideological, ethical, and political issues. These objectives include 
‘encouraging moral virtues and respect for religious traditions, promoting the purification of the 
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spirit, understanding and learning the Koran, understanding Islamic culture, understanding moral 
and religious values, reinforcing the belief in God, developing religious obedience, and 
understanding the obligation of religious practices’ (Peivandi, 2012, p.4). 
Iravani (2011) points to important disparities that still exist both in terms of gender 
disparities and in urban and rural inequalities in the Iranian education system. He points out that 
while literacy rates improved considerably in both rural and urban areas, the former still lags the 
latter, and both individual and family literacy rates are higher in urban areas. Furthermore, the 
literature contains some evidence of gender bias differences between urban and rural areas at 
lower educational levels. For instance, male literacy rates are still higher than female literacy rates 
are, while this difference is close to zero in urban areas. There are still considerable disparities 
between male and female literacy, as well as major discrepancies between the types of female 
education offered. He then concludes that the Iranian government should pay particular attention 
to rural areas in education policymaking. Finally, a field research was conducted jointly by the 
Ministry of Education, and UNICEF (2016) in areas of Tehran to examinethe gender gap in 
education. This research proposed that the most frequently stated issues for girls schooling drop-
outs were as follows: cultural factors (traditional thinking regarding the uselessness of education 
for girls; prioritizing the education of boys over girls); economic factors (financial poverty; mothers’ 
need for the help of girls in housework; the family’s need for the economic, income-generating 
activities of girls); and educational factors (absence of female teachers; co-educational schools). 
1.4 Labour market characteristics of Iran 
 
In the last sections, we discussed the dramatic educational expansion started between 1976 
to 1991 in Iran, which happened in response to the striking increase in Iran’s population. Years 
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later, these birth cohorts gradually entered the Iranian labour market, which recently confronted 
the Iranian government with enormous problems of unemployment and job creation, which 
shaped the characteristics of the Iranian labour market. In this section, we examine these unique 
features of the Iranian labour market, such as high unemployment among the youth and university 
graduates, and low female participation in the labour market. We will also examine current Iranian 
labour market policies such as minimum wage, working hours, laws regarding small-sized firms, 
temporary contracts, child labour, and Gozinesh.  
1.4.1 Youth labour force participation 
 
One of the most important features of the Iranian labour market is the low youth 
participation, especially for women. As Figure 1.5 shows, in 1976, nearly 45% of youth participated 
in the labour force (74% for men and 16.6% for women); this ratio fell to 37% in 2011, with 61% 
for men and 13% for women. Furthermore, we can observe that young women’s participation 
declined over the last four decades. There are a few explanations for this decline; the most relevant 
might be that the youth not participating in the labour market were mainly pursuing school and 



















Various researchers (such as Salehi-Isfahani and Egel, 2007) advised that creating enough 
jobs for the educated youth is going to be the most important challenge faced by the Iranian 
government since the revolution. According to the latest report by the Iranian census in 2016, the 
unemployment rate for young men was 22.1% and 40.6% for women, while unemployment among 
urban and rural youth are 27% and 18%, respectively. This report claims that in the coming years, 
on average, 1.2 million young people will join the labour market each year, while only 300,000 
retire annually.  
A report conducted by the ILO (2005) blamed existing Iranian labour laws such as those that 






























costs by offering young workers contracts of less than a year in duration’ for high unemployment 
among the educated youth. This report suggests that Iran’s formal labour market has preferences 
for older and already employed workers. This study points to the high duration of unemployment 
after graduation for youth as a major obstacle, where on average, male graduates wait 1.25 years 
to find a job, and this duration is even higher (3 years) for recent female university graduates. This 
survey also revealed the extent of labour market segmentation for youth and adults; adult jobs 
tend to be permanent with low turnover, while youth jobs are often temporary, with youth 
switching frequently between the formal and informal sectors. 
1.4.3 University graduate unemployment 
 
Another feature of the Iranian labour market is the high unemployment rate among its university 
graduates. Figure 1.6 presents the unemployment levels for individuals with certificates at different 
levels. The figure shows that male university graduates have the highest unemployment rates, 
29.4%, compared to those at other educational levels. Women with a high school diploma have the 
highest unemployment rate of 49.8%, followed closely by university graduates (48%).  
Figure 1.6: Youth Unemployment Rate by Level of Education (%), 2016 
 


























Gender disparity is a significant characteristic of the Iranian labour market, which is evident 
in the low labour force participation rate among women and higher levels of unemployment for 
women than among men. As we can observe from Figure 1.7, women’s labour force participation 
is only approximately 17%, despite the fact that women comprise over 50% of university graduates. 
As the result of high gender disparities, the Global Gender Gap report (2015), produced by the 
World Economic Forum, ranks Iran among the bottom five countries (141 out of 145) for gender 
equality, including equality in economic participation. 
On the other hand, according to the latest World Bank indicators, the unemployment rate 
among women is approximately 19%, which is twice the figure for men (around 11%). Darvishpour 
(2015) suggests that gender discrimination, the patriarchal structure of families, and the state’s 
anti-women’s rights ideology have kept female employment rates low in Iran since the 1979 
Revolution. 
Figure 1.7: Labour Force Participation Rate (%) 
 
 































Although there is no formal analysis of over-education in Iran, several government officials 
have expressed concerns about the excess supply of college graduates to media. Nemati (2011) 
uses the 2007 unemployment rate statistics to show that the unemployment rate among college 
graduates with two- and four-year degrees is higher than that for high school graduates. In 
2012,Research Centre of Parliament, warned that according to the long-term educational plans, 
only 37% of students in tertiary education must study four-year degrees (and the rest must take 
two-year degrees), but 64% are studying at this level. At the same time, the percentage of college 
students in two-year degrees is below the optimal level, and the result will be an excess supply of 
university graduates with four-year degrees.  
 In a more analytical study, Saidi-Rezvani et al. (2007) track the labour market performance 
of a sample of university graduates with degrees in education and psychology. Their interview 
responses reveal that only 64% of these college graduates were employed and nearly all of the 
employed graduates were working for government agencies. Other studies track the job 
performance of university graduates in other fields. Mohamadzadeh (2006) finds that nearly 40% 
of university graduates in agriculture-related fields were unemployed, while another 32% were 
working part-time. In another study, Salehi-Omran (2006) finds that only 57% of the female 
graduates of Mazandaran University (a university in Northern Iran) were working, while the rest 
were unable to find unemployment. The study also finds that 62% of those with a job were 
government employees. Furthermore, only 3% of the employed females in this survey reported 
that their college education was relevant to the tasks they were performing.  
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1.4.5 Current and recent Iranian labour market policies 
 
1.4.5.1 Minimum wage 
According to Iranian Labour law, the minimum wage is regulated based on inflation and is 
determined by the Supreme Labour Council. However, employees may also be entitled to 
additional minimum allowances if they are married and have children. ‘In addition, the 
determination of the minimum wage varies at the national or regional level and in terms of socio-
economic sectors and its sub-sectors’ (Abadi, 2015, p.13). Currently, the national minimum daily 
wage for 2017 is approximately 237,475 Rials (US$ 7.56) (Iranian Census, 2016). However, trade 
union activists reportedly express dissatisfaction with this minimum wage, and argue that it does 
not match the country’s inflation rate, which is currently above 30 per cent (Abadi, 2015).  
1.4.5.2 Working hours 
 
According to Iranian Labour law (Article 51) working hours should not exceed 8 hours daily. 
Employees in Tehran typically work Saturday to Wednesday, with Thursday and Friday off for the 
weekend. In more rural areas, employees commonly work Saturday to Wednesday and a half day 
on Thursday. However, this article states that with an agreement between the employer and 
workers, the employer can increase work hours on some days, as long as the workweek does not 
exceed 44 hours. For those in hard and harmful professions, working hours should not exceed 6 
hours a day and 36 hours per week. However, if the worker agrees to extra working hours, then he 
or she is entitled to receive a 40% extra wage. In addition, employees are entitled to a minimum of 
one calendar month’s paid annual leave and can carry forward nine days of annual leave from one 
year to the next. Female employees are entitled to 270 calendar days of maternity leave. Finally, 
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employees are entitled to take one month’s unpaid leave to perform their religious pilgrimage once 
during the course of their employment (Abadi, 2015, p.13). 
1.4.5.3 Exclusion of establishments with less than 10 employees 
 
Under the Labour law (Article 191), establishments of less than 10 employees, which 
currently employ about half of Iran’s wage and salary workers, are excluded from some of the 
Labour law provisions, such as:  
1. Exemption from paying the employee on the grounds of employment contract 
termination, total disability, retirement, or a decrease in the employee’s physical or mental ability; 
2. Exemption from provision and enforcement of the Occupation Evaluation and 
Classification System; 
3. Labour law provisions regarding periodic work, leave, and holidays; and 
4. Exemption from provisions regarding welfare facilities. 
As Salehi-Isfahani (2008) points out ‘This exclusion aims to give smaller firms more freedom 
to set their compensation and personnel policies. This is particularly effective when viewed from 
the youth perspective because small firms are the most likely to hire young, first-time job seekers. 
Exemption from the Labour law also enables smaller informal firms to become formal, which would 
help youth treat jobs in these firms more seriously as places to gain work experience and display 
skills that formal education does not provide’(Saleh-Isfahani, 2008, p.69). However, there are also 
concerns regarding this law, because these small firms constitute one third of the Iranian economy 
and are the main employer of the youth. At the same time, since there is no authority on these 




1.4.5.4 Child labour 
 
Iranian Labour law (Article 79) prohibits children to work under the age of 15; notably, Iran 
has not ratified the ILO’s ‘fundamental’ Convention on Minimum Age. However, children between 
the ages of 15 and 18 are limited to working one half hour less than ‘normal working hours’. While 
the Labour Code establishes that children under the age of 18 should not perform hazardous work, 
it does not define what constitutes such conditions; rather, the determination is left to the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs (Harper, 2013). 
1.4.5.4 Gozinesh 
 
The Gozinesh Process is a means to screen individuals upon their application to public 
sector employment.  It requires individuals to assert loyalty to the government, Islam and the 
principle of Velayat-e Faqih (Islamic Jurist)(Harper, et al. 2014).The central law that governs the 
Gozinesh process is the 1995 Selection Law based on Religious and Ethical Standards (‘1995 Law’). 
It guides a full analysis of the individual’s beliefs, previous political opinions, affiliations and 
repentance of any former political opinions are researched. It consists of criteria including, but not 
limited to: 
1. Belief in Islam or one of the official religions set out in the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran; 
2. Practical engagement in the laws of Islam; 
3. Belief and engagement in the Velayat-e Faqih; the state order of the Islamic Republic and 
the constitution; 
 4. Low moral corruption as well as any tendencies towards sin; 
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5. Cleared of any record of membership or support of parties, organisations and groups 
declared illegal 
One could argue that the Gozinesh Process serves as a final layer of analysis but also barrier 
to state employment, and there is the concern that it breaches the international human rights law 
related to the right to work for everyone (Harper, 2013).  
1.5 Summary 
 
In summary, this thesis focuses on factors determining investment in human capital, such 
as determinants of parental educational expenditure, returns on education, and job-mismatches 
in Iran. We also investigate the effects of urban/rural differences and gender variations. 
The main objectives of this thesis are: 
 To identify the determinants of parental educational expenses on children; 
 To examine returns on education in terms of wages; 
 To examine the determinants of over- and under-employment; and 
 To identify the impact of urban/rural and gender differences on each topic above. 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides a brief outline of educational theories, 
including the human capital model and the theory of signalling and screening. In Chapter 3, we 
review some of the existing literature on educational attainment. Chapter 4 examines the 
determinants of parental educational expenditure, with reference to urban/rural and gender 
differences. In Chapter 5, we explore both naïve and causal effects of education on wages. Chapter 
6 examines the determinants of over/under employment in Iran for urban and rural areas and for 
men and women. Chapter 7 concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research. 
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This thesis examines the various factors that affect the decision to invest in human capital 
in Iran. Specifically, we examine the determinants of parental educational expenditure, returns on 
education in terms of wages, and determinants of under/over employment in Iran. Becker (1964) 
introduced the idea of human capital and the theoretical framework that encompasses such 
choices. The human capital model regards education as an investment good and offers a theoretical 
explanation for why some individuals may decide to invest in their own or their families’ education. 
The following sections provide more detailed discussions of the theory of human capital theory. 
First, we examine human capital theory. Then, we explore how human capital theory justifies 
household investment in education, as this is related to Chapter 4, in which we explore the 
determinants of parental educational expenditure on children. Afterwards, we explore human 
capital theory in relation to returns on education and the Mincerian function. This sets the 
theoretical background for Chapter 5. We also examine human capital theory and its examination 
of job mismatch in the labour market, which is related to Chapter 6. Finally, we discuss the theory 
of signalling and screening as an alternative to human capital theory.  
2.2 Human capital 
 
Mincer (1974), Schultz (1961), and Becker (1964) developed the human capital model, 
which introduces the concept that individuals (parents) may invest in themselves (dependents) via 
education, training, medical treatment, and so on. Such investments can be seen as analogous to 
investing in physical means of production such as factories and machinery. Therefore, education 
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can be regarded as an investment good where individuals invest more in education when their 
discounted marginal return from doing so is positive. At the margin, the cost of investing in more 
education must not exceed the return. In its simplest form, this can be written as: 
𝐶 = ∫ 𝑅𝑖
𝑇
𝑡
𝑒−𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖                                      (2.1) 
where 𝐶 is the cost of the marginal unit of education 
𝑇 is the time horizon 
𝑡 is the end of the education period 
𝑅𝑖 is the period i return from the marginal unit of education 
𝑖 is the discount rate 
The implication of equation (1) is that when the discounted marginal cost of education is 
equal to the discounted marginal benefit of education, the accumulation of further education will 
discontinue. That is, education is chosen to maximize the expected present value of the stream of 
future incomes until retirement, net of the costs of education, such that at its optimum, the present 
value of the 𝑖th year of schooling equals the cost of the 𝑖th year of education. The costs of investing 
in more education have direct costs such as tuition fees, books, and materials; and indirect costs, 
namely, the opportunity cost of foregone earnings. Lower costs, higher returns, and lower interest 
rates will lead to additional investment in education, ceteris paribus. Note that the estimates of 
the costs and benefits are made on an individual basis, implying that the rate of return from an 
additional unit of education is subjective. The human capital model thus formalizes the decision of 
individuals to continue or discontinue education. Individuals perceive the expected return of 
additional schooling as less than the associated costs. One can model such a process through a 
binary choice model, where those continuing education perceive that the returns on education 
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outweigh the costs, and those discontinuing education consider the costs to outweigh the benefits. 
A logical point for such an analysis would be after the age of 16 at the end of compulsory education, 
and possibly after the age of 18, before entrance into higher education. 
Figure 2.1 shows two hypothetical age-earnings profiles: go to work or continue studying 
for at least one extra year (for example, going to college). If one decides to work, they will earn $G 
initially, and then over their life-cycle, their earnings rise to profile Y (high school). On the other 
hand, acquiring an extra year of schooling means that one would have zero earnings in the first 
year, plus the direct costs of schooling (tuition fees, books, etc.), which results in negative earnings 
of -$C. However, this individual’s earnings profile Y (college) would result after he or she enters the 
labour market. In other words, obtaining one extra year of schooling enhances future earnings by 
the vertical distance between OA and OB, yet has a direct cost depicted by the two areas composed 
of the direct outlay (area DEFC), and indirect opportunity cost (area GFEO). 
 
Figure 2.1: Stylized age-earning profile 
 
                       Source: Polachek, 1993 
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Human capital theory, and its underlying assumption that education increases productivity, 
can have important implications for all three empirical chapters of this thesis. The theory predicts 
that the more educated, and therefore the more productive, individuals receive higher wages, 
better employment status, and less mismatch in the jobs they have. Hence, parents, individuals, 
and government have an incentive to invest in education; for example, universal primary education 
is often considered one of the more important United Nations Millennium Development Goals for 
this very reason. 
Human capital theory is related to Chapter 4, where we discuss the determinants of 
parents’ educational expenditure on children. This is because according to human capital theory, 
parents, as rational individuals, are aware of the impact of educational attainment on their 
children, namely, higher productivity. Hence, this provides them with an incentive to invest in their 
children, especially if their later life may partly depend on their children’s economic prosperity. 
Human capital theory is also directly related to Chapter 5, in which we examine the wage returns 
on education. If we find that more educated individuals earn more money, then according to 
human capital theory, this higher wage is due to individuals’ higher productivity in the labour 
market. The varying rates of return on this investment can be an important ‘diagnostic’ tool for 
developing countries and an important determinant of where to allocate limited resources. Finally, 
human capital theory is also related to Chapter 6; according to human capital theory, more 
educated individuals are more productive, and hence find better matches in the labour market. 
The extent of this mismatch can be an important piece of information in active labour market 
policies and to help reduce hidden underemployment or overemployment. In the next sections, 
32 
 
we provide more detailed analysis of human capital theory with household investment and job 
mismatch in the labour market. 
2.3 Human capital and household investment in children 
 
So far, we assumed that individuals are investing in their own general education, while it is 
usually parents who invest in their children. The importance of family background such as parents’ 
wealth or parents’ education has been the subject of human capital theory for a long time. The 
basic Becker-Tomas (1986) model was one of the first advocates of the human capital theory that 
stressed the importance of parent’s role in increasing children’s human capital. Figure 2.2 describes 
this theory graphically and presents parent’s3 utility curves with respect to his/her consumption 
and the child’s consumption. This model assumes that the parent is an altruist, meaning that he or 
she values the child’s consumption and makes income transfers to the child. However, these 
transfers also depend on the child’s own earnings. 
Figure 2.2: Transfers within the Family 
 
 
               Source: Polachek, 1993 
                                                           
3For simplicity, we present only one parent. 
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The family budget constraint, F, which appears as a -45 degree slope in Figure 2.2, is the 
sum of the child’s earnings 𝐸𝑡+1, and the parent’s earnings, 𝐸𝑡: 
𝐹 = 𝐸𝑡+1,+𝐸𝑡                                                                                          ( 2.2) 
The child’s consumption, 𝐶𝑡+1 is his/her income plus transfes from parents  
𝐶𝑡+1 = 𝐸𝑡+1,+ 𝑇(2.3) 
Furthermore, parental consumption, which is the same -45 degree sloped line, equals 
his/her income minus transfers to the child, 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡,- 𝑇, which can be written as: 
𝐹 = 𝐶𝑡+1,+𝐶𝑡(2.4) 
Note that the parent’s consumption line in Figure 2.2 moves up and down by varying 
transfers 𝑇. For example, if we start from point 𝐸, with the given indifference curve, the parent will 
transfer 𝑇, and will move to point 𝐴.  
Various interesting aspects of intergenerational transfers can be examined in this model; 
first, a more able child will receive fewer transfers from his/her parents, because the parents will 
expect the child to earn more at later stages. Second, if parental income rises, their transfers to the 
child will also rise, but at a diminishing rate, suggesting that the proportion of total income 
allocated diminishes. Third, while richer parents will make higher rates of transfers to their child, 
the importance of such transfers in the form of educational expenditure is lower for richer families. 
Once the rate of return on the child’s human capital has reached the rate of return on physical 
capital, the parent will make further transfers in the form of physical capital. This suggests a limit 
to unequal educational attainment, and hence a limit to earnings inequality.  
Chapter 4 explores the determinants of parental investment in education in the context of 
human capital theory. It will focus on factors that determine how much parents transfer to their 
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children, with a comparison of urban and rural households. We have no proxy for ‘child’s ability’ to 
observe whether parents will spend less on educational expenses on a more able child. However, 
we can examine other implications of this theory by observing whether richer parents spend more 
on their children’s education, and whether this relationship is linear, or, as the theory suggests, it 
is at a diminishing rate. Furthermore, by observing the proportion of educational expenditure, we 
will also be able to compare the share of educational expenditures of families with different 
incomes. 
2.4 Human capital and returns on education 
 
Human capital theory provides a standard way to estimate returns on education via a 
Mincerian earning equation. The Mincer equation (1974) explains wage income as a function of 
schooling and experience. The equation is recognised as the foundation for studies of education 
economics and is ‘one of the most widely used models in empirical economics’ (Lemieux, 2006, 
p.130). According to Heckman et al. (2003), Mincer’s equation estimates two separate economic 
concepts. First, it estimates how the labour market rewards productive attributes like schooling 
and work experience, which characterise it as a ‘pricing equation’. Second, it estimates the rate of 
return on schooling, which we can compare with the interest rate to determine the efficiency of 
investment in human capital.  
The Mincer (1974) method in its simplest form can be represented as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝜒 + 𝛽3𝜒
2 + 𝛽4𝛧 + 𝜀(2.5) 
 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 is the log wage at time 𝑡, 𝑆 is years of schooling, 𝜒 denotes years of labour 
market experience, and Ζ is a vector of other miscellaneous observed variables. 𝜒 is quadratic to 
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allow for any possible decline in post-school human capital formation. Here, 𝛽1 is the marginal 
effect of schooling in percentage on log wages.  
Chapter 5 explores the returns on education in terms of wages by employing the Mincer 
function above. Specifically, we compare returns on education in urban and rural areas, and 
between men and women. 
2.5 Human capital and job mismatch 
 
Regarding job mismatch, human capital theory suggests that although there can be a job 
mismatch in the short term (Green et al., 2006), eventually, a natural equilibrium will be reached. 
The theory proposes that in the long term, the employer will make the necessary adjustments in 
order to make full use of the skills available; alternatively, the employee will seek a more 
appropriate match to achieve his/her production potential and hence maximize earnings (Ramos, 
2016). 
Kalleberg (2007) advocates that labour markets usually operate inefficiently; thus, the 
matching of persons to jobs may result in matches that are unsatisfactory from the point of view 
of workers, employers, or both. In this regard, human capital theory has been criticized for failing 
to explain rigidities (such as under/over employment) in the labour market (Carnoy, 1994). These 
inefficiencies may be caused by limited information about the choices available; geography, or the 
inability to access the job location’s, being unable to go to where the jobs are; supply and demand 
mismatch; and qualifications or skill level mismatch (Kalleberg, 2007). Desjardins and Rubenson 
(2011) refer to this as search theory and suggest that the mismatch exists due to imperfect 
information available to employees about the nature of the job, and to employers regarding 
employees’ actual skills (Desjardins and Rubenson, 2011). Another alternative theory to the human 
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capital model is job competition theory, which focuses on the supply side in the labour market. 
This theory highlights the institutional rigidities in which marginal products, and consequently 
earnings, are associated with job characteristics and not with individual characteristics (Thurow, 
1975). Jobs are allocated based on the available supplies of workers and jobs; workers may possess 
more education and skills than their jobs necessitate. In the extreme, education simply serves as a 
means to obtain the job, and there is a zero return on human capital beyond that required to do 
the job, as all workers in a given job are paid the same wage. Another alternative model that tries 
to explain such rigidities in the labour market is Sattinger’s (1993) assignment theory, which asserts 
that there is an allocation problem in assigning heterogeneous workers to jobs that differ in 
complexity. The frequency distributions on the demand and supply side are unlikely to match, and 
education mismatches may be a persistent problem if the job structure is relatively unresponsive 
to changes in the relative supplies of educated labour. 
The alternative theories discussed in this section can have important implications for our 
thesis. Most of these theories confirm the existence of market rigidities as the main explanation 
for job mismatches in the labour market. Such rigidities are even more prevalent in developing 
countries, where access to perfect information is not possible. Lack of high quality data, lower 
technological access, and inconsistent research are only a few possible explanations for such 
inconsistencies. Job competition theory is also relevant to our area of research, where institutional 
rigidities in the supply side of the labour market still exist. As mentioned in the previous section, 
an ILO study blamed existing rigidities in Iranian labour market laws (such as those that protect 
jobs for older workers but allow employers to offer young workers contracts of less than a year in 
duration) for job mismatches in this market. Chapter 6 aims to make a contribution to this literature 
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by investigating the extent, and determinants, of job mismatches in Iran with a specific focus on 
over- and under-employment.  
2.6 Signalling and screening 
Signalling theory is an alternative theory of how people make decisions about how much to 
invest in education (Spence, 1973; Arrow, 1973; Stiglitz, 1975). Whereas human capital theory is 
based on the idea that education raises a worker’s productivity, signalling is based on the idea that 
employers cannot directly observe a worker’s ability and instead use their education as a signal to 
determine who will be a productive worker. We can assume that the cost of achieving high levels 
of education is lower for more able or high-productivity individuals, for example, because they will 
not have to spend as much time studying. For this reason, high productivity workers will be willing 
to incur the costs of higher education and attain the qualification, which acts as a signal to 
employers and secures them a higher wage. Although low-productivity workers would also like to 
earn the higher wage, it is too costly for them to attain the university qualification. In this way, 
high-level education, such as university education, acts as an effective signal that help firms 
correctly distinguish between high and low productivity workers.  
This theory has important implications for this thesis (especially Chapter 5, in which we 
examine returns on education), and we should note that this theory might be more relevant to 
MENA countries, where the low productivity of education has been confirmed in studies about the 
social rate of return on education, with estimates close to zero (for example, Pritchett, 1999). If 
this were the case, then our results and estimates would still be valid, although there would be a 
shift in interpretation: they would not be viewed as effects arising from human capital formation 
via the school system, but rather as effects arising from innate skill and ability formation that occur 
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naturally and are independent of the school system. In such a case, educational success simply acts 
as a signal revealing underlying productivity differentials between groups of individuals. 
Nevertheless, ‘despite the low productivity of education, families and youth still believe in 
education as the main path to social and economic success and continue to invest heavily in 
schooling’ (Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2009, p.2). 
However, we should point out that observing which of these theories is ‘true’ is very 
complicated using empirical methods, as both have the same implications. Whilst various 
innovative ideas have been used to try to determine which theory is more accurate (e.g., see Tyler 
et al., 2000, which uses difference-in-difference methodology to ascertain the signalling effect of 
the GED), the evidence is still divided. In fact, it is likely that both explanations play a role; that is, 
that education increases worker’s productivity, and sends a signal about their ability level. There is 
a plethora of evidence regarding the human capital model and the ‘signalling and screening’ 
hypothesis. Support for the human capital model can be found aplenty in Psacharopolous (1985), 
Psacharopolous and Patrinos (2004), Ashenfelter and Kruger (1994), Card and Kruger (1992), Mitch 
(1984), Lorenz and Wagner (1993) and Johnes (1998), to mention a few. A number of studies found 
weak evidence supporting signalling and screening (Brown and Sessions, 2004; Shabbir, 2011).  
2.7 Summary 
 
Human capital theory has become a core theory within labour economics and has 
implications for many important empirical questions. As discussed above, it demonstrates the 
source of people’s motivation to invest in their own and their children’s education. The link 
between investment in education and later returns via higher wages was also explored in human 
capital theory. This theory postulates that individuals will invest in human capital to the point 
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where the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal return. This has important implications for an 
individual’s decisions about their investment in their own education, and affects parental decisions 
regarding investment in their children, and hence the transmission of earnings and wealth through 
generations. Determinants of investment in human capital have become an important theme in 

























The private and social benefits of education are not concealed from anyone. It is widely 
accepted in the literature that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to achieve 
economic success in terms of higher wages and a higher probability of employment (Becker, 1964). 
On the other hand, education has social benefits such as reduced crime and poverty rates, and 
social equality. Additionally, more educated individuals usually enjoy healthier life-styles, 
participate more in democratic and political processes, and care about environmental 
sustainability (Barro, 2001; Sen 1999). 
This thesis explores determinants of parental education expenditure, returns to education, 
and the determinants of job mismatch in Iran; with a particular focus on urban/rural distinctions 
and the extent to which the experiences of women [and men] differ between these regions. In this 
section, we provide a literature review in a wider context to embody these subjects. Nevertheless, 
each empirical chapter will provide a more specific literature review as well. Accordingly, this 
chapter discusses the existing literature on the determinants of human capital theory (in 
developed, developing, and MENA countries), the importance of regional (urban and rural) 
disparities, and significance of gender inequality in determining educational attainment. 
In the first section of this chapter, we present factors such as household and personal 
characteristics, schooling, and neighbourhood factors that affect educational attainment. 
Furthermore, we specifically dedicate a separate section to the determinants of educational 
attainment in developing and MENA countries because these countries differ in their socio‐
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economic status, school practices, teachers, students, cultures, and political systems from 
industrialized countries (Badr et al, 2012). At the end of this section, we conclude that according 
to the existing literature, parental background such as education and wealth are the most 
important determinants of children’s educational attainment. The underlying discussion and 
literature in this section is closely related to the next chapter of this thesis, where we discuss the 
determinants of parental educational expenditure in Iran. 
The second goal of this literature review is to evaluate the literature on the importance of 
regional inequality in education, specifically urban versus rural differences. We dedicate a separate 
section to this important factor because in all upcoming empirical chapters, we examine the 
impacts of urban and rural differences. For instance, in our first empirical chapter, we examine 
differences between the educational expenditures of urban and rural parents, while in the second 
empirical chapter, we focus on the differences in returns on education for individuals in urban and 
rural areas of Iran; in our final empirical chapter, we examine various determinants of job 
mismatches in urban and rural areas of Iran. Our goal is to emphasize the importance of regional 
inequalities in education and that any study of the determinants of education must examine both 
urban and rural differences to draw a full picture of any given country.   
Third, we review the literature on the importance of gender inequality in education. Again, 
we dedicate a separate section of our literature review to this important factor because one of the 
main goals of this thesis is to shed light on the gender differences in education in Iran, and in each 
empirical chapter that follows, we differentiate between men and women. In this section, we 
examine biological factors, family resources, returns on education, schooling characteristics, and 
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institutional factors as the main challenges in the existing literature in gender inequality in 
education. 
3.2 Determinants of Educational Attainment 
 
In this section, we examine determinants of educational attainment according to four main 
categories: parental/household inputs, personal characteristics, schooling, and neighbourhood 
effects. 
3.2.1 The effect of Household Characteristics 
 
The effects of family background on children’s educational attainment can be divided into 
four main categories: income, employment, parents’ educational status, and household structure.  
The importance of family income for children’s educational attainment was first supported 
by the human capital model (1964). This model argues that in the absence of perfect capital 
markets, individuals from wealthier households have lower marginal costs for educational 
attainment. In other words, lower resources imply higher opportunity costs associated with 
continued education, which in turn leads to early labour market entry and lower educational 
attainment. Thereafter, many studies (such as Brooks-Gunn et al., 1998; Gregg and Machin, 2000; 
and Acemoglu and Pishke, 2001) find similar results and argued that family income is one of the 
most important determinants of children’s educational attainment. For instance, Blanden et al. 
(2004) estimate the relationship between family income and educational attainment to be around 
one third of the raw correlation in the UK. Later on, Blanden et al. (2007) update their previous 
study and add that it is not easy to separate the influence of income from other aspects of family 
background, and argue that if ‘unobserved child or family heterogeneity is positively correlated 
with income, this will generate an upward bias in the relationship between income and child 
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educational attainment’ (Blanden et al., 2007, p19). On the other hand, Cameron and Heckman 
(2001) dispute the literature on the importance of family income for children’s educational 
attainment and argue that the literature exaggerates the importance of family income. Some 
economists agree with these arguments and find weak linkages between families’ financial 
constraints and educational attainment (for example, Cameron and Taber, 1999; Altonji and Dunn, 
1996). 
Linked to parental income is employment status, which can also affect children’s 
educational attainment. The evidence on the effect of parental employment on children’s 
educational attainment in the UK and US is rather mixed, and various researchers have studied the 
effects of employment from different aspects. For instance, Ermisch et al. (2000) suggest that a 
mother’s full-time employment has a negative impact on children’s educational attainment, while 
Joshi and Verropouloum (2000) find that if the mother works when the child is already a teenager, 
then there are positive effects due to the extra income and positive role modelling. Overall, most 
of the analyses suggest mixed and inconsistent results (Kiernan, 1997; Gregg and Machin, 2000; 
Harvey, 1999).  
However, probably the most important determinant of children’s educational attainment 
is their parents’ educational status (Haveman and Wolfe, 1995). The literature on the impact of 
parental education on children’s educational attainment is rather clear and consistent, and all of 
the existing literature confirms a positive relationship between the two. For instance, Haveman et 
al., (1991) investigate the effect of parents’ college graduation on children’s educational 
attainment in the US, and find a significant and positive relationship between both the mothers’ 
and fathers’ educational attainments and their children’s educational attainments. Chavalier 
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(2003) also support these results, and argue that maternal education is the most important 
determinant of children’s educational attainment. Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) argue that there 
is a positive relationship between parental education and their children’s educational attainment 
because parents who reach a certain educational level expect their children to reach at least the 
same level of education.  
Another household characteristic economists examine is family structure. Most of these 
studies (Hanushek, 1992; Ribar, 1993; Haveman et al., 1991) find that educational attainment 
decreases with family size. The implication is that as the number of siblings increase within a 
household, individual average attainment falls as limited ‘parenting time’ is allocated to more 
children. Parents’ marital status has also been studied as a determinant of children’s educational 
attainment. For example, McLanhan and Sandefur (1994) suggest that children who grow up in a 
single or step parent family have lower educational attainment compared to those who live with 
their biological parents. Bilbalarz and Raftery (1999) also find that children living with their 
biological parents achieve higher outcomes in terms of education and later occupation, even after 
controlling for mothers’ education and occupation. Ribar (1993), Astone and McLanahan (1991), 
Bogges (1998), and Ginther and Pollack (2004) provide similar results.  
3.2.2 The effect of Personal Characteristics 
 
Personal characteristics such as earlier educational attainment and ethnicity can also 
contribute to an individual’s educational attainment. 
Previous educational accomplishment is an imperative contributor to educational 
attainment. Robertson and Symons (2003) show that high test scores at age 7 to 11 are closely 
associated with high test scores at age 16. However, Currie and Thomas (1999) point out that 
45 
 
interaction between earlier exam performance and parents’ socio-economic status may exist, 
though this causes an endogeneity problem with children from higher socio-economic groups 
performing less well if they had better prior exam results than children from lower socio-economic 
groups.      
Another important personal characteristic that contributes to educational attainment is 
ethnicity. According to Bell (1997) immigrants in the UK have 1.1 more years of schooling compared 
to the indigenous population. Dolton et al., (1999) find similar results: Asian men have higher rates 
of educational attainment than men of white or other ethnic groups at the GCSE level. For the US, 
most studies (Manski et al., 1999; Sander and Krautman, 1995; Nguyen and Talor, 2003) find that 
black Americans are more likely to graduate from high school than whites are, and find the opposite 
for Hispanics. These findings are interesting because they demonstrate that in contrast to common 
perception, ethnic minorities obtain above-average educational attainment results (except Afro-
Caribbeans). These interesting results are generally not recognized in the literature due to the high 
socio-economic disparities that exist between white and other ethnic groups. In other words, the 
issue of ethnic minorities performing worse than their white counterparts is not a race issue but 
one of ethnic groups coming from poorer family backgrounds with fewer resources at their disposal 
(Buscha, 2007).  
3.2.3 The effect of Schooling 
 
School quality is one avenue that has attracted a lot of attention from researchers (for 
example, Behrman and Birdsall, 1983). Researchers use variables such as expenditure per pupil, 
class size, or institutional differences between private and public schools as a proxy for quality of 
schooling (Buscha, 2007). Feinstein and Symons (1999) find that grammar schools do notably better 
46 
 
compared to comprehensive schools. Dustman (2004) finds similar results, and points out that 
private schools do better than grammar schools in achieving high educational attainment rates. 
Dearden et al., (1997) and Dolton et al., (1997) report similar findings. A critical observation of 
these studies conducted in the UK is that few adequately address the issue of endogeneity of school 
choice (Buscha, 2007), hence there is need to investigate whether ‘pupils attending selective 
schools would perform on a similar level had they chosen to attend comprehensive schools’ 
(Buscha, 2007, p.57).  
Empirical analysis of the impact of class size on educational attainment is rather mixed. 
Experimental evidence of the STAR class-size experiment advocates that 'the internal rate of return from 
reducing class size from 22 to 15 students is around 6%'(Kruger, 2003,p.34). However, Hanushek and 
Kimko (2000) suggest that the effect of class size depends on the age and ability level of the class. 
Feinstein and Symons (1999) find a negative impact of class size on attainment, but their regression 
results are not significant in any of their models. On the other hand, Akerhielm (1995) finds small 
and positive effects of the pupil-teacher ratio. Studies of the impact of class size on educational 
attainment for the UK are more uniform and consistent. Most studies (Iacovou, 2002; Bradley et 
al., 2000) suggest that students in smaller classes outperform larger. In contrast, the literature on 
the effects of school size in the UK, suggests that larger schools can do better than smaller schools. 
According to these studies, smaller schools cannot compete on a cost effective scale with large 
schools that can raise more funds. These studies suggest that the deficiency of small schools could 
be explained by their financial challenges and tight budget rather than poor administrative running 




3.2.4 The effect of neighbourhood 
 
The earliest literature regarding the effects of neighbourhood on schooling was conducted 
by Wilson in 1987, and he proposed that the concentration of poverty in particular regions in the 
US has adverse effects on the educational development of these residents. Garner and 
Raudenbusch (1991) in Scotland find that a change from being in the 90th percentile of 
neighbourhood deprivation to a 10th percentile will result in higher attainment outcomes of about 
two O-level passes. For Australia, Jensen and Seltzer (2000) examined adverse effects of 
neighbourhood characteristics (such as the average income, the rate of unemployment, and the 
average educational attainment) on children’s schooling dropouts. Finally, Gibbons (2002) suggests 
that children raised in the same neighbourhood attain similar educational achievement, however, 
he argues that the effect of neighbourhood on educational attainment should not be exaggerated, 
as the estimates are much smaller than family background variables. 
3.3 Determinants of educational attainment in developing countries 
 
It is important to recognize that less-developed countries have very different socio-
economic conditions compared to more industrialised societies. As Buchmann et al. (2001) stress, 
‘these differences may include class structures that are less differentiated, educational systems 
that vary in the extent to which they have been institutionalized, and occupational structures that 
are shaped by low levels of economic development and a weak position in the world system’ 
(Buchman et al., 2001, p.78). They then suggest that research on developing countries is important 
as it can provide opportunities ‘for testing, refining, and extending theoretical perspectives that 
have emerged from research on industrialized countries’ (Buchman et al., 2001, p.80). We agree 
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with their argument, and hence provide a separate section of this chapter to review the literature 
on the determinants of educational attainment in developing countries. 
Heyneman and Jamison (1980) conducted one of the first studies on education in 
developing countries, in Uganda, and argue that family background is less important than school 
factors in determining academic achievement. Heyneman and Loxley (1983) re-examine Heyneman 
and Jamison’s (1980) findings for other developing countries and report similar results. They also 
point out that their research suggests that the effect of schooling and teacher quality become much 
larger for poorer countries (Heyneman and Loxley, 1983). More than a decade later, Baker et al. 
(1999) conduct the same OLS model as Heyneman and Loxley (1983), but also use hierarchical 
linear modelling procedures to observe whether large school effects still exist. Their research 
contradicts previous work by Heyneman and Loxley (1983) and suggests that family factors are 
more important predictors of educational achievement than school factors. However, they 
acknowledge that in very poor developing countries, the school effect is still very large. In the years 
following, many studies aimed to assess determinants of educational achievement in a wide range 
of developing countries. Some reports marked disparities in enrolment and attainment associated 
with socioeconomic status (Sathar and Lloyd, 1993 for Pakistan; Stash and Hannum, 2001 for Nepal; 
Hannum, 2000 for rural China; Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1996 for Bolivia and Guatemala), 
while others find that family income is the predominant determinant of schooling for children. For 
instance, Bacolod and Ranjan (2008) analyse the impact of poverty on educational attainment of 
children in the Philippines and ascertain that household wealth is the most important factor in 
determining whether a child goes to school or not. They then advocate that ‘while other factors—
including mother’s labour supply, the presence of a family business, and access to good school 
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quality—contribute to these decisions, household wealth is the most important determinants of 
child human capital attainment’ (Bacolod and Ranjan, 2008, p. 10). Suryadarma et al. (2010) 
investigate the causes of low secondary school enrolment in Indonesia using a longitudinal 
household survey dataset and find similar results. Drajea et al. (2014) find a significant relationship 
between parents’ income and the quality of support for their children’s education in rural Uganda. 
They employ a mixed-methods study with an ethnographic element, and argue that their findings 
confirm Feinstein et al.’s (2008) assertion that ‘the effect of income on children’s achievement can 
be an effect of prior parental education, which this study has shown has a mediated positive effect 
on children’s educational outcome overall’ (Drajea, 2014, p. 32). However, their qualitative 
approach included only 21 participants, so their findings cannot be generalized to every household 
in rural Uganda. For India, Jayachandran (2002) investigates the socio-economic determinants of 
school attendance by exploring boys and girls separately. He finds a positive and significant 
relationship between poverty and child school dropouts. Possibly the most comprehensive study 
on school attainment in developing countries was conducted by Filmer and Pritchett (1999), which 
includes 35 countries in Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. This study reveals 
substantial cross-country variation in the differences between median years of school obtained by 
students in the top 20% of the wealth distribution compared to those in the bottom 40%. Their 
results suggest that all countries in the study (except Kazakhstan) show a difference between rich 
and poor children’s attainment; the largest wealth gaps emerged in South Asian countries 
(Buchmann, and Hannum, 2001). 
Studies of the impact of parental education on children’s educational attainment in 
developing countries have the same opinion on the importance of this factor. For instance, 
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Behrman and Wolfe (1987) on Nicaragua, King and Bellew (1989) on Peru, and Birdial (1985) on 
Brazil, suggest a strong relationship between parental education and children’s schooling. 
Bahreman and Wolfe’s (1987) study also reveals that the maximum effect happens at the 8th or 9th 
year of education for parents, with diminishing returns on parent’s education thereafter. However, 
while Bahreman and Wolfe (1987) find that maternal education matters more than paternal 
education, King and Bellew (1989) propose the opposite argument for Peru. King and Bellew (1989) 
find that the effect of father’s education for sons is twice that of maternal education, while for 
daughters, both parents’ education has the same impact.  
On the other hand, there are mixed results for the effect of family size on children’s 
educational attainment in developing countries. For sub-Saharan Africa, Lloyd (1994) hypothesizes 
that the effect of family size differs between urban and rural areas; urban areas are more likely to 
show a negative relationship, while rural areas will show a positive one. Some studies investigate 
the influence of particular family structures on children’s schooling. For instance, Lloyd and Gage-
Brandon (1994) examine the impact of younger and older siblings on girls’ schooling compared to 
boys’ schooling for Ghana. They find that girls’ dropout rates were higher and educational 
attainment lower when they had younger siblings compared to boys who had younger siblings. 
Their findings suggest that older children’s household responsibilities, especially for girls in caring 
for younger children, may adversely affect their educational achievement. Fuller and Liang, (1999) 
analyse the effects of female headship on children’s schooling in seven sub-Saharan African 
countries using Demographic and Health data, and find that although female-headed households 
are poorer than other households, their children are more likely to be enrolled in school. They 
explain this by suggesting that ‘female household heads are more likely to invest resources, 
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including time, money and emotional support, in facilitating the education of children living in their 
household’ (Fuller and Liang, 1999).  
Buchmann, and Hannum (2001) review the literature on the impact of  school factors on 
educational attainment in developing countries, and suggest that some of these studies 
(Heyneman and Jamison, 1980; Heyneman and Loxley, 1983; Lockheed et al., 1986; Behrman and 
Birdsall, 1983) find that ‘basic material inputs such as textbooks, libraries, and teacher training 
strongly determine achievement while more expensive inputs such as science laboratories, 
increased teachers’ salaries, and reduced class sizes appear to have little effect’( Buchmann, and 
Hannum, 2001, p.86). They then conclude that, it seems that there is a concurrence among these 
studies that in countries with unequally distributed educational resources, basic material inputs 
are most important, while in countries with a minimum level of basic resources, the importance is 
less evident. However, there are some criticisms of the methodological approaches in school effect 
studies. As Buchman (2001) points out, ‘Indeed, one shortcoming of most studies of the impact of 
school effects versus family effects was their reliance on OLS regression analysis and the total 
variance in achievement (R2) to measure the impact of family and school effects on student 
achievement’ (Buchman, 2001, p. 88). In contrast to previous studies employing the production 
function approach, few studies (for example, Riddell, 1989 for Zimbabwe; Lockheed and Longford, 
1991 for Thailand) use multi-level models to examine school effects in developing countries. 
Interestingly, with this approach, they find greater effects of family background than school factors 
on educational achievement. In their analysis, Lockheed and Longford (1991) find that in Thailand, 
family’s socio-economic status explains 68% of students’ success in math scores, while school 
effects explain only 32%. Finally, when observing the impact of schooling factors on educational 
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attainment, it is important to evaluate ‘how schools impact achievement in developing countries 
(Buchmann, and Hannum, 2001, p.88). For instance, Lockheed and Komenan (1989) examine the 
effects of quality of teaching, while Fuller and Snyder (1991) examine class room dynamics such as 
classroom management and hours of instruction. Interestingly, all few mentioned studies above 
find out that these factors have significant impact on educational attainment. However, lack of 
high quality data regarding schooling has made it difficult for scholars to provide high quality 
school-based data (Buchmann, and Hannum, 2001). 
3.4 Regional inequality in education: urban versus rural 
 
Regional effects are the social interaction that influences individuals’ behaviour and 
educational outcomes (Buscha, 2007). In this section, we investigate the different impacts that 
living in urban and rural areas has on children’s educational attainment. These impacts are 
specifically interesting for us because this thesis highlights the urban and rural differences in all 
upcoming empirical chapters.   
As we discussed in Section 2.2 of this chapter, many studies (such as Brooks-Gunn et al., 
1998; Gregg and Machin, 2000; and Acemoglu and Pishke, 2001) analyse determinants of 
educational outcomes. However, studies that consider the relevance of geography in children’s 
educational attainment are less common. Empirical analysis on the differences in educational 
outcomes between students in rural and urban areas started in the US during the 1980s; however, 
these studies do not arrive at a consistent conclusion. For instance, Edington and Martellaro (1984) 
find no significant differences in the outcomes of students in urban and rural schools in the US 
state of New Mexico, while Kleinfeld et al. (1985) and Blackwell and McLaughlin (1999), find that 
for the whole of the US, the rural-urban location variable is significant in explaining students’ 
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performance. However, one should note that such variations might differ by level of development 
of each specific country. For instance in developed countries, inner-city areas might be less well 
off. Furthermore, as Ramos (2012) implies ‘the differences in the performance of students in rural 
and urban schools are not due to the location per se, but rather to the fact that the characteristics 
of the students, their families and the schools differ in these two groups’ (Ramos, 2012, p.4). This 
is because students in rural areas usually belong to households with less financial resources, their 
parents’ levels of education is lower compared to their urban counterparts, and the schools they 
attend are usually poorly endowed in terms of facilities. Researchers such as Hannaway and Talbert 
(1993) and Young (1998) confirm this argument and claim that these differences in the 
characteristics of urban and rural areas account for most of the differences in students’ 
performance, and not the location variable itself. Hence, the gap in students’ educational 
attainment in urban and rural areas can be explained by many factors. For instance, according to 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2000), in Australia, the main factors that explain 
why rural children remained disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment are costs and 
availability of transport and levels of family income support (HREOC, 2000). In a comparative study 
of urban and rural schools in China, Hao et al. (2015) suggest that the quality of the education that 
rural students receive is the main negative factor that has adverse effects on children in rural areas. 
They explain that rural children face limited choices in course subjects, and hence many have 
limited options to pursue their field of interest; and even if they find their field of study, educational 
facilities in rural areas are far behind those in urban areas. A comprehensive study of OECD 
countries in 2015 that focuses on different facilities offered in urban and rural areas suggests 
‘overall in most OECD countries urban schools are usually larger, have a more socio-economically 
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advantaged student body, enjoy greater responsibility for resource allocation, are less likely to 
experience staff shortages, are more likely to have a higher proportion of qualified teachers, and 
have higher student-teacher ratios than schools in rural areas and towns’ (OECD, 2013, p. 24). 
Another factor that explains the educational gap in urban and rural areas is the difference in 
household structures between these two areas (McLaughlin et al., 1999). Usually, rural families are 
more likely to have two parents, which can have a positive impact on children’s educational 
attainment, according to existing literature that suggests that children belonging to single-parent 
families perform worse in terms of educational attainment (Downey, 1995). 
Overall, we can observe that all the important factors mentioned in Section 2.2 as main 
contributors to children’s educational attainment can be directly or indirectly affected by 
urban/rural differences. These regional differences can affect households’ socio-economic 
characteristics such as income and educational status. These can affect the level of school quality 
and neighbourhood characteristics of households. Hence, any comprehensive study of 
development in education should provide an insight into the differences in urban and rural areas.  
3.5 Gender Inequality in Education 
 
Many aspects can explain the existing gender gap in educational attainment, such as 
biological factors, family resources, returns to education, school-related factors, and institutional 
factors. Below, we examine these factors. 
An area within gender inequality that researchers study is how boys and girls perform 
differently in different subjects of test scores (for example, Baker and Jones, 1999; Willingham and 
Cole, 1997; Gallagher and Kaufman, 2005). However, despite the large literature in this area, 
disagreements remain on several fronts. For instance, while most of the results indicate that boys 
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have higher test scores in mathematics and girls have higher test scores in reading (Nowell and 
Hedges, 1998; Buchmann et al., 2008, Marks, 2007), there is considerable variation in the size of 
these gaps. However, all of these studies consistently agree that there is a life course component 
to gender differences in test scores; generally, girls and boys have similar performance in 
mathematics and reading in the early years of schooling, though as they get older, boys obtain 
more advantage in maths scores, while girls obtain a higher advantage in reading scores (Maccoby 
and Jacklin, 1974; Buchmann et al., 2008). There is also evidence that suggests gender gaps in test 
scores are more pronounced among low-income children (Hinshaw, 1992;Buchmann et al., 2008). 
For example, Buchmann et al. (2008) suggest that ‘although girls and boys start first grade with 
similar reading scores, a female-favourable gap in reading emerges by fifth grade, but only for 
children from economically disadvantaged families, while boys and girls from middle- and upper-
class families have very similar reading scores’(Buchmann et al.,2008, p.322). Jacobs et al. (2005) 
suggests that parents provide more ‘math-supportive environment’ for their sons, by providing 
more math and science toys for them during their early childhood. Steele (1997) points to an 
interesting line of research into how traditional gender stereotypes and norms might influence 
students’ perceptions of their own abilities. Steele (1997) argues that due to conventional notions 
that men outperform women in mathematics, women experience a heightened anxiety during test 
taking that interferes with their test performance. 
Another area within the literature on gender differences is whether or not parents’ decision 
to spend time and money on children differs by their child’s gender. Household educational 
expenditure on children is the topic of our first empirical chapter (Chapter 4), where we provide a 
comprehensive literature review; hence, we do not discuss it here. On the other hand, regarding 
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parental time with children, Stevenson and Baker (1987) find some evidence of gender bias, noting 
that at early stages, parents are more involved in their sons’ school activities and in home activities 
with their daughters; however, as children grow older, parent’s time involvement with boys 
declines, while it remains constant with girls. On the one hand, Muller (1998) contradicts Stevenson 
and Baker’s findings (1987) that parental involvement in children’s schooling is gender specific. 
However, ‘the empirical basis for these claims is questionable for the simple reason that parenting 
styles and parental expectations may be responsive to the personalities and behaviour of their 
children, and thus may be consequences as well as causes of gender differences’(Buchman e al., 
2008,p.315).  
Studies of gender gaps in educational performance also examine teachers and the school 
and classroom environments for possible explanations. There is an ongoing debate regarding 
whether teachers favour one gender over the other. Research based on classroom observations in 
the early 1990s talked about ‘how schools short-change girls’, with teachers calling on and praising 
boys more often than girls (Sadker and Sadker, 1994). Meanwhile, more recent studies argue that 
the opposite is true and that schools favour girls and contribute to a ‘war against boys’ (Sommers, 
2000). The empirical evidence on whether and how teachers’ gender plays a role in gender 
differences in educational outcomes is inconclusive. Some studies find that males perform no 
better when taught by male teachers than by female teachers (Sokal et al., 2007). In contrast, 
others (Dee, 2005) find that having a female teacher instead of a male teacher in specific subjects 
raises girls’ achievement and lowers boys’ achievement.  
Institutional-level factors also shape gendered patterns of educational attainment. These 
include socio-cultural changes in gender roles and expectations about life course trajectories for 
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both women and men. Some studies (Averett and Burton, 1996; Perna, 2003) suggest that the 
rising educational inequality in favour of women is the result of higher returns on education for 
educated women than for men. Continuing this argument, DiPrete and Buchmann (2006) argue 
that in studying returns on education for women, if we move beyond changes in wages and 
consider changes in the probability of getting married, the family standard of living, and insurance 
against poverty, then returns on education for women are even higher than the common 
estimates. Hence, due to women’s expectation of high returns on education, which is higher than 
that for men, they continue their studies further on. We examine returns on education in Chapter 
5 of this thesis and will provide a comprehensive literature review then. Finally, shifts in the 
structure of the labour market such as declining discrimination against women can also impact 
individual incentives to acquire education (Spencer et al., 1999). 
3.6 Determinants of educational attainment in MENA countries 
 
The existing literature on the determinants of educational attainment in the MENA region 
is limited and quite scarce. Badr (2012) points out that this scarcity is mainly due to the lack of 
micro-level data. The only available data to use for research on children’s educational attainment 
in this region is the TIMSS, which offers comprehensive data on international student achievement 
test scores. In the TIMSS, studies tested samples of eighth graders in math and science, and the 
data includes information about these test scores, as well as family background, school resources, 
and teacher characteristics (Glewwe, 2002). 
Employing TIMSS data, Badr (2012) explores determinants of educational attainment in the 
eight MENA countries of Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Tunisia. He 
employs three methodologies: first he estimates an educational production function for each 
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country to examine the effect of school resources and households’ socioeconomic background on 
test score achievements in math and science. Second, he employs a meta‐analysis approach to 
compare the test results in these countries and to identify whether any factors are significant 
across the countries. Finally, he employs quantile regressions to examine if the influence of factors 
on children’s educational attainment varies by level of attainment. He finds that in all these 
countries, parental socioeconomic characteristics are strongly related to their children’s 
educational attainment. However, in Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, the relationship between 
student’s math performance and parents’ level of education is weaker compared to Turkey, Jordan, 
and Iran. Their research also suggests that school characteristics such as class size and teacher 
characteristics are statistically and positively related to students’ performances only for Iran and 
Turkey. However, according to this study, even in these two countries, the schooling effect is much 
smaller than parental effects. Other studies also stress the importance of parental background in 
MENA countries. Tansel (2002a) for Turkey and Al-Qudsi (2003) for Kuwait, Jordan, Gaza, and 
Yemen, for instance, agree with Badr (2012) in that parental education and income are the most 
important determinants of education for children in these countries. Namora and Roushdy (2007) 
also provide evidence on the importance of parents’ educational level for enrolment and drop out 
in Egypt’s primary education. However, all of these studies use the same data (TIMSS), because as 
previously mentioned, for most countries in the region, this is the only comprehensive data 
available to compare the determinants of educational attainment. 
Using another data source (the 1994 Household Budget Survey), Tansel (1998) examines 
gender inequality in educational attainment in Turkey, and finds that parental education and 
income has the highest impact on children’s educational attainment, and that the effect of parents’ 
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income and education is larger for girls than for boys. He explains that the stronger impact of 
parental education on girls’ schooling suggests less social mobility for girls than for boys. He then 
points out that children in urban areas of Turkey have much higher educational attainment than 
those in rural areas do. Ahlburg et al. (2004) also raise the issue of gender and urban/rural 
differences in educational attainment in the context of Egypt’s education system. The author’s note 
that the enrolment rate of rural girls aged 6-14 was only 72% of that of rural boys. Updating Ahlburg 
et al.’s (2004) research in Egypt, Namora and Roushdy (2008) and Rammohan and Dancer (2008) 
show that boys are more likely to receive more education than girls are, while Hanushek et al. 
(2008) note that girls’ dropout rate is 0.06 higher than that of boys in elementary schools. Al-
Samarrai and Peasgood (1998) also stress the importance of gender differences in educational 
attainment and find that household characteristics such as parental education may have a totally 
different impact on the education of females and males in Tanzania.  
Smits (2007) analyses the effects of socio-economic, cultural, demographic, and geographic 
background characteristics on educational attainment for five Arab countries, namely, Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria using a multilevel logistic regression. He suggests that in all of 
these countries, rural areas are lagging behind urban areas in terms of educational attainment, 
especially with regard to girls’ participation in education. They argue that the higher educational 
attainment of rural boys compared to that of rural girls indicates that infrastructural restrictions 
are only part of the problem in MENA countries, and that families’ preferences for boys’ education 
over girls’ education also plays a role. Sanchez (2009) also investigates the differences in 
educational achievements between urban and rural areas in Yemen, and reveals that improving 
the public infrastructure network to reduce the time needed to travel to school would remarkably 
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raise the probability of entry and attendance in basic education by, respectively, 33% and 22%, and 
by around 10% for entry and attendance in high school. The author points out that this probability 
can be even higher for females, as parents would be more willing to send their daughters to school 
if improved public infrastructure shortens the distance and the time to travel to school 
considerably. The study concludes that spending on public infrastructure would be more cost-
effective than spending to build more schools and hire more teachers for basic education. Chaaban 
(2012) studies the effect of having books and computers at students’ homes in Tunisia, Turkey, and 
Iran, and argues that this could be a good proxy to estimate household characteristics because they 
are related to both parental education and other unobserved abilities such as motivation and 
capability to help children at home with their studies. Chaaban (2012) asked students to report the 
number of books at home and find that in all countries, the effects of having books is high, at 33 
and 27 points, respectively. Interestingly they find that having computers at home improves 
students’ performances in Iran, while in Turkey and Tunisia, it worsens their performance in maths 
and science scores.  
Assad et al. (2014) employ the Household Income, Expenditure, and Consumption Surveys 
(HIECS) from eight MENA counties, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Iran, and Jordan. 
They analyse both the probability of entry and of reaching secondary school using a censored 
ordered probit model, and find that in all countries, parental background has the highest impact in 
later stages of study. They suggest that households’ income more strongly affects the likelihood of 
reaching secondary education than the probability of ever entering school. However, they explain 
that these results are not surprising because basic education is complimentary in these countries. 
They then conclude that although ‘countries of MENA have made notable progress in raising the 
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education level of their citizens. However, this progress has been limited to the average years of 
schooling and little has been achieved in terms of education quality or equality of educational 
opportunities’ (Assad et al., 2014, p. 2). 
Overall, it seems that there is limited research conducted on the determinants of 
educational attainment in MENA countries, and this is due to the scarcity of data available on this 
subject. The main comprehensive dataset is the TIMMS, which many scholars use for this subject. 
The literature mentioned above suggests that most scholars agree on the importance of parental 
education and income for children’s educational attainment (Tansel, 2002; Al-Qudsi, 2003; Badr, 
2012; Namora and Roushdy, 2007). The existing literature also suggests that gender differences in 
educational attainment are persistent in MENA countries (Ahlburg, 2004; Namora and Roushdy, 
2007; Rammohan and Dancer, 2008; Handshake, 2008; Al-Samarrai and Peasgood, 1998). It is also 
widely accepted that rural areas are lagging behind urban areas in educational attainment (Smitts, 
2007; Sanchez, 2005). In terms of the effects of school qualities, it is evident from the existing 
literature that while its importance should not be neglected, its effect is not as large as the effect 
of parental income and education (Chaaban, 2012; Badr, 2012).  
3.7 Summary 
 
In this chapter, we first presented a review of the literature on the determinants of 
educational attainment. We discussed the effects of household and personal characteristics, 
schooling, and neighbourhood effects. This section suggests that most studies consistently agree 
that household income and parental education are the most important factors shaping children’s 
educational attainment.  
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Second, we provided a literature review on the determinants of educational attainment in 
developing countries, and later on MENA countries. The rationale for dedicating a separate section 
to developing and MENA countries is that the study context for this thesis, Iran, is a developing 
country within the MENA region, and we believe that the characteristics of these countries such as 
their class structures, educational systems, institutions, and occupational structures differ from 
those in developed countries. A review of the literature in this section suggests that earlier studies 
of the determinants of education status in developing countries imply that schooling factors are 
more important than household factors, which is in contrast to the existing research in developed 
countries. However, more recent studies stress the importance of household factors such as 
household income and education. The review of the existing literature for MENA countries is 
specifically constructive for our upcoming empirical chapters, as it informs us what type of variable 
choices might be more relevant in our analysis. Needless to say, we do not have all of the suggested 
variables (especially those related to schooling) available; however, we will try to operationalize 
the available data in our empirical setups. The overall review of the literature for developing 
countries suggests that, in most of these countries, if they lack basic educational facilities, then the 
effect of schooling is bigger than that of household characteristics; however as these countries 
obtain certain standards for educational facilities, then the effect of household characteristics 
become more predominant. Furthermore, we found that for MENA countries, most studies 
concede that while schooling factors are also important, family income is the most important factor 
in children’s educational status. Following this, as we stated in chapter one of this thesis, it appears 
that Iran has a well-developed education system compatible with minimum standards worldwide. 
This suggest that household factors are more important in Iran, and this will be the path of our 
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investigation, where in the following sections, we examine the effects of household characteristics 
on various factors that determine educational attainment (such as household investment in 
children’s educational expenditure and returns on education). 
Finally, we also provided a brief literature review on the importance of regional (specifically, 
urban and rural) and gender inequality in education. Our review of the literature on urban and rural 
disparities suggests that regional disparities shape all household socio-economic characteristics as 
well as the schooling status that students face. We suspect that such regional inequalities are 
higher in a country like Iran, where, like most developing countries, the government’s limited 
resources compel a focus on urban areas. Our review of literature on gender inequality also 
suggests that many factors can affect higher educational achievements for men, and some of these 
factors, such as parents’ decision to spend money on children and returns on education are the 

















This chapter examines the determinants of household expenditure on education in Iran and 
focuses on a comparative analysis between urban and rural areas, with a particular focus on 
differential gender impacts between these two geographies. There are several reasons why such a 
study is important. First, urban and rural divides are particularly significant in developing countries, 
where wide differences in economic development, resource distribution, and opportunity still 
exist(Rodriguez-Pose, et al., 2005), and this implies that there might be large variations between 
Iranian urban and rural households' educational expenditure, which we investigate in this chapter. 
Second (as will be discussed in the literature review section), there is evidence that in some 
developing countries child’s gender might affect the household’s decision regarding educational 
expenditure (Huy, 2012; Tansel, 2002a). This problem might be more prevalent in countries of the 
MENA region, where religious ideology is the priority for these countries’ policy makers. Third, a 
study of household educational expenditure in Iran is important and has both policy and research 
implications because the government’s role as the main spender on education has decreased 
sharply over the past 30 years, and the ministry of education has announced that it is planning to 
increase students’ enrolment rates in private schools from 8.5% to 20% in 8 years (Kurd, 2014). 
Fourth, the continued decline in public expenditure resulted in poor quality public schools, which 
have been criticised by many scholars (such as Assad, 2013, 2014; Babaie, 2011), which meant that 
the role of household-level decision-making on education spending is more important than ever, 
and understanding educational investment in terms of private resources is now as important as 
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public expenditure for researchers and policy makers. Finally (as mentioned in the first chapter), in 
all three Iranian development plans since 2000, improving gender equality in education and 
eliminating regional disparities for education are the main objectives of the government. Hence 
research on determinants of private expenditure on education is important for policymakers, to 
understand Iranian household’s characteristics in terms of educational expenditure, especially 
potential differences that urban and rural households have.  
This chapter intends to make three contributions. First, to our knowledge, only one study 
of household expenditure on education in Iran currently exists, which is in Farsi language, and this 
study only focuses on the proportion of educational expenditure in rural and urban households’ 
budget. Other Iranian studies on parental investments in children focus primarily on expenditures 
such as food, clothing, transportation, and health care (for example Fazaeli et al.,2016; Ghiasvand 
et al., 2015), and the few studies that do look at educational expenditure typically combined these 
costs with other goods and services (Zare et al., 2014, Azadeh et al., 2016). Second, we only focus 
on private expenditure on education, while most of the existing literature on education in Iran 
focuses on public expenditure on education (Ahmadi et al., 2010; Akbarian, 2010). This is probably 
because education is free in Iran, and the Iranian government is the main contributor to the 
education system. However, households often make additional expenditures on educational 
goods, like tuition for private schools or extra books and supplies, and these investments are likely 
to affect educational outcomes and have implications for policymaking (Tabar et al., 2017). Third, 
existing studies used data from surveys restricted to a small number of villages in a province 
(Emadzadeh, 2000; Behkish, 2003). However, this study will use the HEIS to cover a sample of the 
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whole population, which allows for a more detailed overview of the effects of socio-economic and 
geographic differences on household educational expenditure. 
This section of our thesis intends to answer these three interrelated objectives. We first 
investigate the extent to which various factors such as parental background, parental education, 
marital status, and so on are related to household decisions to spend or not spend money on their 
children’s education. Second, we will examine the extent to which the same factors are related to 
variations in educational expenditures greater than zero. Our final objective is to investigate 
variations in the ‘proportion’ of educational expenditure.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two critically reviews the literature 
on the determinants of educational expenditure; Section three discusses the data; Section four 
explains the econometric methodology; the results are presented in Section five, followed by a 
conclusion in Section six.  
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Cost of education 
 
Household costs of education can be divided into two categories: direct and indirect costs. Direct 
costs include payments made to a school (such as tuition and examination fees), as well as 
expenditures on textbooks, stationery, uniforms, transport, private tuition, and so on (Shafiq, 
2007). In contrast, indirect costs refer to opportunity costs, in this case, foregone earnings. This 
chapter comprises only the direct costs incurred by households educating their children.  
On the other hand, investment in education occurs in two realms: the individual and the 
institutional (Tilak, 2002). The former is contributions by students and/or their parents, also 
referred to as household or family investment in education, while the latter investment is known 
67 
 
as public, or government, investment in education. Researchers have examined the relationship 
between them, however as Tilak (2002) rightly points out 'while public investment can provide 
educational facilities, only household investment can enable their utilisation. The two are inter-
dependent, so in the absence of either, there is likely to be an under allocation of resources to 
education' (Tilak, 2002. p.2). However, Penrose (1998) argues that household investments can be 
a substitute for public investments in education. For example, if publicly funded schools are 
perceived to be inadequate, then even the poorest households might be compelled to spend 
money on private education. In this case, the poorer the quality of public schools—ceteris 
paribus—the higher the level of household expenditure to fill the gap. Wisniewski (2013) agrees 
with Simmons’ (2013) argument and suggests that high household expenditure cannot always be 
considered a positive indicator, as it might denote low quality public provision (Wisniewski, 2013). 
Tilak (2002), on the other hand, points to the positive impacts government investment can have 
on household expenditure on education and argues that when a government spends more on 
providing high quality education, households are likely to feel enthusiastic and more willing to 
contribute to their children's education, thus supplementing public efforts.  
Summing up, household and government investments in education are closely related, 
either substituting for or complementing each other. This chapter, however, is concerned with 
understanding household investment in education, and will not examine levels of government 
expenditure. 
4.2.2 Share of household education expenditure 
 
The main categories of household expenditure are usually divided into six groups, which 
include housing, food, transportation, clothing, health care, and education, with housing 
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expenditure usually the largest budgetary share in a household’s total expenditure. The share of 
education expenditure in each household varies depending on many factors, and various studies 
(such as Mauldin, 2001, and Lino, 1995) try to estimate the cost of education. For example,Mauldin 
(2001) finds that education costs for a child were 13% of the total expenditure for raising a child 
and 14% when including college expenditures. Lino (1995) suggests that the share of each category 
varies according to a household’s income. He then estimates that among middle and higher income 
groups, the largest budgetary expenditure was housing and the smallest was health, while the 
smallest budgetary expenditure was childcare and education among households within the lower 
income groups.  
Overall, most studies estimate educational expenditure at between 6% and 14% of a 
household’s total budget. However, the share can change according to households’ socio-
economic characteristics. In the next section, we examine the existing literature on the 
determinants of households’ educational expenditure.  
4.2.3 Determinants of household expenditure 
 
According to Kornich et al. (2012), there are three ways to understand parental expenditure 
on children. The first is the extent of parental investment, which indicates the amount of spending. 
The second is to consider the composition of spending, which determines what households buy 
with the money they spend on their children. The final way is to understand the relationships 
between spending and household characteristics, or the ‘determinants’ of spending. They propose 
that 'shifts linked to household characteristics tell us how parents respond to changing social 
demands on the family and whether this differs for different segments of the population' (Kornrich 
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et al., 2012, p.34). This section surveys the literature related to the latter factor, namely, on the 
‘determinants’ of household educational spending on children. 
4.2.3.1 Household characteristics 
 
Various studies suggest that household characteristics are crucial components of 
households’ expenditures on education (Knight and Shi, 1996; Qian and Smyth, 2011; Choudhury, 
2011; Lakshamanasamy, 2006; Tilak, 2002). The most relevant characteristics are the parental 
education level and income, employment status, age, race, and family size. In this section, we 
examine each of these factors. 
Various studies examine the impact of parents’ human capital on their educational 
spending on their children, and while most of these studies (such as Choudhury, 2011; Kutty, 2008; 
Shipler, 2004; Laureau, 2003) find that parental education is an important determinant, some also 
question the importance of parental education, and believe that there are other more important 
factors. For example, Sulaiman et al. (2012) find that for Indonesia, parent's education is not a 
significant determinant of their educational expenditure on children. They then explain this by 
claiming that households with lower education levels are more concerned with their children's 
education because they suffered discrimination against them due to their own low human capital, 
which leads them to spend more on their children's education. However, we should note that this 
research was conducted in Indonesia, which is a developing country, while most theories that stress 
on the importance of human capital stem from research in developed countries. On the other hand, 
many researchers, such as Choudhury (2011), stress that parental education is the single most 
important determinant of household expenditure on children's education. Choudhury (2011) 
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explains that this is because households who are better educated are aware of the importance of 
investing in education and have a greater appreciation for children's education. Kutty (2008) also 
emphasises that parents with higher levels of education have seen the benefits of higher education 
in terms of higher wages and better occupational opportunities and hence are more likely to invest 
in their children's education (Kutty, 2008). Overall, most studies of the determinants of household 
educational expenditure agree on the important effect of parental education on educational 
expenditures for their children (for example Shipler, 2004; Laureau, 2003). Interestingly, some 
studies (Kohli and K̈unemund, 2003) emphasise the intergenerational impact of education, and 
how parents' experience of educational expenditure by their family shapes their future 
expenditure on educating their children.As Steelmann and Powell (1991) accurately point out, 
'parents’ attitude to the education of their children depends on the parents’ own human capital, 
which in turn was shaped by the grandparents’ attitude to the education of the parents, etc.'. 
Steelmann and Powell (1991) then claim that parents whose college education was financed by 
their parents are also more likely to spend on their children education. As they conclude 
‘investments in human capital do not only affect the immediate recipient, that is, the next 
generation, but also future generations'(Steelmann and Powell, 1991, p.15). Finally, it is important 
to note that although most research on the effect of parental human capital on educational 
expenditure agree about the importance of parents' education, there is disagreement regarding 
whether it’s the mother's, father's, or both parents’ education that matters. For instance, Al-
Samarra and Peasgood (1992) analyse household survey data in rural Tanzania using a logit model, 
and reveal that the father's education has a greater influence on households’ education 
expenditure on boys, whereas the mother's education has a greater influence on households’ 
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educational expenditure for girls. They explain these findings by implying that more educated 
mothers usually have more household decision-making power and have a relatively stronger 
preference for their daughter’s education. On the other hand, Qian and Smyth (2011) analyse 32 
cities in China and find that while maternal education is an important determinant of household 
educational expenditure, paternal human capital does not have any significant effect on household 
educational spending.  
Researchers also find that family income is an important factor in determining how much 
parents spend to educate their children (Kane, 1994; Rouse, 1994; DesJardin et al.; 1999; Ellwood 
and Kane, 2000). However, although all these studies agree that family income is important, it is 
central to note that the definition of income varies across studies. For instance, Ellwood and Kane 
(2000) measure income in quartiles, Des Jardin et al. (1999) use dummy variables to control for 
income, while others use continuous measures of income.  
Parents’ employment status may also be related to expenditures on a child’s education. 
Mauldin (2001) suggests that even ‘after controlling for income, employment status may influence 
parents’ perception of the relationship between human capital investments and returns on 
thoseinvestments’ (Mauldin, 2001, p.222). Qian and Smyth (2011) analyse data from China and 
suggest that the father’s professional occupations rather than those of the mother has an 
important impact on educational spending. Criticizing existing studies, Ermich (2000) claims that it 
is difficult to estimate the effect of parental occupation on educational expenditure on children 
because 'parents choose their occupation in conjunction with choices about the way they spend 
their time and money on children'. This emphasises the need to account for other factors that 
affect decisions regarding educational spending; however, he argues, 'no matter how many 
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parental variables are measured, they are still likely to omit some important aspects of family 
background that exert an influence'. For this reason, such estimates based on comparisons of 
young adults from different families are unlikely to identify the 'effect' of parents' employment 
patterns (Ermich, 2000, p.146). 
 Models of household expenditure also include family size measured by the number of 
siblings as an explanatory variable. According to Bradley and Nguyen (2003) ‘there is a trade-off 
between child quality and quantity, and families are solving a constrained maximisation problem. 
The trade-off exists since parents’ resources and time are limited and must be spread more thinly 
among more children’ (Bradley and Nguyen, 2003, p.15). This implies that the larger the number 
of siblings in the family, the less time and financial resources available for each; hence, household 
educational expenditure per child also declines. However, it is important to note that number of 
siblings that the child has can be endogenous and it is thus important to test for such a problem. 
This variable may be endogenous because ‘parents make fertility and labour market decisions 
jointly and because they may decide to have fewer children if they wish to educate them more’ 
(Kambhampati, 2008, p.5).  
Some researchers (for example, Lino, 1995; Sulaiman et al., 2012) study the impact of 
parents’ age on their decision to spend to educate their children, and there is usually agreement 
that educational expenditure increases with parents’ age, but at a decreasing rate. This means that 
children with younger parents have a smaller probability of education spending. Mussa (2013) 
suggests that age echoes experience, and it is commonly accepted that older parents have a better 
understanding of the benefits of education. Mauldin (2001) argues that older parentshave more 
financially stability, so they are more able to spend higher a proportion of their earnings on 
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children’s educational expenses. However, Sulaiman et al. (2012) point out that, for Indonesia, it is 
the age of the head of the family, and not the mother, that is important. They argue that due to 
social and cultural factors, the father is the main breadwinner in the household; hence, his age 
profile and not the mother’s affects households’ educational expenditure. Their study also shows 
that educational expenditure is likely to peak around middle ages, when the head of the household 
is likely to have higher school grade level children. 
Finally, race is another determinant of household educational expenditures. Fan and Lewis’ 
(1999) study shows that different racial groups within the same income group allocate their 
budgets differently for educational expenditures on their children. For instance, for the US, various 
studies (Fan, 1999; Lareau, 2011) reveal that among lower expenditure households, white 
households spend a higher percentage of their total expenditures on education than do African 
American, Hispanic, and Asian American households. These findings suggest that non-White 
children in low-expenditure households are at an educational disadvantage. However, among 
higher expenditure households, Asian American households have the highest expenditures on 
education, and white households the lowest. The present literature is inconclusive about how 
family and race jointly determine parents’ spending on children. 
4.2.3.2 Child characteristics 
 
Various studies suggest that factors related to child characteristics such as age, returns on 
education, and gender also affect parents’ decision to spend money on education.  
The existing literature on the relationship between child gender and parental education 
expenditure is rather inconclusive, and related to many complicated social and cultural factors. For 
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instance, Huy (2012) claims that in some developing countries, parents invest less in their 
daughter's education because in the future, she will become part of her husband's household after 
marriage, and her income will contribute to her husband's households, and not to her own 
parent's. On the other hand, some researchers, such as Tansel (2002a), argue that due to the higher 
return on education for girls, parents are willing to spend more money to educate their daughters 
than their sons. Kambhampati (2008) also suggests that returns on education is an important 
determinant of parents’ spending on children. Estimating returns on education separately for 
Indian boys and girls, he reveals that the rate of return on education significantly increases 
households’ educational expenditure, although the impact was much larger at secondary level and 
for girls. Kingdon (1998) considers the impact of returns on education on households’ investment 
in education by decomposing the gross gender differential in earnings using the Blinder-Oaxaca 
method. She concludes that girls face lower returns on education, and this has a significant impact 
on parents spending on educating their daughters. 
On the other hand, there is evidence that parents distribute investments very differently 
during the life cycle of their children, with higher education expenses during the earlier stages of 
children’s education (Kornich and Furstenberg, 2008). Huy’s (2012) survey of Vietnamese 
households testifies such results and find a positive and significant relationship between children's 
years of school and their parents’ educational expenditure. His results show that households with 
more primary school age or secondary school age children spend more on education, while 




4.2.4 Worldwide literature 
 
Numerous empirical studies investigate the determinants of household expenditure on 
education in different countries. In this section, we examine these studies.  
McMahon (1984) develops a future-oriented family utility function to examine the factors 
that affect families’ investment in education in the US. He observes expected non-monetary 
returns, family disposable income, tax subsidies, student loans, family size (number of brothers and 
sisters), order of birth, and estimates the demand function using academic scores and parents’ 
schooling level. He concludes that children’s ability and mother’s education are the most important 
factors that determine households’ educational expenditure in the US.  
Tilak (2002) studies the determinants of household education expenditure in rural India by 
employing an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation. He also examines the elasticity of the 
household expenditure on education to changes in household income on the one hand and 
government expenditure on education on the other. He finds that in rural India, while household 
expenditure is large, there is no gender difference in educational expenditure. He also reveals that 
household characteristics such as household income, household size, and the education level of 
the head of the household are the most important determinants of expenditure on education. He 
also points out that household expenditure is highly elastic to household income levels.  However, 
this study is based on cross-sectional evidence, while the dynamics of household investment 
decision making in education cannot be captured by evidence provided by cross-sectional surveys. 
Tilak (2002) accepts such criticism and explains that time series data on household expenditure on 
education in India are not available. 
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Focusing on only one province (Delhi), Choudhury (2011) examines the pattern and 
determinants of household expenditure on engineering education in India. The data were collected 
from a student survey of final year students pursuing IT courses, and uses the OLS technique. The 
findings reveal that the larger expenditure on engineering education is not due to high tuition and 
other fees charged by an institution, but rather due to higher expenditures on non-fee 
expenditures (such as dorm/housing, food, textbooks, transport) and additional expenditures (such 
as private fees to improve English and a computer, cost of computer, expenditure on internet and 
phones). He then concludes that the pattern of household expenditure on education does not 
confirm the general perception that a significant portion of the household expenditure goes 
towards fees. However, both Tilak and Choudhury (2011) use an OLS estimation, and hence fail to 
allow for the large number of zero expenditures on education. In order to capture non-spenders 
on education, Kambhampati (2008) employs an educational expenditure model instead of a simple 
OLS methodology. He reveals that the rate of return on education is the most significant variable 
that increases parent's likelihood of spending on education for both for boys and girls. 
Furthermore, his study shows that the impact of variables is much larger at the secondary level and 
for girls.  
Sulaiman et al. (2012) examine the determinants of expenditure on education using the OLS 
model with data from a household survey in Malaysia. An interesting part of their study was that 
apart from common variables such as households’ background, they also examine the impact of 
globalisation on households’ educational expenditure. They confirm that in Indonesia, household 
income and age of head of household are significantly and positively related to expenditure on 
education. Interestingly, they find that years of education of the head of the household and mother 
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are statistically not significant. The study indicates that the level of education among household 
heads correlated positively but is not significant, while years of education of mothers are negatively 
correlated with educational expenditure. This implies that households with lower education levels 
are more concerned with their children's education, which leads them to spend more on their 
education. They also indicate that demand for education is unitary elastic, which means that it is 
neither a necessity nor a luxury item in the consumer's budget. Finally, they find that parental 
awareness of globalisation was significantly and positively related to their expenditure on 
children's education. However, this study employs a simple OLS model and fails to consider the 
possibility that at least one of their variables in the model might not be exogenous and does not 
correct for such endogeneities. For instance, household income may be endogenous because 
parents who wish to spend more on children’s education may work harder to earn more to pay for 
it. Alternatively, it is possible that parents who spend less on education have children who work 
rather than attend school, which would also influence household expenditure.  
Duong (2004) conducts a primary survey in Vietnam and finds that both parents' education, 
household income, and their social class are important determinants of educational spending on 
children. However, Quang (2012) criticizes this study and argues that since it is a primary survey, 
its results cannot be generalised to all areas in Vietnam. Following this criticism, he employs the 
Vietnamese Household Living Standards Survey using the Tobit model. His findings are similar to 
those of Duong (2004) in terms of the importance of parental income. However, his results suggest 
that it is only the education and occupation of the head of the household that has most significant 
impact on households’ educational expenditures. This study also adds that children's school age is 
significantly related to educational expenditure, and proposes that households with children at 
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primary school or secondary school age spend more on education compared to those with pre-
school or college age children.  
Donkoh and Amikuzuno (2011) use a logit model to find the socio-economic determinants 
of a household's probability of spending on education using the Living Standards Survey for Ghana. 
They employ a logit model to estimate the probability of incurring education expenditure as the 
dependent variable. They find two categories of households with greater probability of spending 
on education. The first consists of households whose heads are relatively young and those whose 
heads have formal education and own land, and other durable assets. The second category includes 
female headed households, households with a greater number of children of school age, rural 
households, and households living farther away from the nation's capital. However, their study 
focuses only on one aspect of educational expenditure, namely probability of spending, and did 
not examine other factors such as amount of expenditure. Taking a similar approach, Ogundari and 
Awudu (2014) focus only on the likelihood of spending in Nigeria; however, they combine 
educational and healthcare spending because the data they use did not have separate information 
for these two categories. The study employs household-level data to examine expenditure patterns 
for rural and urban household using a double-hurdle model. The empirical results show that a 
household decision to spend on educational and health care services are positively and significantly 
related to household income, household size, and the level of education of the household head. 
Moreover, the findings suggest that female-headed households tend to spend more on education 
and healthcare services compared to male-headed households. 
For Tanzania, Ngwilizi (2013) investigates the socio-economic determinants of household 
educational expenditure. The results show that number of children in the household, household 
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income, education of household head, and age of children were major determinants of households’ 
investment in human capital. Since they differentiate between urban and rural areas of Tanzania, 
they find some disparities between these two regions. For instance, in urban households, the age 
of the household head plays a significant role; in rural areas, this effect is minimal. 
In summary, based on this reviewed literature, we can claim that household income, 
parents’ education level, and household size are often considered as the most important 
determinants of household's expenditure on education. Some studies also mention some 
uncommon variables such as globalisation, distance of households from national capital, students’ 
ability, family assets ownership, and school location.  
However, the results from the reviewed literature show the uncertain significance of socio-
demographic variables. Some studies confirm a significant effect of social-demographic variables 
on household spending on education, for instance, Tansel (2002), Kambhampati (2008), and 
Ogundari and Awudu (2014). Nevertheless, Choudhury (2011); Sulaiman et al (2013); and Ngwilizi 
(2013) argue for the insignificance of some variables. The findings are inconsistent because these 
studies differ in geographical context; some studies were conducted in urban areas while others in 
rural areas, which differ in terms of economic development. The studies also use different types of 
data; some use primary data, while others used secondary data. The studies also have differing 
designs: some use a cross-sectional study design while others use a longitudinal design. 
Furthermore, they do not use the same econometric techniques. For instance, most of the studies 




4.2.5 Literature on Iran 
 
While there is a fairly reliable database of public educational expenditures in Iran, 
information about household expenditures is extremely limited. Serious attention was not given to 
collecting data on long-run household educational expenditures because these were considered 
trivial and unnecessary to public expenditure planning. Consequently, there are few empirical 
studies surveying household expenditures on education on Iran, though ‘it is increasingly accepted 
that that ignoring household investment might prove costly for educational planning in the long 
run (Tilak, 2002, p.10). This chapter intends to fill the gap in the Iranian literature on the 
determinants of parental educational expenditure.  
A look through the limited research available in Iran suggests that expenditure is very low, 
especially among the lowest income deciles. According to a report by the Statistical Centre of Iran 
(2014), in years 2012 to 2013, educational expenditure was the lowest proportion of the household 
budget compared to other expenses. As Figure 4.1 shows, a typical household spends only 4.1% of 
their total income on education in urban areas. This is even lower in rural areas, where households 
spend only 3.4% of their total income on education. The second lowest expenditure for Iranian 
households is on clothing. This report suggests that despite high educational attainment in Iran, 
private education expenditure is very low in Iranian families in both urban and rural areas. 
Hashemkhani (2014) provides a rather descriptive methodology of this report by the Statistical 
Centre of Iran and claims that 70% of Iranian families spend less than $1 per child per month on 





Figure 4.1: Household non-food Expenditure 
 
Source: Statistical Centre of Iran (2014) 
Ansari (2011) examines the effects of family financial resources on child deprivation, and 
claims that the 5th highest income decile spent 81 times more than families in the lowest deciles 
did. However, this study was conducted in a small village in east Iran, with a limited number of 
families; thus, the findings are unlikely to apply to other regions and provinces in Iran. On the other 
hand, Alitabar (2012) conducts primary research on the impact of family background in one city in 
Iran and finds that the number of students in the household increases as household income rises. 
He then points out that, for families in the lowest decile, the average number of students is 1, 
whilst in the highest decile the average number is 2.  Although this study is restricted to a limited 
number of families, the questionnaire included a question about the importance of returns on 





























their children's returns on education are very essential on their decision to spend on education of 
their children. 
Noorbakhsh (2003) also investigates the importance of regional disparities between one of 
the richest (Tehran) and poorest cities (Sistan Balouchestan) of Iran, and finds that the latter had 
the lowest educational expenditure in the whole country.Javadi (2012) also examines regional 
disparities between these two cities and suggests that the differences between these two 
provinces might be due to differences in their rate of return on education. Using a simple Mincer 
function, she finds that while in Tehran, one additional year of schooling increased income by 7.5%, 
in Sistan Balouchestan, it led to a 2.5% increase. However, both of these studies employ primary 
data collected by themselves, and compare only two cities (Tehran versus Sistan Balouchestan), 
while we use HIES data, which is a rich and informative data set across Iran, with both urban and 
rural considerations. Finally, the only study using the same data from the Iranian Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (HIES) that we do and focuses on both urban and rural areas is by Kashi 
(2010), which is in Farsi language. He employs a time-series analysis from 1984 to 2006 and 
compares the proportion of household educational expenditure for urban and rural households by 
using t-student distribution. He also examines the elasticity of household expenditures on 
education to changes in household income. His main finding is that there is a large disparity in 
terms of educational expenditure of urban and rural households, and that education is a necessity 
good in Iranian households’ budgets. He finds that for urban households, the proportion of 
educational expenditure increased from 2.6% in 1984 to 4.4% in 2006, while these numbers are 
2.4% and 3.1% in rural areas. He suggests that this rise in educational expenditure suggests that 
the importance of education in households is rising. He then explores the educational expenditure 
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of various household deciles. For example, among urban households, the proportion of educational 
expenditure for the first and 10th decile is 2.8 %and 3.9%, respectively, while that for rural 
households is 2.6% and 3.6%.  
Overall, the research examining the determinants of household expenditures on education 
in Iran is limited, and the topic has not attracted widespread research attention thus far. This lack 
of detailed knowledge led to incorrect presumptions about the extent, nature, and quality of 
household-level investments in education. These presumptions contributed to the formulation of 
inefficient and unsound policies on fees, scholarships, and subsidies in Iran. Our study hopes to 
contribute to the existing literature by conducting this research. 
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section briefly introduces the dataset used in this analysis and provides the descriptive 
statistics of key variables.  
4.3.1 HIES data 
 
This chapter uses data from two cohorts of the annual Iranian HIES: 2009/10 and 2011/12.4 
The HIES is an annual survey conducted by the Statistical Centre of Iran designed to monitor 
households’ income and living costs. The survey has been administered in rural areas since 1963 
and in urban areas as of 1968. Initially, the survey was limited to gathering data on household 
expenditures; it was only in 1974 that questions concerning household income were introduced to 
the survey's questionnaire. According to the Statistical Centre of Iran, the HIES aims to develop 
                                                           
4The Iranian year begins in March and each year of data therefore covers two Western calendar years  
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estimates of the average income and expenditure for urban and rural households at 
provincial and country levels. It makes it possible to understand household income and 
expenditure composition and distribution patterns, the household consumption pattern, 
the weight for each commodity in the household consumption basket, and is also used to 
calculate the poverty line, and study the imparity in household income and facilities.5 
The HIES aims to represent the national level each year. The survey uses a three-staged 
cluster sampling method with strata. At the first stage, the census areas are classified and 
selected. At the second stage, the urban and rural blocks are selected, whilst the selection of 
sample households occurs at the third stage. The sample sizes are chosen to estimate the 
representative average annual income and expenditures. In order to obtain representative 
estimates for the year, the samples are evenly distributed between the months. 
Using the HIES has several advantages. First, it has a large sample size and can be pooled 
for even larger sizes. Second, the dataset includes a large amount of information on individual 
characteristics, employment status, educational attainment, earnings, and living costs, in a similar 
format to standard European Labour Force Surveys. The HIES data is split into both rural and urban 
data files and we present summary statistics for both. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics for 








4.3.2 Summary statistics of dependent variables 
 
We employ three types of dependant variable in our sample of households with children 
under 22.We restrict the sample to households with at least one child under the age of 22 because 
our primary concern is the impact of household characteristics on child schooling expenditure, and 
thus families with no children, or older children, are not of interest. We chose 22 rather than 18 as 
the maximum age because there some students might have failed certain levels of education, or 
started going to school later than usual, and we did not want to exclude them from the analysis.  
The first dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value of zero or one and describes 
whether households spend on education or not. The second describes how much households 
spend on education. The final dependent variable describes the proportion of a household’s 
expenditure that is on education. 
As discussed in the previous section, many households in our dataset either have not 
reported their educational expenses, or listed their expenditure on education as 0. However we 
are only using those households that have reported their educational expenditure as zero or more. 
Accordingly figure 4.2 gives a graphical presentation of our first dependant variable (a binary 
variable that takes the value of zero or one and describes whether households spend on education 
or not)for urban and rural households in our sample (families with children under 22). It shows that 
the number of households with zero reported educational expenditure is higher in rural areas than 
urban areas: 15.88% of urban households reported zero educational expenditure, while this is 
19.02% in rural areas. The higher number of non-spenders in rural areas is not a surprise, as in most 




Figure 4.2: Comparison of spending on education in urban and rural areas 
 
    Source: HIES 2009/10-2011/12, Own calculation 
 
Figure 4.3 presents a comparison kernel density plot of our second dependent variable, log 
educational expenditure. The figure shows that educational expenditure in rural areas is lower than 
in urban areas. On average, urban households’ educational expenditure is log 12.68 Rial, whilst for 
rural households it is log 12.13 Rial. Furthermore, we observe a wider distribution and fatter tails 







Figure 4.3: Comparison of log of Household Education expenditure in urban and rural areas 
 
      Source: HIES 2009/10-2011/12, Own calculation 
 
Finally, Figure 4.4 presents a comparison histogram and kernel density plots for our final 
dependent variable, proportion of household expenditure on education for rural and urban areas. 
We calculate the proportions by dividing educational expenditure by total expenditure. The plot 
shows high numbers of zero spenders on education in both areas. Figure 4.4 shows that the 
number of families who do not spend proportionally on education is higher in rural areas compared 
to urban areas. Interestingly, once you exclude 0 spenders, the averageproportion spent on 
education is higher in rural areas than urban areas. According to Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the average 
proportion of expenditure in rural areas is 4.3% of total household expenditure, while in urban 
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areas, we observe a lower average proportion of household education expenditure at 3.2% of total 
household expenditure. The number of urban households spending more than 20% of their total 
expenditure on education is much higher than for rural areas, where the percentage of families 
spending more than 20% of their total expenditure on education is close to zero. 
Figure 4.4: Educational expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure 
 
 
Source: HIES 2009/10-2011/12, own calculation 
 
 
4.3.3. Summary statistics for urban areas 
 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for both the whole urban sample (211,300) and 
our restricted sample (70,839), on which we run the multivariate regressions. Since we are 
interested in parental educational expenditure on children, we dropped parents who are students 
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themselves, so that household education expenditure should only relate to spending on children. 
Finally, we focus only on children under 22 who still live with their parents. We exclude older 
children who no longer live with their parents because the characteristics of their present 
household are not likely to be those that determine the educational outcomes of interest, and may 
also be the result of prior schooling decisions. Given the cumulative nature of schooling decisions, 
the circumstances of the household in which the child was raised are more relevant; for this reason, 
we focus on children still living in the household of their parent or parents.  
Table 4.1 shows that 49.88% are male and 50.12% female in the whole sample, whereas 
this is 52.34% male and 47.66% female for households with children under 22. In terms of parental 
characteristics, Table 4.1 shows that in the whole (restricted) sample, the average mother’s age is 
43.45 (38.91)6. It is clear why average mother’s age is lower for households with younger children, 
since mothers with younger children are usually younger as well. The average age of fathers for the 
whole (restricted) sample is 48.30 (44.21). 
The influence of parental human capital formation on children’s ability to acquire their own 
human capital has been extensively studied (see Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Keane and Wopin, 
1997). To examine this relationship in our dataset, we present two variables on parental education 
in Table 4.1: parental education levels (fathers and mothers separately), and parental over-
education (fathers and mothers separately). We categorise parents’ education level in 6 levels: 
level 1 for parents with primary education; level 2 for secondary level; level 3 for high school level; 
level 4 is some sort of university degree level (can be first year of university, or last year of masters); 
                                                           
6The reference person in each family is defined as the guardian of household; we determine the relationship of other 
household members is with respect to this person. 
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level 5 for those with more than 18 years of schooling, which is PhD (or higher) levels; and category 
6 for any other type of education. Finally, because there were many missing values for both 
parents' schooling, we recoded our data to create a category of missing values for educational 
levels. We also address this in our regression framework by including ‘missing’ dummy variables. 
Table 4.1 shows that in the whole (restricted) sample, 29.81% (30.93%) of fathers have 
some primary level education, 17.29% (19.60%) have some sort of secondary education, 19.69% 
(20.30%) have some sort of high school education, 14.97% (15.55%) have university level 
education, and 0.25% (0.24%) have a PhD or above. Missing values account for 16.94% (12.87%) of 
fathers. It is important to note that information on parent’s education levels is only given where 
parents are literate; there is no education level of 0 reported. This means a high percentage of 
missing values might be the result of 0 years schooling, or in other words, illiterate parents. 
However, we cannot confirm that these missing values are solely due to illiteracy or lack of 
schooling.  
Another category of parental education in Table 4.1 is father’s over-education status.7 
According to our descriptive analysis, 9.50% of fathers are undereducated in their occupation, 
61.97% are normally educated, and 28.53% are over-educated. In households with children under 
22, this is 10.76%, 66.26%, and 22.98%, respectively. This confirms the existence of over education 
in Iran, which we mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
Although a father’s education level is an important determinant of investment in children’s 
education, many scholars argue that maternal human capital matters more (Kornich, 2012). Table 
                                                           
7We compute over-education by taking the average value of years of schooling for each occupational category and 
treating all individuals who fall within 1 standard deviation of this value as ‘normally’ educated. Those above or 
below these thresholds are ‘under’ or ‘over’ educated.  
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4.1 presents mothers’ level of education and maternal over-education statistics. It shows that 
30.98% of mothers have some sort of primary level education, 14.18% have some sort of secondary 
education, 18.73% have some sort of high school education, 8.51% have university level education, 
0.04% have a PhD or above, and 0.43% have other types of education. Missing values for mother’s 
education account for 27.14% of cases, which is significantly higher than that for fathers. For 
mothers with children under 22, the figures are 33.96%, 16.39%, 20.34%, 8.48%, 0.03%, 0.22%, and 
20.58%, respectively. Table 4.1 suggests that over-education is more prevalent amongst women 
than men in Iran, as we can observe 4.77% of mothers are undereducated in their occupation and 
62.06% are normally educated, while 33.17% are over-educated. Within households with children 
under 22, the values are 5.37%, 69.07%, and 25.56% (compared to 22.98% for fathers), 
respectively. 
Parental employment status can also relate to expenditures on a child’s education. Table 
4.1 shows that 66.56% of fathers were working, 2.00% were unemployed and looking for a job, 
19.82% were unemployed with income, 0.05% were housekeepers, and 1.42% were in some other 
category. Occupation status is missing for 10.03% of fathers. In households with children under 22, 
these figures are 77.06%, 2.13%, 11.21%, 0.02%, 0.95%, and 8.62%, respectively. Haveman et al. 
(1991) suggest a significant, positive relationship between a mother’s employment status, 
particularly during a child’s teenage years, and high school completion. Table 4.1 shows that 7.52% 
of mothers were working, 0.43% were looking for a job, 8.00% were inactive, 80.55% were 
housekeepers, and 0.26% were in other categories. Information is missing in 2.45% of cases, which 
is much lower than for fathers with missing employment information (10.03%). For mothers’ 
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employment status in households with children under 22, the figures are 9.26%, 0.44%, 4.82%, 
84.64%, 0.08%, and 0.77%, respectively.  
Turning now to child characteristics, Table 4.1 shows the average child age is 16.14 years 
for the whole sample and 12.61 years for households with children under 22. In terms of the 
number of children per household, within the whole sample, 24.26% have no children, 24.96% have 
one child, 28.20% of households have two children, 14.50% of households have three children, 
5.27% of households have four children, 2.12% of households have five children, and 0.68% have 
six or more children. For households with at least one child under 22 years old, these numbers are 
20.51% for those with one child, 39.04% with two children, 24.58% with three children, 9.97% with 
four children, 4.44% with five children, and 1.48% with six and more children. Gender composition 
can also be an important determinant of household expenditure on education (Lundberg and Rose, 
2002); Table 4.1 shows that 23.55% of the whole sample have boys only, 16.12% have girls only, 
and 60.33% have children with mixed genders. The figures are 25.90%, 21.16%, and 52.94%, 
respectively, for our sample of households with children under 22 years old.  
Table 4.1 also provides information on the spending characteristics of Iranian households. 
For Information on income, we added the income for wage workers with the self-employed and 
we included other types of income, for instance, from properties or heritage. According to this 
table, annual household income was 59,585,198.69 Rials (6,156.44$)8 for the whole sample, and 
60,020,534.97(6,201.42$) Rials for households with children under 22 years old. Our variable on 
income is gross income, and it excludes taxes. It also has been deflated. In our dataset, the total 
average household expenditure includes spending on food, housing, clothing, communication, 




transport, education, and entertainment. Annual total household expenditure for the whole 
sample was 32,591,388.57 Rials (3,367.39$), and 32,291,394.12 Rials (3,336.4$) for households 
with children under 22 years old. Another variable describing household spending behaviours is a 
binary variable that takes the value of zero or one describing whether families spend on education 
or not. According to Table 4.1, within the whole sample, 32.20% spend nothing on education, while 
67.80% report some sort of expenditure on education. For households with children under 22, 
15.88% of households report no educational expenditure at all, while 84.12% report some sort of 
spending. Clearly, the probability of some sort of educational expenditure rises if households have 
at least one child. Table 4.1 also provides information on how much families spend annually on 
education. On average, all families (with or without children) spent 791,954.42($81.83) Rials per 
year on education, while for households with children under 22, educational expenditure rises to 
some extent to 855,833.50($88.43). Hence by implication, families without children have lower 
educational expenditure than families with children. However, comparing the educational 
expenditure of all families with those with children, suggest that the two figures are very similar, 
implying that families with children spend similar amounts to families without children. There can 
be few explanations for this phenomenon. First of all households with no children might be 
spending money on their own education. For example a young married couple might be still going 
to university and that is why they are spending money on their education. This is why in our 
subsample we have dropped those households that father and mother are going to university. For 
instance, in our whole sample we have couples that are spending money on their university level 
education, while in our subsample we don't have these families. Secondly in our whole sample we 
have all families with children hence there are families who are spending money on their children's 
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university level, while in our subsample we only have those households that are spending money 
for children under the age of university. Given the fact that university expenses are very high in 
Iran, and the fact that many parents prefer to send their children to public school and save their 
money for when they are going to university (REF) this phenomenon can be explained.  
Note that education expenditure here is for primary, secondary, and high school levels only 
and excludes educational expenditure on higher education. We have two reasons to do so. First, 
we are interested in parental expenditure on their children’s education; parents spending on 
higher education might be spending that on themselves. Second, we are primarily interested in 
younger children, so an analysis of educational expenditure on higher education is not relevant. 
Proportionally, educational expenditure accounts for 2.8% of total expenditure in the whole 
sample and 3.2% for families with children under 22.9As mentioned in the literature review, many 
studies claim that Iranian households spend low proportions of their total expenditure on 
education. Our sample confirms these findings (Hashemkhani, 2011; Ansari, 2011). Finally, Table4.1 









                                                           
9We calculate proportions by dividing educational expenditure by total expenditure. 
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics Urban Areas
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev. Value P-value
Continuous
Famlily income last year (deflated) 211,206 59,585,198.69 64,552,749.42 70,289 60,020,534.97 54,856,011       435,336.28 0.003
Family total expenditure last year (deflated) 211,295 32,591,388.57 43,468,058.19 70,320 32,291,394.12 42948359.41 -299,994.45 0.426
Family educational expenditure last year (deflated) 210,644 791,954.42 2,757,322.39 70,185 855,833.50 2,670,665         63,879.08 0.000
Proportion of family expenditure on education 210,644 0.03 0.056 70,185 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.000
Fathers age 190,115 48.31 13.05 64,256 44.21 9.50 -4.10 0.000
Mothers age 206,118 43.45 12.27 69,773 38.92 8.52 -4.54 0.000
Child age 192,694 16.14 8.79 70,320 12.61 6.10 -3.53 0.000
Categorical
Sex
Male 105,402 49.88 36,803 52.34 2.46 0.000
Female 105,896 50.12 33,516 47.66 -2.46 0.000
Father  education levels
Level 1 56,665 29.81 19,877 30.93 1.12 0.000
Level 2 32,876 17.29 12,593 19.60 2.31 0.000
Level 3 37,434 19.69 13,047 20.30 0.61 0.000
Level 4 28,462 14.97 9,992 15.55 0.58 0.000
Level 5 467 0.25 152 0.24 -0.01 0.000
Level 6 1,999 1.05 324 0.50 -0.55 0.000
Missing 32,208 16.94 8,271 12.87 -4.07 0.000
Mother education levels
Level 1 63,856 30.98 23,696 33.96 2.98 0.000
Level 2 29,232 14.18 11,433 16.39 2.21 0.000




Table 4.1(Continues): Summary Statistics Urban Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev. Value P-value
Level 3 38,599 18.73 14,191 20.34 1.61 0.000
Level 4 17,539 8.51 5,920 8.48 -0.03 0.000
Level 5 78 0.04 20 0.03 -0.01 0.000
Level 6 888 0.43 154 0.22 -0.21 0.000
Missing 55,936 27.14 14,363 20.58 -6.56 0.000
Fathers overeducation
Undereducated 18,062 9.50 6,913 10.76 1.17 0.000
Normal educated 117,813 61.97 42,576 66.26 4.69 0.000
Overeducated 54,240 28.53 14,767 22.98 -5.88 0.000
Mother overeducation
Undereducated 9,836 4.77 3,747 5.37 0.5 0.000
Normal educated 127,921 62.06 48,198 69.07 5.81 0.000
Overeducated 68,371 33.17 17,832 25.56 -6.31 0.000
Father working status
Working 140,646 66.56 54,188 77.06 5.56 0.000
Looking for job 4,231 2.00 1,501 2.13 0.13 0.000
Unemployed with income 41,874 19.82 7,881 11.21 -8.64 0.000
Student 264 0.12 na na na na
Housewife 100 0.05 17 0.02 -0.03 0.000
Others 3,000 1.42 669 0.95 -0.48 0.000
Missing father information 21,185 10.03 6,064 8.62 -1.44 0.000
Mother working status
Working 15,892 7.52 6,513 9.26 1.68 0.000
Looking for job 915 0.43 308 0.44 0.00 0.000
Unemployed with income 16,894 8.00 3,386 4.82 -3.22 0.000
Student 306 0.89 na na na na





Table 4.1(Continues): Summary Statistics Urban Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev. Value P-value
Housewife 170,209 80.55 59,516 84.64 3.48 0.000
Others 557 0.26 54 0.08 -0.18 0.000
Missing Mother information 5,172 2.45 543 0.77 -1.68 0.000
Number of children in household aged less than 22
0 51,265 24.26 na na na na
1 52,750 24.96 14,422 20.51 -4.33 0.000
2 59,596 28.20 27,450 39.04 10.87 0.000
3 30,633 14.50 17,283 24.58 10 0.000
4 11,125 5.27 7,008 9.97 4.66 0.000
5 4,487 2.12 3,119 4.44 2.28 0.000
6 or more 1,444 0.68 1,038 1.48 0.79 0.000
Child gender composition
All boys 23,885 23.55 18,215 25.90 2.39 0.000
All girls 16,353 16.12 14,879 21.16 5.09 0.000
Mixed 61,193 60.33 37,225 52.94 -7.48 0.000
Family spends any money on education
0 67,824 32.20 11,144 15.88 -16.38 0.000
1 142,820 67.80 59,041 84.12 16.38 0.000





4.3.4. Summary statistics for rural areas 
 
Table 4.2 provides the same summary statistics for rural areas. We first present a 
descriptive analysis of the whole rural sample (222,763) and then describe our restricted sample 
(84,778). To avoid repetition, this section will highlight the differences between rural and urban 
areas only, and will not describe each statistic separately. 
Characteristics such as parents’ age, child gender composition, and child age are in the 
same range for both environments. Two children per household is the most common family size 
in both types of area, though rural households have a higher proportion of large families than 
urban households do. For example, in rural areas, 2.95% of households with children under 22 
have 6 children or more, while this is 1.48% for urban households.  
In terms of parents’ education levels, there are interesting differences between rural and 
urban areas. The number of fathers with the lowest level of education is higher in rural areas 
(37.29%) compared to urban areas (29.81%). In addition, the percentage of fathers with some 
sort of higher education is much lower in rural areas (3.79%) compared to urban areas (14.97%). 
We can observe similar differences in households with children under 22 years old, where the 
percentage of fathers with the lowest level of education is 41.72% in rural areas and 30.93% in 
urban areas. The number of missing values for fathers’ education is also higher in rural areas 
(34.76%) compared to urban areas (16.94%). As explained above, this suggests, though does not 
confirm, that the number of illiterate fathers is higher in rural areas than in urban areas. 
University level education amongst fathers in households with children under 22 also differs 
between rural and urban areas, at 4.23% in rural areas compared with 15.55% in urban areas. 
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Another indicator of paternal education level is fathers’ over-education, which also differs 
between urban and rural areas. Table 4.2 suggests that over-education among rural fathers in 
the whole sample is much higher in rural areas (47.62%) compared with urban fathers (28.53%). 
The same trend is also evident in households with children under 22, where over-educated 
fathers in rural areas make up 36.06% of the sample compared to over educated fathers in urban 
areas (22.98%). 
In terms of maternal education, Table 4.2 shows that rural mothers have lower education 
levels than urban mothers do. For example, only 1.18% of rural mothers in the whole sample 
have some sort of university education, while this is 8.51% in urban areas. These numbers are 
1.13% (rural) and 8.48% (urban) in households with children under 22. Furthermore, missing 
values are recorded for 50.41% of mothers in rural areas in the whole sample, compared to 
27.14% of missing values for urban mothers. With the caveats above, these values suggest high 
numbers of illiterate mothers in rural areas. In households with children under 22, the number 
of missing values is slightly lower, at 41.72% (rural). In terms of maternal over-education, Table 
4.2 shows much higher over-education among rural mothers (63.01%) compared to urban 
mothers (33.17%) in the whole sample, and 56.48% and 25.56% in households with children 
under 22 years old. 
In terms of household income, Table 4.2 highlights interesting differences between rural 
and urban households. Average annual income for rural households with children under 22 was 
32,986,069.19 Rials (3,408.17$), while it was 60,020,534.97(6,201$) Rials in urban households. 
This suggest that urban households have annual income of was nearly double that of rural 
households. Rural and urban households also differ in terms of family expenditure. Total annual 
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expenditure for a rural household with children under 22 was 18,007,172.56(1,860.53$) Rials, 
while it was 32,291,394.12(3,336.40$) Rials for urban households. 
Educational expenditure for rural households with children under 22 was also much lower 
(429,640.60 Rials/44.39$) compared to urban households (855,833.50 Rials/88.34$). 
Interestingly, rural households with children under 22 spend proportionally more of their income 
on education compared to urban households: 4.3% versus 3.2%. These numbers are 3.1% and 
2.8%, respectively, for the whole sample.  
Overall, a comparison of the summary statistics in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 confirms the 
existence of education and income inequality between urban and rural areas. Both mothers and 
fathers in urban areas are better educated than their rural counterparts are. Urban families have 
higher incomes and spend more money on education than rural families in absolute terms. 
Interestingly, however, rural families spend a greater proportion of their income on educational 
goods than urban families do. Finally, missing values (which can be an indicator of illiteracy) are 
much more common among rural parents. We will explore how these differences influence 





Table 4.2: Summary Statistics Rural Areas
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev. Value P-value
Continuous 0.000
Famlily income last year (deflated) 220,786 32,798,137.10 39,005,192.55 83,773 32,986,069.19 36,824,595       187,932.10 0.086
Family total expenditure last year (deflated) 222,766 18,786,151.74 29,284,104.48 84,953 18,007,172.56 28032383.98 -778,979.178 0.000
Family educational expenditure last year (deflated) 220,441 351,186.14 1,040,732 83,883 429,640.60 1,132,158         78,454.45 0.000
Proportion of educational expenditure 220,441 0.03 0.065 83,883 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.000
Fathers Age 172,001 48.48 14.63 64,923 43.65 10.58 -4.83 0.000
Mothers Age 216,078 43.78 13.16 83,298 38.85 9.19 -4.93 0.000
Child age 202,220 15.31 8.52 84,953 12.19 5.86 -3.12 0.000
Categorical
Sex
Male 105,435 47.33 44,485 52.47 5.14 0.000
Female 117,327 52.67 40,292 47.53 -5.14 0.000
Father  education levels
Level 1 64,138 37.29 27,024 41.72 4.43 0.000
Level 2 24,888 14.47 10,944 16.89 2.42 0.000
Level 3 14,012 8.15 5,711 8.82 0.67 0.000
Level 4 6,521 3.79 2,742 4.23 0.44 0.000
Level 5 29 0.02 10 0.02 0.00 0.000
Level 6 2,621 1.52 537 0.83 -0.69 0.000
Missing 59,788 34.76 17,813 27.50 -7.26 0.000
Mother education levels
Level 1 73,539 34.04 34,016 40.92 6.88 0.000
Level 2 18,120 8.39 8,157 9.81 1.42 0.000




Table 4.2 (Continues): Summary Statistics Rural Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev. Value P-value
Level 3 12,191 5.64 5,114 6.15 0.51 0.000
Level 4 2,559 1.18 943 1.13 -0.05 0.000
Level 5 11 0.01 4 0.00 -0.01 0.000
Level 6 709 0.33 208 0.25 -0.08 0.000
Missing 108,924 50.41 34,681 41.72 -8.69 0.000
Fathers overeducation
Undereducated 13,968 8.13 6,187 9.55 1.42 0.000
Normal educated 76,009 44.25 35,234 54.39 10.14 0.000
Overeducated 81,801 47.62 23,360 36.06 -11.56 0.000
Mother overeducation
Undereducated 7,164 3.61 3,362 4.27 0.66 0.000
Normal educated 66,316 33.39 30,873 39.25 5.86 0.000
Overeducated 125,152 63.01 44,428 56.48 -6.53 0.000
Father working status
Working 139,129 62.46 57,011 67.25 4.79 0.000
Looking for job 4,470 2.01 1,924 2.27 0.26 0.000
Unemployed with income 25,013 11.23 5,032 5.94 -5.29 0.000
Student 47 0.02 na na na na
Housekeeper 83 0.04 21 0.02 -0.02 0.000
Other 3,259 1.46 793 0.93 -0.53 0.000
Missing father information 50,762 22.79 19,997 23.59 0.80 0.000
Mother working status
Working 33,167 14.89 13,316 15.71 0.82 0.000
Looking for job 606 0.27 251 0.30 0.03 0.000
Unemployed with income 13,771 6.18 3,459 4.08 -2.10 0.000
Student 439 0.20 na na
Housewife 167,187 75.05 65,974 77.82 77.62 0.000




Table 4.2 (Continues): Summary Statistics Rural Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev. Value P-value
Others 893 0.40 123 0.15 -74.90 0.000
Missing Mother information 6,700 3.01 1,655.00 1.95 1.55 0.000
Number of children in household aged less than 22
0 48,001 21.55 na na . .
1 44,703 20.07 12,680 14.96 -5.11 0.000
2 59,784 26.84 28,226 33.29 6.45 0.000
3 37,472 16.82 21,681 25.57 8.75 0.000
4 18,407 8.26 11,908 14.05 5.79 0.000
5 10,964 4.92 7,775 9.17 4.25 0.000
6 or more 3,432 1.54 2,508 2.95 1.41 0.000
Child gender composition
All boys 23,460 20.72 19,078 22.50 1.78 0.000
All girls 16,602 14.67 15,236 17.97 3.30 0.000
Mixed 73,143 64.61 50,464 59.52 -5.09 0.000
Family spends any money on education
0 81,309 36.56 16,110 19.02 -17.54 0.000
1 141,094 63.44 68,603 80.98 17.54 0.000






Our goal in this chapter is to investigate the determinants of parents’ educational 
expenditure on children in urban and rural areas of Iran. To do so, we employ three types of 
dependent variable in our regression analysis: a binary variable for spending, log of 
educational expenditure, and the proportion of educational expenditure compared to total 
household expenditure.  
Since our three types of dependent variable differ in their construction, we will need 
to employ a different regression model for each one. For the binary spending variable, we 
employ a logit model, which will allow us to examine spending at the extensive margin. For 
the continuous variable of log educational expenditure, we employ an OLS model to examine 
education spending at the intensive margins. Finally, to examine the proportion of household 
expenditure on education, we employ a fractional logit model that allows us to estimate a 
flexible distribution bounded between 0 and 1, where both may appear as outcomes 
(something not feasible with a traditional Tobit model).  
4.4.1. Logit model 
 
Our data is characterised by the presence of a large number of zeros in the response 
variable, indicating no expenditure on children’s education. To model spending decisions at 
the extensive margin, we first investigate what determines whether households spend 
resources on education. To ensure that such dependent variables are accommodated 
correctly in our empirical framework, we estimate the decision to spend non-zero amounts 
via a standard logit model. 
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Following Jones (1998), let the probability that educational expenditure for individual 
i,𝑌1𝑖 , is positive be determined by two vectors of observable factors (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ). Let(𝜀𝑖 ) be the 
error term distributed as a logistic distribution function with cdf𝐹(⋅). The probability that the 
dependent variable, 𝑌1𝑖 , takes the value of 0 or 1 is a function of whether the underlying 
latent variable 𝑦1𝑖
∗ is higher than a threshold value.  
𝑌1𝑖𝑗 = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑗






The vectors of observable characteristics are given by individual specific variables, 
𝑥𝑖
′𝛽1, (such as age, gender) and household specific variables, 𝑥𝑗
′𝛽2, (father’s and mother’s age, 
father’s and mother’s education, household income, etc.). See Tables 4.1 and 4.2 for more 
information. Because it is possible that multiple children have the same parents, we cluster 
all standard errors by household. 
Finally, we present our results using marginal effects coefficients estimated at the 
mean of all independent variables for the logit model, as marginal effects are a more powerful 
interpretive device. According to Wulff (2014), a clear advantage of the marginal effect 
method is that it provides richer and more meaningful information not available through by 
interpreting the coefficients, and it provides information about changes in the predicted 
probabilities due to a change in a predictor.  
4.4.2. OLS model 
 
The second model is a standard linear regression model, conditional on the subsample 
of families that spend a non-zero amount on education. We regress the monetary amount 
spent,𝑌2𝑖𝑗, on observable covariates 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗. We log the dependent variable and deflate it 
106 
 
for each year. We also cluster robust standard errors by household as in the previous model. 
The model we estimate takes the form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑌2𝑖𝑗) = 𝛽0 +  𝑥𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑗
′𝛽2 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    (4.2) 
Where 𝑥𝑖
′ 𝛽1 is a vector of observable individual characteristics (such as age, gender) 
and 𝑥𝑗
′ 𝛽2 is a vector of family characteristics (such as father’s and mother’s age, father’s and 
mother’s education, household income, etc.). 𝜀𝑖𝑗 is a standard normally distributed variable 
that, for a causal interpretation, we assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables.  
4.4.3. Fractional logit model 
 
We now turn to the proportion of educational expenditures as our dependant 
variable. An OLS is unworkable for regressions on proportions because two of its tenets are 
violated. An OLS requires that the response, y, be continuous and unlimited between −∞ <
𝑦 < +∞, and that the error variance be constant everywhere in that range. However, since 
our dependent variable is a proportion, it is constrained to the unit interval, 0 <p< 1, and the 
variance is not constant but depends on 𝑣𝑎𝑟(p) = p(1 − p). Thus, OLS regressions would 
produce biased and inconsistent estimates in this situation due to non-normally distributed 
errors (Blundell & Meghir, 1987; Cragg, 1971; Lamb, 2004).  
To correct this estimation problem, we implement a limited-dependent variable 
model called the fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1993). The standard approach 
to dealing with a censored variable is via a traditional Tobit model that combines the probit 
likelihood that a zero value will be observed with the linear regression likelihood to explain 
non-zero values. However, more complex Tobit models are needed when, in addition to a 
lower bound, an upper bound is present (in this case, at the value one). Even if no upper 
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bound values are present, the fractional logit model is theoretically consistent, as the Tobit 
model simply does not apply when theoretical values beyond the censoring point are 
infeasible. 
The fractional logit model is estimated via quasi-maximum likelihood, and the log-
likelihood for our dependent variable 𝑌3 𝑖𝑗is given by: 
𝑙𝑛 𝐿 = 𝑌3𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝛬(𝒙𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽)) + 𝛽)) + (1 − 𝑌3 𝑖𝑗) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1 − 𝛬(𝒙𝑖𝑗
′ 𝛽))(4.3) 
Where Λ is the logistic CDF and 𝑦3𝑖𝑗  is bounded between [0,1] (which differs from 
normal logit models that limit y to a value of either 0 or 1). 𝑌3𝑖𝑗  is the proportion of household 
expenditure on education for each child I in household j. 𝒙𝑖𝑗
′  is a vector of individual and family 
characteristics used in the previous models. We can interpret the coefficients using odds 
ratios or marginal effects. In this case, we present marginal effects calculated at the mean of 
other independent variables.  
4.4.4. Selection models 
 
So far, the previous three models have been estimated independently and take no 
account of any underlying selection process that may drive our dependent variables. For 
example, equation (4.2) is only observed when spending on education is above 0. However, 
when the correlation between the two error terms in (4.1) and (4.2) is non-zero, selection 
bias will exist, and bias the resulting estimates in equation (4.2). This could occur if an 
underlying non-observed process is driving both models, such as parental motivation or 
attitudes towards spending (possibly due to other unobserved family background variables). 
For this reason, we also explore two selection models that aim to account for potential 
selection in education expenditure.  
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The first model is the traditional Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979), where a 
regression equation is specified, in this case, our OLS model in equation (4.2): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑌2𝑖𝑗) = 𝛼𝑖
′𝛽0 +  𝑥𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝑥𝑗
′𝛽2 + 𝑢1𝑖𝑗    (4.4) 
and a selection equation is specified, in this case, our Logit model in equation (4.1): 
𝑌1𝑖𝑗 = 𝑧𝑖
′𝛽1 + 𝑧𝑗






The error terms are distributed as follows: 
𝑢1~𝑁(0, 𝜎)     
𝑢2~𝑁(0,1) 
 
Additionally, there is a correlation between both error terms of 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢1, 𝑢2) = 𝜌. We 
estimate this system via maximum likelihood and achieve identification by including at least 
one additional variable in (4.5) that strongly affects the chance of observation (i.e., the 
probability that children experience educational expenditure), whilst not affecting the 
outcome under study (i.e., the actual educational expenditure). Theoretically, we can run the 
model without such variables, but in this case, identification will depend on functional form.  
We can apply the same selection treatment to equation (4.3) examining the 
proportion of household expenditure on education. Traditional models used for proportions, 
such as the fractional logit model mentioned above, assume that proportions are bounded 
between 0 and 1, but do not actually consist of 0s or 1s. However, as highlighted in Figure 4.2, 
our data clearly contains a large proportion of 0s. This suggests there might be an underlying 
process generating the 0s, and equation (4.3) does not consider this explicitly. Equation (4.3) 
specifically assumes that proportions taking values greater than 0 are determined through 
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the same process as proportions that take the value 0. Obviously, this may be an incorrect 
assumption.  
We therefore also estimate a zero-inflated beta model that consists of up to three 
parts: a logit model for whether or not a proportion takes the value 0, a logit model for 
whether or not a proportion takes the value 1, and a beta model for proportions between 0 
and 1. In our case, the absence of 1s means that the model reduces to a two-part model. We 
do the estimation via maximum likelihood and identification is not only necessary if one 
believes that the underlying process that determines 0s differs from the process that 
determines proportions greater than 0 and less than 1. 
For both models, we spent a significant amount of time examining the dataset for 
potential exclusion restrictions that we could use in the first stage of either model. Any 
potential variable could affect the decision to spend on education, but not affect the amount 
of household expenditure on education. Conceptually, this was challenging, and we could find 
few theoretically suitable variables in the available data. In addition, as our results show, most 
variables are either statistically significant in all regressions or statistically insignificant in all 
regressions. We therefore estimated models without exclusion restrictions in both cases and 
attached these results in the appendix. We acknowledge that such results are unlikely to be 
robust, but argue nonetheless that these results might suggest some selection bias. Any 
apparent selection bias in these models suggests that selection is more of a concern than 
anticipated, and that our ‘base’ models should be interpreted with caution. Appendix A 








Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the determinants of family educational expenditure for 
urban and rural households in Iran measured at both the extensive and intensive margins. 
Employing both margins allows us to explore both the statistical significance and direction of 
the relationships. The first section presents the results of the logit model examining whether 
households spent money on education or not; the second section presents the results of the 
OLS model examining how much money households spent on education where expenditure 
was more than zero; and the third section presents the results of the fractional logit model 
for the proportion of household expenditures allocated to education.  
4.5.1 Urban areas 
4.5.1.1 Logit model 
 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the logit model for any kind of educational expenditure 
on children in urban areas. The results indicate that parental over-education, maternal 
education, and most coefficients regarding parents’ working status are not significantly 
related to the probability that families spent money on education. On the other hand, 
household annual income, child’s gender, number of children, age category of children, 
father’s education, and most coefficients on both parents' age, are significantly related to the 
probability that the family spent money on children’s education. 
Table 4.3 shows that household annual income is positively related to the probability 
that the family would spend money on children’s education. The results in this table suggest 
that a 1 per cent increase in household income increases the likelihood of household 
educational expenditure by 1.2 percentage points. It should also be noted that the 
relationship between income and the probability of spending on education appears to be 
111 
 
relatively linear since the higher order polynomial terms (not shown) were not significant. In 
other words, children from the richest family are most likely to experience education-related 
expenditure, whilst children from the poorest families are least likely. The finding that 
household income has a significant effect on educational expenditure is consistent with wider 
results in the literature. For example, Glewwe and Patrinos (1999) find that as household 
income increases, willingness to spend on education also increases. One possible explanation 
is that parents with higher incomes perceive investments in education as providing future 
returns in terms of greater earnings potential and higher quality of life for their children. This 
suggests that lack of intergenerational income mobility exists in Iran.  
Table 4.3 also suggests a positive and significant relationship between a child’s gender 
(being a girl) and the probability of any kind of educational expenditure. According to our 
results, the probability of any type of educational expenditure rises by 1.3 percentage points 
for urban households with a girl (although we do not know that the money was actually spent 
on the girl in mixed gender households). Babaie (2011) claims that one of the reasons parents 
in Iran spend on their daughters’ education is that university education will help them escape 
low-wage work. On the other hand, Isfahani (2009) investigates the rising marriage age of 
young Iranians and claims that higher education, especially for women, could increase their 
chances of marriage. Finally, Salehi-Isfahani (2011) claims that higher educated young women 
in Iran will be the main educators in the home as future mothers. This interesting argument 
could also explain why households value educating girls more. Considering the studies 
mentioned above(Babaie, 2011; Isfahani. 2009) our proposed explanation for a higher 
likelihood of educational expenditure for girls is that given existing discriminations against 
women in the Iranian labour market, parents who are aware of these prejudices expect that 
higher and more productive education for the girls might help compete with their male 
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counterparts in the labour market, increase their chances of getting married, and become 
better educators when they have children.  
Table 4.3 suggests that a father’s age is only significantly related to the probability of 
spending on education when they are between 20 and 40 years old. Households with fathers 
between 20 to 30 years old have the highest probability of educational expenditure on 
children; compared to our reference age (10 to 20), households with fathers between 20 to 
30 years old are 4.7 percentage points more likely to spend on education. On the other hand, 
children whose fathers are between 50 to 60 experienced a lower probability of educational 
expenditure (1 percentage points) compared to children with fathers between 20 to 30 years 
old (4.7 percentage points). It should be noted that the sample size becomes small quickly as 
paternal age increases and this contributes to wider standard errors.  
For maternal age, the categories 20 to 30, 30 to 40, and 40 to 50 are significantly 
related to probability of spending on education. Mothers between the ages of 40 to 50 have 
the highest probability of educational expenditure on children although the effect remains 
similar to that of young fathers (approximately 4 percentage points) across the entire 
maternal age range. This is an interesting difference from results related to fathers. It should 
be noted that these parental effects are independent of children’s ages since we control for 
these separately.  
A father’s education level appears to affect the probability of household educational 
expenditure. Table 4.3 shows that if a father has a university degree or equivalent, the 
probability of educational expenditure on children in his household rises by 3 percentage 
points. Furthermore, if a father has a PhD degree or above, the probability of educational 
spending rises by 6 percentage points. Maternal education, however, is not an important 
determinant of the probability of expenditure on education. This might be because in a 
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typical, traditional Iranian household, fathers are the children’s guardians and the main 
decision makers. This finding suggests that any intergenerational transmission of education 
in Iran is likely to be driven by the father’s education as opposed to the mother’s education. 
This is also an interesting result in light of the other finding that girls in a family increase the 
likelihood of educational expenditure. This may have important implications for future studies 
on social and intergenerational mobility in Iran.  
Finally, in line with expectations, there is a clear positive relationship between the 
number and age of children and the probability of educational expenditure. The coefficients 
for number of children are large and significant, and show the importance of household size 
on the probability of spending on education. It should be noted that because the sample is 
limited to households with children, the reference category is 1 child. This suggests that larger 
families (those with 2 children or more) are significantly more likely to spend money on 
educational goods. Coefficients for all child categories over 1 are approximately 25 
percentage points more likely, which is a large probability increase. The largest coefficients in 
our model, however, are those relating to the age of a household’s children. The highest 
probability of educational expenditure is for households with teenage children aged 10 and 
14. All categories show coefficients of approximately 0.5, suggesting a 50 percentage point 
increase in the probability of spending over children that are younger than 5 years old. 
As mentioned before, coefficients such as parental over-education, maternal 
education, and parents’ working status were not significantly related to the probability that 
households spent money on their children’s education, while the primary determinants of 
whether families spend money on their children’s education are the number and age of 
children in the household, the level of their father’s education, and family income leve l.  
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4.5.1.2 OLS model 
 
Observing the results for the intensive margins in column (2) of Table 4.3 also provides 
some interesting insights on the determinants of parental expenditure on children's 
education in urban areas. Here, the dependent variable is the log of educational expenditure 
for families who spend money on education; there are 53,171 observations. According to this 
table, child gender, fathers’ age, most coefficients on parents’ over-education and 
employment status are not significantly related to the amount of household educational 
expenditure. While household income, maternal age, and both parents’ education status, 
child age, and household size is significantly related to the amount of educational 
expenditure.  
There is a clear positive relationship between annual household income and the 
amount of educational expenditure, where the coefficient is 0.317.The coefficient suggests 
that educational expenditure is a necessity good. This means that like any normal good, 
educational expenditure rises as household income risesal though the increase for spending 
on education is less than proportional to the rise in income. In other words, the proportion of 
expenditure on education falls as income rises. This finding is in accordance to worldwide 
literature (for example, Gundersen et al, 2004) for demand on education. However, as 
Gundersen et al (2004) explain, in most developed countries household can borrow the 
money they need and invest it on their children's educations whereas in developing countries, 
'where credit markets function poorly most investment in education must be funded by 
households. This makes it very likely that credit-constrained and risk averse lower income 
households will invest less in education'(Gundersen et al, 2004, p.9). Finally, the magnitude 
of this coefficient suggests that household income is an important determinant of educational 
expenditure on children. 
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Moreover, the maternal age categories suggest that older mothers spend more money on 
education, and mothers aged 50 to 60 spent the most on children's education. Note  
That none of the father’s age categories (apart from the missing variable) are significant in 
the OLS model. Furthermore, Children from families with highly educated parents 
experienced higher educational expenditure. For father’s education level, the results show a 
similar relationship to the previous model: a father’s education is significantly related to the 
amount of household educational expenditure, and fathers with a PhD or above spent 
substantially more (coefficient 1.138) on their children's education. Fathers with some type 
of university degree also spend 40% more on their children's education. Interestingly, unlike 
the previous models, maternal education also appears significant, and these coefficients 
suggest, consistent with the existing literature (Harris and Morgan, 1991; Lundberg and Rose, 
2002), that the maternal education level has a greater positive effect on educational 
expenditure than fathers' education level. Table 4.3 suggests that for mothers with a PhD 
qualification or above the coefficient is 1.811 while for fathers with a qualification with a PhD 
or above the coefficient is 1.138 with the same level of education. Note that the differential 
relative to the reference category is larger for women than for men, suggesting there is more variation 
in spending across education attainment categories of mothers than of fathers.  
Finally, our results on child age and household size suggest a positive and significant 
relationship between these variables and the amount parents spend on their children's 
education. Table 4.3 shows that as the number of children and their ages rise, the amount of 
educational expenditure also rises. Children aged 15 to 22 received the highest expenditure 
compared to other age groups. Thus, students studying for high school, or preparing for 
university entrance or the labour market, receive the greatest educational expenditure. 
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4.5.1.3 Fractional logit model 
 
Columns (7), (8), and (9) of Table 4.3 estimate a fractional logit model for the 
proportion of expenditure allocated to education by urban households. Most coefficients do 
not appear to directly relate to the proportion of expenditure. The column shows that child’s 
gender, parents’ age, parents’ schooling, and employment status are not significantly related. 
In terms of financial resources, our model suggests a negative relationship between 
the proportion of expenditure allocated to education and household wealth. This contrasts 
with models (1) and (2), which suggest a positive relationship between household educational 
expenditure and family income. The marginal effect of -0.004 is statistically significant at the 
0% level, and suggests that richer families proportionally spend approximately 0.4% less on 
education for each 1% increase in total income. This suggests that in urban areas, as families 
become wealthier, total expenditure on other consumables rises, but the proportion 
allocated to education declines. This is an interesting contrast to the ‘level’ models in columns 
(1) and (2) that suggest ever increasing expenditure on education items. 
In terms of fathers’ over/under education, our model indicates some negative effects 
of educational mismatch on the proportion of expenditure allocated to education. Our 
previous model suggests no statistically significant effect of parental over-education, so it is 
interesting to see its influence on this dependent variable. Column (3) in Table 4.3 shows that 
while under-educated fathers have a negative effect on the proportion of educational 
expenditure, this effect is positive for children whose fathers are overeducated; in 
comparison with household whose fathers are normally educated, households with over-
educated fathers experience a 0.7% increase in proportional spending. In terms of maternal 
over-education, we observe a positive significant relationship for over-educated mothers, 
where the coefficient is 0.008 and translates to a 0.8 per cent increase in household spending 
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on education proportionally. A possible explanation for higher educational spending of over-
educated parents is that although these parents are over-educated and possibly haven't 
received the appropriate income and employment they initially invested for, they value 
education beyond an investment but as a precious feature. Hence they spend higher 
proportion of their income on the education of their children. Another explanation might be 
related to the intergenerational impact of education, and how parents' experience of 
educational expenditure by their family shapes their future expenditure on educating their 
children (Steelmann and Powell, 1991). In other words overeducated parents still spend 
proportionally more of their income on their children's education because their own parents 
spent higher proportion of their income on their children's education. The coefficient for 
mothers who are undereducated, however, is not statistically significantly different from 
zero, which suggests that this does not play a role in household allocation decisions. 
Households in which both parents are overeducated experienced approximately 1.5% more 
expenditure on education proportional to household expenditure. We can also observe that 
maternal education has a positive and significant impact on the proportion of a household’s 
educational expenditure. For instance, households where the mother has a PhD experience a 
3.6% increase in the proportion of household’s educational expenditure. As stated before, 
father’s education is not significantly related to the proportion of education expenditure in 
urban households. 
Finally, the results of the fractional logit model suggest a positive and significant 
relationship between the numbers of children, child’s age, and the proportion spent on 
education. Column (3) of Table 4.3 shows that households with children aged 10 to 15 spent 
the highest proportion of their expenditures on education, and bigger households with more 
children spent the greatest proportions. 
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4.5.1.4 Selection models 
 
We noted previously that our selection models are based on an identification strategy 
that does not use exclusion restrictions due to the difficulty of finding appropriate variables. 
We nonetheless argue that we can obtain some insight on possible selection effects by 
examining and comparing the coefficients of key variables across both model types (non-
selective vs selective). We present the results for our selection models in Appendix A. 
Examining the Heckman selection model for urban areas suggests that the Mills 
inverse ratio is statistically significant. This indicates that selection into expenditure may be 
an issue in our previous models, and that our results should be taken with some caution. 
When examining the coefficients in detail, however, most variables between the selection 
and non-selection model display statistically similar coefficients. Only father’s age and child’s 
age appear to deviate between the models. This suggests that a possible route into selection 
may be age-related factors, and these could be explored in more detail. The overall conclusion 
remains that both sets of models display broadly similar findings, even in the presence of a 
statistically significant selection term.  
The same applies to the fractional logit expenditure proportion model. Evidence from 
our zero-inflated beta models suggests that including a selection equation does not 
significantly alter the results of the proportional outcomes. Although the selection term does 
suggest some selection, the individual coefficients are generally not statistically significantly 
different. We therefore argue that for both model types, we can accept our standard set of 
results, with some caution.
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Table 4.3: Results on Urban Areas
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values
Continuous
Log family income last year (deflated) 0.012 0.002 0.000 0.317 0.015 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Child gender (female) 0.013 0.002 0.000 -0.020 0.011 0.173 -0.001 0.000 0.059
Categorical
Father age(reference: 10 to 20)
20 to 30 0.047 0.009 0.000 -0.131 0.071 0.165 0.001 0.001 0.524
30 to 40 0.037 0.011 0.001 0.041 0.075 0.581 0.003 0.002 0.104
40 to 50 0.022 0.014 0.109 0.079 0.079 0.321 0.003 0.002 0.088
50 to 60 0.010 0.018 0.558 0.162 0.087 0.064 0.002 0.003 0.397
Missing -0.016 0.017 0.209 0.570 0.096 0.000 0.036 0.003 0.000
Mother age(reference: 10 to 20)
20 to 30 0.039 0.007 0.000 0.088 0.033 0.007 -0.001 0.001 0.481
30 to 40 0.043 0.011 0.000 0.139 0.041 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.126
40 to 50 0.049 0.012 0.000 0.150 0.052 0.004 -0.005 0.002 0.116
50 to 60 0.028 0.018 0.113 0.174 0.093 0.062 -0.008 0.003 0.121
Missing -0.036 0.046 0.427 -0.339 0.437 0.438 -0.001 0.002 0.471
Father  education levels (reference:Level 1)
Level 2 (Secondary School) 0.010 0.005 0.037 0.102 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.841
Level 3 (High School) 0.013 0.005 0.011 0.269 0.028 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.134
Level 4 (Degree) 0.030 0.006 0.000 0.406 0.038 0.000 -0.007 0.001 0.123
Level 5 (Phd) 0.060 0.016 0.000 1.138 0.219 0.000 0.008 0.009 0.402
Level 6  (other) 0.024 0.015 0.112 -0.036 0.118 0.759 -0.004 0.005 0.446
Fractional logit model of proportion of educational 
expenditure





Table 4.3(Continues): Results on Urban Areas 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values
Missing -0.031 0.011 0.004 -0.057 0.049 0.249 -0.005 0.002 0.015
Mother education levels(reference:Level 1)
Level 2 (Secondary School) 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.130 0.026 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.024
Level 3 (High School) 0.005 0.005 0.262 0.299 0.029 0.000 0.007 0.001 0.000
Level 4 (Degree) 0.012 0.010 0.250 0.430 0.067 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.001
Level 5 (Phd) 0.037 0.028 0.182 1.811 0.383 0.000 0.036 0.019 0.005
Level 6  (other) -0.107 0.059 0.067 -0.432 0.184 0.019 -0.018 0.006 0.005
Missing -0.029 0.015 0.054 -0.261 0.082 0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.002
Fathers overeducation(reference:Normal ) 
Undereducated 0.003 0.005 0.619 -0.014 0.027 0.605 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Overeducated -0.003 0.006 0.537 0.046 0.037 0.214 0.007 0.001 0.000
Mother overeducation(reference:Normal ) 
Undereducated 0.003 0.007 0.651 -0.103 0.038 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.785
Overeducated -0.023 0.013 0.076 0.130 0.077 0.092 0.008 0.003 0.002
Father working status(reference:Working)
Working (reference category)
Looking for job -0.005 0.011 0.592 -0.085 0.056 0.129 0.003 0.002 0.303
Inactive 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.050 0.029 0.084 0.004 0.001 0.001
Housekeeper . . . -0.785 0.076 0.000 -0.014 0.003 0.000
Other -0.019 0.022 0.383 0.048 0.103 0.639 0.001 0.004 0.800




Table 4.3(Continues): Results on Urban Areas 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values
Mother working status(reference:Working)
Looking for job 0.015 0.014 0.230 -0.063 0.152 0.677 -0.007 0.004 0.070
Inactive 0.010 0.013 0.428 -0.035 0.078 0.651 0.001 0.003 0.651
Housekeeper -0.012 0.008 0.090 0.010 0.042 0.820 -0.003 0.002 0.109
Other -0.161 0.117 0.174 -0.120 0.436 0.783 0.007 0.019 0.737
Number of children in household aged less than 22(reference: 1)
2 0.228 0.007 0.000 0.249 0.023 0.000 0.010 0.00 0.000
3 0.274 0.008 0.000 0.503 0.027 0.000 0.015 0.00 0.000
4 0.274 0.009 0.000 0.700 0.037 0.000 0.022 0.00 0.000
5 0.261 0.012 0.000 0.869 0.057 0.000 0.021 0.00 0.000
6 or more 0.266 0.014 0.000 0.953 0.098 0.000 0.030 0.01 0.000
Child age(reference: 0 to 5)
5 to 9 0.496 0.015 0.000 0.303 0.045 0.000 0.018 0.001 0.000
10 to 14 0.534 0.017 0.000 0.825 0.049 0.000 0.029 0.001 0.000
15 to 22 0.506 0.019 0.000 1.005 0.053 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.000
Missing 0.503 0.019 0.000 1.301 0.063 0.000 0.020 0.002 0.000









Logit model for any educational expenditure OLS model of amount spend (Rial) Fractional logit model of proportion of educational 
Source: HIES 2009/10-2011-12. Standard errors clustered on household
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4.5.2. Rural areas 
 
4.5.2.1. Comparison of rural and urban areas 
 
Table 4.4 shows the results for rural households in Iran from 2009/10 to 2011/12. To avoid 
repetition, we will not explain each coefficient individually, but will instead highlight the 
differences in results between urban and rural areas. 
Table 4.4 shows that child’s gender, maternal educational levels, parental over-education, 
and employment status are not statistically significant in rural areas of Iran when the dependent 
variable is whether children experience educational expenditure or not (logit model). However, 
we observe the significant importance of family income, parents’ age, fathers' education, number 
of children, and child’s age. In rural households, like their urban counterparts, a father holding a 
university degree increases the probability of spending on education. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for the effect of a father’s university degree is 0.046, which is larger than for urban 
areas (0.030). Interestingly, maternal education does not appear to be an important determinant 
of the probability of educational spending in either rural or urban areas.  
Turning to the OLS model in Table 4.4, we observe that just like in urban areas, there is a 
strong and significant relationship between annual household income and the amount spent on 
education. Table 4.4 shows that children from richer households in rural areas received 15% more 
educational spending than children from lower-income families. Table4.4 also shows that child’s 
gender (being a girl) is negatively related to the amount of household educational expenditure, 
and this effect is stronger in rural areas than urban areas. In addition, the strong positive 
relationship between maternal education level and amount of educational expenditure does not 
hold in rural households, where all of the coefficients on maternal education are not statistically 
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significantly different from zero. Just like in urban areas, however, there is a positive relationship 
between households with a father who completed higher education and the amount spent on 
education. For instance, household’s where the father has a university degree spend 32% more 
on their children’s educational expenditure, which is a similar differntial than urban households 
(40%). Finally, similar to urban areas, there is a significant positive relationship between the 
number and, age of children, and the amount of educational expenditure in rural areas. In terms 
of the proportion of expenditure allocated to education within rural households Table 4.4 shows 
that wealthier rural households spend a lower proportion of their income on education, which is 
consistent with our findings for urban households. We can also observe that, father’s education 
level has a different effect in urban and rural areas: Table 4.4 suggests a strong negative and 
significant relationship between father’s education level and the proportion of household 
expenditure on education. For example, households with fathers with a PhD-level education 
spend 3.4 percentage points smaller proportion on educational expenditure, while in urban 
areas, the effect of a father’s education level was not statistically significantly different from zero.  
4.5.2.2. Selection Models 
 
Appendix B provides the selection model results for rural areas. The Heckman selection 
model suggests that the Inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant, in that selection regarding 
expenditure may be an issue in our previous models and that the results should be taken with 
some caution. When examining the coefficients in detail, however, most variables between the 
selection and non-selection models display statistically similar coefficients. Only parents’ age 
appeared to deviate between both models. This suggests a possible route into selection may be 
age-related factors, which could be explored in more detail. The overall conclusion, however, 
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remains that both sets of models display broadly similar findings, even in the presence of a 
statistically significant selection term.  
The same applies to the third model with the proportion of expenditure allocated to 
education as an outcome. Evidence from our zero-inflated beta models suggests that including a 
selection equation does not significantly alter the outcomes. Although the model does suggest 
some selection, the individual coefficients are generally not statistically significantly different. 








Table 4.4: Results on Rural Areas
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values
Continuous
Log family income last year (deflated) 0.015 0.003 0.000 0.154 0.011 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000
Child gender (female) 0.000 0.003 0.924 -0.024 0.009 0.006 -0.001 0.000 0.089
Categorical
Father age(reference: 10 to 20)
20 to 30 0.092 0.013 0.000 0.011 0.045 0.813 0.003 0.001 0.026
30 to 40 0.065 0.016 0.000 0.125 0.049 0.010 0.002 0.002 0.222
40 to 50 0.063 0.018 0.000 0.178 0.056 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.178
50 to 60 0.050 0.020 0.013 0.147 0.064 0.021 0.001 0.003 0.653
Missing 0.069 0.125 0.580 -0.007 0.233 0.977 -0.014 0.007 0.032
Mother age(reference: 10 to 20)
20 to 30 0.065 0.009 0.000 0.030 0.025 0.235 -0.001 0.001 0.245
30 to 40 0.066 0.013 0.000 -0.012 0.034 0.718 -0.005 0.002 0.004
40 to 50 0.052 0.015 0.001 -0.025 0.045 0.583 -0.010 0.002 0.000
50 to 60 0.037 0.020 0.071 -0.009 0.079 0.906 -0.016 0.003 0.000
Missing -0.010 0.048 0.830 -0.065 0.214 0.760 -0.004 0.002 0.018
Father  education levels (reference:Level 1)
Level 2 (Secondary School) 0.003 0.006 0.638 0.032 0.021 0.002 -0.004 0.001 0.000
Level 3 (High School) 0.020 0.009 0.031 0.167 0.044 0.000 -0.011 0.001 0.000
Level 4 (Degree) 0.046 0.009 0.000 0.320 0.051 0.000 -0.013 0.002 0.000
Level 5 (Phd) 0.092 0.015 0.000 -0.275 0.252 0.275 -0.034 0.010 0.001
Level 6  (other) 0.027 0.017 0.109 -0.016 0.095 0.870 -0.005 0.004 0.231
Missing -0.034 0.015 0.022 -0.041 0.052 0.433 -0.005 0.002 0.008





Table 4.4(Continues): Results on Rural Areas 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values
Mother education levels(reference:Level 1)
Level 2 (Secondary School) 0.017 0.005 0.112 0.068 0.024 0.125 -0.001 0.001 0.616
Level 3 (High School) 0.022 0.015 0.157 0.002 0.093 0.982 -0.002 0.002 0.335
Level 4 (Degree) -0.047 0.027 0.175 0.246 0.116 0.134 0.003 0.003 0.294
Level 5 (Phd) -0.051 0.022 0.123 0.858 0.532 0.106 -0.002 0.012 0.850
Level 6  (other) 0.049 0.025 0.046 0.039 0.204 0.848 0.013 0.009 0.164
Missing -0.032 0.021 0.124 -0.215 0.097 0.027 0.002 0.002 0.465
Fathers overeducation(reference:Normal ) 
Undereducated -0.007 0.008 0.364 0.000 0.026 1.000 -0.001 0.001 0.563
Overeducated -0.018 0.011 0.105 -0.012 0.047 0.797 0.009 0.001 0.000
Mother overeducation(reference:Normal ) 
Undereducated -0.005 0.010 0.615 -0.070 0.035 0.049 -0.002 0.002 0.297
Overeducated -0.028 0.019 0.129 0.167 0.095 0.079 0.002 0.002 0.331
Father working status(reference:Working)
Looking for job 0.021 0.010 0.041 -0.020 0.047 0.669 0.001 0.002 0.534
Inactive 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.067 0.033 0.042 0.001 0.001 0.39
Housekeeper . . . -2.885 0.190 0.000 -0.021 0.009 0.018
Other -0.032 0.029 0.276 -0.017 0.092 0.854 -0.004 0.004 0.278








Table 4.4(Continues): Results on Rural Areas 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values
Mother working status(reference:Working)
Looking for job 0.050 0.022 0.020 -0.110 0.113 0.330 0.007 0.007 0.375
Inactive 0.050 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.086 0.999 0.003 0.004 0.472
Housekeeper 0.005 0.007 0.526 0.021 0.027 0.426 0.002 0.001 0.105
Other -0.013 0.050 0.795 -0.112 0.187 0.547 -0.009 0.004 0.014
Number of children in household aged less than 22(reference: 1)
2 0.277 0.009 0.000 0.156 0.023 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.000
3 0.350 0.010 0.000 0.410 0.026 0.000 0.017 0.001 0.000
4 0.371 0.011 0.000 0.624 0.030 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.000
5 0.362 0.012 0.000 0.847 0.040 0.000 0.033 0.002 0.000
6 or more 0.340 0.019 0.000 1.025 0.061 0.000 0.037 0.004 0.000
Child age(reference: 0 to 5)
5 to 10 0.461 0.015 0.000 0.342 0.034 0.000 0.014 0.001 0.000
10 to 15 0.490 0.018 0.000 0.730 0.038 0.000 0.021 0.002 0.000
15 to 22 0.413 0.021 0.000 0.881 0.043 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.000
Missing 0.421 0.022 0.000 1.343 0.059 0.000 0.015 0.002 0.000









Logit model for any educational expenditure OLS model of amount spend (Rial) Fractional logit model of proportion of 
educational expenditure




This chapter examined the determinants of household educational expenditure on 
children, and provided a comparative analysis between urban and rural areas, and gender 
differences in Iran. As mentioned previously, while studies on household expenditure (such as 
Fazaeli et al., 2016; Ghiasvand, 2015) have identified the determinants of parental spending 
on other major household outgoings, the question of education has received little research 
attention. Despite this, studying household educational expenditure in Iran is important for 
both policy and research implications. This is because Iranian governments have reportedly 
announced in their development plans that their main objective is to eliminate gender and 
regional inequalities in terms of education (Kurd, 2014). This means that understanding factors 
that determine private/household spending on education is an important first step for Iranian 
government. 
Our results in this section show that in both urban and rural areas a household's annual 
income, number of children, and age of children were key factors determining the decision to 
spend on education, the amount spent, and the proportion of household expenditure 
allocated, which is consistent with existing literature (DesJardin et al.; 1999; Ellwood and 
Kane,2000). Secondly, we found that household annual income has larger effects (nearly 
double) in urban areas than rural areas. The positive effects of household income disappear, 
however, when we observe its effects proportionally, suggesting that while higher income 
families tend to spend more on their children, they spend the same proportionally. Third, we 
found that in rural areas, maternal education is not significantly related to decisions regarding 
spending on education, amount or proportion of educational expenditure, while father’s 
education is significantly related to all these three decisions. This finding suggests that any 
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intergenerational transmission of education in rural areas of Iran is likely to be driven by the 
father’s education as opposed to the mother’s education, which is in contrast with the existing 
literature that emphasises the important role of a mother’s education (Haveman et al., 1991). 
However, in the context of Iranian society, this result seems comprehensible, as fathers are 
generally the main decision-makers within Iranian households. These finding highlight the 
importance of cultural and social effects, and strengthens the argument that studies of 
parental expenditure on education should go beyond economic regressions to consider more 
complicated effects and pressures. Finally, our results suggested that, while in both areas, 
there was a negative relationship between child gender (being a girl), and amount of 
educational expenditure, this coefficient is only significant in rural areas. This can also be 
explained by the fact that in rural areas there might not be much demand for educated 
women, as women are usually working in farms and at homes, where less education is 
required. Hence rural households don’t see it necessary to spend money on their daughter’s 
education. 
Overall, our results suggest a common and accepted fact that policy makers should 
focus on different subjects in urban and rural areas. For instance, it seems that eliminating 
gender inequality in education might be more challenging in rural areas, while in urban areas, 
eliminating income inequality between households might be more advisable. In the case of 
the Iranian government, it appears that it needs to provide cultural lessons to rural households 
about the important role that women can play, while in urban areas they need to provide 
more financial access to poorer households, through tax reforms, and various subsidies 
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Investments in education are usually evaluated by rates of return on educational 
investments, which is the increase in labour market earnings associated with additional 
education (Borjas, 2012). Becker’s (1964) pioneering work on human capital established the 
notion of evaluating education by its rate of return, and since then extensive research has 
been conducted on the determinants and effects of returns to schooling around the world (for 
example Mincer,1974; Spence, 1973; Heckman, 1997, Salehi-Isfahani, 2009, Tansel, 2016). 
There are several reasons why our study is important. Firstly, although the existing 
studies on returns to education are extensive and well established, they largely ignore 
evidence from the MENA region, particularly Iran (though some researchers do attempt to 
address this issue, such as Assaad, 1997; El-Hamidi, 2006; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2009). Second, 
as mentioned previously, Iranian household expenditure on education is very low, and the 
government intends to encourage households to invest more in private education. One of the 
main reasons that households may invest in education is their expectations of future returns 
to education. Hence, a study on returns to education in Iran is important as it clarifies whether 
private spending on education has high returns in terms of wages or not. Third, returns to 
education are usually different in urban and rural areas (Tokila, 2010), where wide differences 
in their labour market characteristics still exist, and this implies that there might be large 
variations between returns to education between urban and rural areas, which we investigate 
in this chapter. Finally, there is some evidence in the literature that returns to education are 
higher for women than men(Huitfeldt and Kabbani, 2007), if this is also the case in Iran, then 
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policy makers can improve women’s status in the society, by encouraging women’s 
educational attainment.  
This chapter intends to make three contributions. First, we extend the previous 
literature on the returns to education in Iran by using a new high-quality data source. Second 
by attempting a causal interpretation of years of schooling on wages using instrumental 
variable (IV) techniques. Finally, our study focuses on rural and urban regions and men and 
women separately, which was not previously done in any studies of returns to education in 
Iran.  
This chapter has various interrelated objectives. The first is to investigate the average 
returns to schooling in terms of wages in Iran. Our second goal is to investigate the difference 
between returns to schooling for men and women separately to determine whether there are 
any differences between these returns in terms of gender. Our third objective is to examine 
whether there are any differences in returns to human capital between urban and rural areas 
of Iran. Our fourth goal is to examine the existence of non-linearities in returns to education 
in Iran. Our final objective is to investigate the causal returns to education in Iran. To fulfil the 
first, second, and third objectives, we employ a simple Mincer function, and report the results 
for urban and rural areas and for men and women separately. In order to examine non-
linearity in returns to education in Iran(fourth objective), we employ a quadratic term for 
schooling in our Mincer function as well as using educational levels instead of years of 
schooling. Finally, in order to attain objective 5, we employ an IV strategy to examine the 
causal effects of education on earnings. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section examines the literature on the 
determinants of returns to schooling. Section 3 presents the summary statistics of the data 
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used in this study. Section 4 describes the methodological approach, while the empirical 
results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the concluding remarks.  
5.2. Literature Review 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
Returns to education can be divided into two categories: social returns and private 
returns. Social returns to education consider the direct costs of schooling incurred by 
governments and then refer to the large scale benefits from such investments. On the other 
hand, private returns to education refer to the individual’s benefits from investments in 
education. In this section, we focus on private returns to education and overlook public returns 
to education (Harman et al, 2000). 
We should note that private returns to education are observable in three interrelated 
aspects: higher wages, greater employment stability, and greater upward mobility in income 
(Mincer, 1974). Private returns to education in terms of higher wages can be a result of two 
factors. First, as discussed in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2), increased human capital 
results in higher productivity that allows workers to extract higher hourly wages. Second, 
increased education ‘increases labour force participation, decreases the probability of 
unemployment, and decreases job turnover. This results in highly educated workers who work 
a greater number of hours annually for higher hourly wages than their less educated labour 
market competitors’ (Hall, 2000, p.5). This chapter examines only the returns to education in 
terms of higher wages, and overlooks the other two effects of education. Nevertheless, 
Chapter 6 will look at a different aspect of employment, namely, mismatch in the labour 
market.  
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In the next section, we examine the Mincer function and its drawbacks, and then 
discuss factors that impact returns to education in term of wages. We also examine the related 
literature on the MENA region countries as well as the case of Iran. 
5.2.2 Estimations of returns to education 
 
The Mincer function, which we mentioned in Chapter 2, contributed a lot to labour 
economics, and addresses many subjects within this area. The Mincer function in its simplest 
form can be represented as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆 + 𝛽2𝜒 + 𝛽3𝜒
2 + 𝛽4𝛧 + 𝜀(5.1) 
where 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑡is the log wage at time 𝑡, 𝑆 is years of schooling, 𝜒 denotes years of labour 
market experience, and Ζ is a vector of other miscellaneous observed variables. 𝜒 is quadratic 
to allow for any possible decline in post-school human capital formation. Here, 𝛽1 is the 
marginal effect of schooling in percentage on log wages. However, this specification has 
several drawbacks: 
The first drawback of the original Mincer function is related to the variable of schooling, 
𝑆. This variable refers to years of schooling; however, some researchers (such as Spence, 1973; 
Heckman, 1977) argue that returns to education is not the same in every year of schooling, 
and suggests that the return on a year of schooling might be higher between 11 and 12 years 
of education (high school credential effect) and between 15 and 16 years of schooling (college 
credential effect) than for other years of schooling. This is motivated by the evidence that 
degrees matter over and above years of schooling (the sheepskin effect)10.Furthermore, 
Krueger and Lindahl (1998) find that there is an inverted-U patter for returns to education that 
suggests that there are diminishing returns to education, with the peak effect at 7.5 years.  In 
                                                           
10 More detailed discussion of non-linearity of education is provided in section 5.4.2. 
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this section of thesis, we will first employ a schooling variable as in the original Mincer 
function. Furthermore, we will employ a quadratic term for schooling, to investigate the 
notion of diminishing returns to education (as suggested by Krueger and Lindahl (1998))and 
thenwe will employ educational levels instead of years of schooling to investigate the 
sheepskin effect (as suggested by Isfahani, 2009).A second critique of the Mincer function is 
also related to the schooling variable, and the fact that in the original Mincer function, the 
schooling variable is treated exogenously, while many researchers stress that education is an 
endogenous choice variable in human capital theory (Borjas, 2012). However, there is no 
agreement over the magnitude of this endogeneity bias in the literature. For instance, Angrist 
and Krueger (1991) suggest a limited impact of endogeneity, while Harmon and Walker (1995) 
find a rather large effect. 
Finally, in the Mincer specification, ‘the disturbance term captures unobservable 
individual effects, which may also influence the schooling decision and induce a correlation 
between schooling and the error term in the earnings function’ (Harman et al, 200, p.5). 
Usually unobserved ability is being used as an example for this situation. In this context, 
Murnane et al. (2000) argue that at least 50% of the full return on higher achievement can be 
attributed to individual ability. However, there is disagreement among researchers on how to 
deal with the issue of endogenity (Griliches, 1976), and various modifications were employed 
to find proxies for ability. As Regan, et al. (2006) argue, some scholars (such as Behrman and 
Birdsall, 1983; Card and Krueger, 1992) employ a variable such as quality of schooling in their 
earning function to address the unobserved omitted variables, while others (such as Altonji 
and Dunn, 1996; Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997; Agnarsson and Carlin, 2002) include a 
variable that captures family background. We should note that although studies use various 
modifications for unobserved effects, the threshold argument in each is that 'by inclusion of 
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some proxies for ability the coefficient on education will capture the effect of education alone 
since ability is controlled for' (Harmon et al., 2000, p. 8).  
On the other hand, various studies (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Rouse, 1999; 
Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2001) try to address endogeneity by employing research on 
identical (monozygotic, MZ) twins. According to Trostel (2005), 'it is the prospect that 
differencing within MZ twin pairs eliminates unobserved endowments that makes twins 
attractive for researchers. Thus, the extent of ability bias can, in principle, be inferred from 
comparing the schooling coefficient estimate using data on the fraternal (dizygotic, DZ) twins 
(or, indeed, any sample of unrelated individuals) with estimates based on MZ pairs of twins' 
(Trostel, 2005, p. 198). However, various researchers (such as Bound and Solon, 1999; 
Griliches, 1979) criticise the simplistic assumption of such studies and the fact that all these 
studies assume that 'the omitted ability is entirely made up of a genetic effect', and argue that 
there are other factors such as birth weight differences between twins that can affect their 
ability to obtain schooling later (Bingley et al. 2005, p.4). 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) propose a final approach to address endogeneity by 
introducing IV estimates. They explore season of birth as a suitable instrument, and investigate 
how this might affect students’ school leaving age. Following this methodology, Harmon and 
Walker (1995) use a change in the compulsory schooling law that raised the minimum 
schooling age in Britain to generate an exogenous change in education. 'In both of these 
approaches, the key variable will affect the education decisions of a subset of the population, 
those who leave school as soon as they can, so one interpretation of these results is that the 
IV estimates identify the rate of return on the marginal or "treated" group only'(Denny and 
Harmon, 2000, p.2). In this section, we attempt to address endogeneity by employing the same 
methodology. To do so, we employ two instruments: parental background and the educational 
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expansion that occurred in Iran after the Islamic revolution. We provide more details about 
this approach in the methodology section. 
5.2.3 Determinants of Returns to Education 
 
In this section, we discuss various determinants of returns to human capital, namely, 
ability, gender, and schooling characteristics. 
Many researchers (such as Levhari and Weiss, 1974; Altonj, 1996; Card, 1999; Walker, 
2000) recognize that one of the most important determinants of individuals’ returns to 
education is their innate ability. As Walker (2000) points out, differences in ability can have 
two effects. First, individuals with more ability are probably more competent to ‘convert’ 
schooling into human capital efficiently. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of schooling 
is higher for individuals with higher ability because they could earn more money by working 
in the labour market instead (Walker, 2000). However, despite the existing acknowledgment 
of the importance of individual ability in the literature on returns to education, it is not easy 
to examine this factor in datasets (Levhari and Weiss, 1974). Consequently, the issue of 
individual ability usually leaves its trace in concern over bias in the empirical applications of 
human capital theory (Altonji, 1996; Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985).  
Prior studies also examine the impact of gender on returns to schooling, and whether 
such returns are higher for women than for men. For instance, in one of the most 
comprehensive papers in the literature, Dougherty (2005) cites 27 studies on returns to 
education in the U.S., of which 18 report unambiguously higher returns for women than for 
men. For Europe, Trostel et al. (2002) report estimates for 28 countries, and find that for 24 
of these countries, returns are higher for women. However, we should note that the level at 
which schooling is responsible for different estimates of returns to schooling by gender is 
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unclear, and while most studies imply that university education is responsible for higher 
returns for women, these results have been called into question. For instance, Pekkarinen 
(2012) argues that ‘previous studies fail to account for the top-coding of earnings in the 
available data and that once this is done, there is no evidence of gender differences in returns 
to university education’ Pekkarinen, 2012, p.8). He then studies the trends of returns to 
university education for men and women since the 1980s and suggests that this increase in 
returns occurred for both men and women since the early 1980s. Overall, it seems fair to 
conclude that although the evidence on gender differences in returns to university education 
is inconclusive, most of the literature points toward the fact that returns to education are 
higher for women than for men. However, we should point out that ‘women still work less 
hours over their life cycles than men do at all levels of education; hence, even if there are no 
large differences in university premiums between men and women, men are still in a better 
position to reap the full financial benefits of education than women are’ (Nordic, 2012, p.176).  
Schooling characteristics can also be an important determinant of returns to schooling 
(Borjas, 2012), and various studies acknowledge the important impact of schooling on returns 
to education (for example, Card and Kruger, 1992; Betts, 2010; Groger, 1996; Harmon and 
Walker, 2000; Dearden et al., 2002). For instance, Card and Krueger (1992) analyse the effects 
of pupil/teacher ratios and annual teachers’ pay on returns to education, and find a large, 
negative, and significant effect of pupil/teacher ratios on the rate of return on education. On 
the other hand, Hanushek et al. (1996) study the effects of school characteristics on returns 
to education, and claims that the level at which school quality is aggregated affects the 
estimation results, and claims that ‘aggregation biases upward estimated school quality 
effects’ (Case, 1999, p.19). Replicating the Card and Krueger results in the 1970, 1980, and 
1990 censuses, Heckman et al. (1998) clarify the importance of allowing for non-linearity in 
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the returns to education when estimating the impact of school resources. Implementing non-
linearity in the returns to education, they find that school quality is only strong for those who 
attend college. For the UK, Blundell et al. (1997) find that men who study subjects such as 
chemistry or biology degrees have lower returns than average, while women graduating with 
education, economics, accountancy, and law degrees have significantly higher returns 
compared to other subjects. Overall, the existing evidence on the impact of schooling is rather 
mixed and inconclusive, the main reason being that there are various dimensions of schooling, 
and no study can examine all of these factors together.  
5.2.4 Returns to education in developed countries 
 
Becker (1964) conducted the first attempt to estimate returns to education by 
estimating the internal rate of return on college and high school education, finding a rate of 
return between 13% to 28%. Following Becker's estimation, Solow (1965) argues that these 
large estimates must be corrected for correlations between education and ability, and 
addresses the issue of endogeneity of schooling in the human capital model. Generating his 
famous equation, Mincer (1974) estimates that each additional year of schooling yields a net 
increase of 11.5% in annual earnings (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) 
estimate the return on schooling by introducing returns to schooling and wage rates of 
identical twins with different levels of educational attainment, and suggest that each 
additional year of schooling generates a wage increase of about 12% to 16%. Rouse (1999) 
also took a similar approach; however, his estimates were lower than those in the initial twin 
studies (about 10% per year of schooling). Arias and McMahon (2001) estimate the dynamic 
and expected rates of return on college and high school in the US, and after correcting for 
ability, family factors, and measurement errors, suggest that average returns are 13.3% in real 
terms. Dearden (1999) and Blundell et al. (2005) try to address common issues that usually 
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cause biased OLS estimates, ‘including measurement error, omitted ability bias, composition 
bias, and the heterogeneity of returns according to observable characteristics’ (Cattan, and 
Crawford,2016.p.8). Both studies estimate returns to educational qualifications by different 
model specifications and methods (OLS, matching, IV, and control function methods). They 
estimate that returns to education are between 5% and 19% depending on the methodological 
approach. In a meta-analysis of the related literature, Ashenfelter et al. (1999) review 96 
estimates from 27 studies conducted in 9 different countries and find that the average OLS 
estimate of the return on schooling is 6.6%, whereas the average IV estimate is 9.3%. In a 
comprehensive analysis, Montenegro et al. (2013) employ a meta-analysis of data based on 
545 observations from 131 economies. They suggest that between 1970 and 2011, the average 
rate of return on one additional year of schooling is 10.4%. Interestingly, they find that the 
returns to schooling by world region are highest in Sub-Saharan Africa and lowest in the MENA 
region. Table 5.1 summarises Montenegro et al. (2013) results. 
Table 5.1: Returns to schooling by region11 
Region
Returns to Schooling (%)
World 5.6
Middle East and North Africa 7.0
South Asia 8.2
High Income Economies 10
East Asia and Pacific 10.3
Latin America and Caribbean 10.3
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.8
 
       Source: Montenegro et al. (2013) 
 
Table 5.2 summarises the empirical findings above with respect to the rate of return 
on education. As we observe, the overall empirical evidence (for developed countries) 
                                                           
11It should be noted that table 5.1 only presents selected regions and not every region in the world.  
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suggests that the average estimate of the return on an additional year of education ranges 
from 5% to 15% (Wilson, 2001). We must also mention that according to the World Bank 
(2013), returns to schooling have been declining significantly, and since the 1980s, the returns 
have declined by 4.5 percentage points, or 1% per year. Part of the explanation for this trend 
can be the rise in educational expansion by almost 50% (World Bank, 2017). 




Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994 12%-16%
Psacharopoulos 1994 5%-15%
Dearden 1998 5.5%-9.3%
Ashenfelter, Harmon, and Oosterbeek 1999 6.6%-9.3%




However, all of these studies focus only on private returns to education. Cattan et al. 
(2013) argue that such an approach could be misleading. They direct attention to an 
individual's educational spill-over to their firm, city, or country and suggest that 'if these 
effects are positive but unaccounted for by individuals when making educational decisions, 
they will lead individuals to under-invest in their education from a social perspective, thus 
creating an incentive for government subsidization of education. The traditional approach 
focusing on the individual returns to education obviously ignores this part of the picture and 
thus could under-estimate the total benefits of education' (Cattan and Crawford, 2013, p. 15). 
A final limitation of these studies is that they estimate the private returns to education 
at one particular age, while there is evidence of life-cycle changes in the impact of education 
on wages (Heckman et al., 1996; Cattan et al. 2013; Haider and Solon, 2006). In other words, 
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the returns to education is not constant over the lifecycle, while many of the studies 
mentioned above use data from different time periods (Dickson, 2015). According to Buscha 
and Dickson (2015) Bhuller et al. (2011) specifically warn of the danger of lifecycle bias and 
suggest that estimating returns to educational attainment over a lifecycle can provide more 
precise estimates of returns at various ages. 
5.2.5 Returns to education in the Middle East and Iran 
 
Wahba (2000) investigates the determinants of labour market earnings in Egypt. She 
assesses the relative importance of individual and regional effects on earnings inequality. The 
main findings of the paper are: (i) the average rate of return to education is 7.8% for the whole 
sample. (ii) returns to education increase with rising educational levels; for instance returns to 
education for university degree are 131%, while for secondary education are 74%, and for 
those with basic education are 22% (iii) there are substantial variations in returns to education 
across regions. (iv) estimates point to the importance of sheepskin effects in the Egyptian 
labour market. However, this study employs only a simple OLS model and does not examine 
causal returns to education or point to the possibility that returns to education are 
heterogeneous across individuals and that individuals make educational decisions based on 
their individual gains. Hence, the OLS estimates used in this study are likely to be biased and 
should be interpreted with caution. It also does not mention the possibility of strong selection 
mechanisms into higher education because, if education is not randomly assigned and is 
instead assigned according to ability, the estimates are not returns to education but to ability 
as well. As such, the results should be interpreted with caution. El-Hamidi (2006) also studies 
the Egyptian labour market using the 1998 household survey. However, she focuses on factors 
that influence an individual’s choice between vocational and general education as well as the 
relative returns between them. Using an ordered logit model, the study finds that parental 
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education increases the likelihood of an individual choosing general education. Interestingly, 
the analysis suggests that the presence of young siblings in the household motivates the 
parents to send their daughters to vocational school, but the study did not observe this impact 
for sons in families. Finally, after correcting for self-selection, she concludes that in terms of 
earnings, vocational education offers higher returns than general secondary education for 
men, while the study did not observe this impact for women. The study also stresses the 
existence of a sheepskin effect for men that is not evident for women. One of the limitations 
of the study is that the sample is restricted to urban workers in the private sector, despite the 
importance of urban/rural differences in the vocational education curriculum and labour force 
participation rates. In addition, two thirds of this sample are either not working or working in 
the public sector, and the econometric technique used to correct for this relies on dubious 
assumptions, such as the exclusion of parental education, lagged household income, and high 
test scores from the earnings equation.  
Tansel (2016) conducted one of the most recent studies on returns to education using 
the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey to examine causal returns to schooling for men and 
women in the 1938-2000 birth cohorts. This study uses the exogenous variation in years of 
schooling due to the education expansion of the early 1960s as the instrument to address the 
problem of endogeneity. To our knowledge, this is the only study to use an IV estimation for 
the returns to schooling in the MENA region. Their analysis suggests that naïve estimates on 
returns to education are 8% for men and 10% for women. Interestingly estimates of returns 
are smaller for the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimates than for the OLS estimates, which 
is contrary to the existing IV literature. Their IV estimates suggest that returns to education 
are 4.7% for men, and 1.7% for women, which suggests that returns for women are lower than 
for men. The methodology in that study (using education expansion as an IV) is similar to our 
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methodological approach; we also employ this type of IV for estimates of returns to schooling 
in Iran. However, we also stress the importance of spatial differences in terms of urban and 
rural areas, as we believe that there are important differences in returns to human capital 
between these two regions. 
Finally, Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009) conduct the only study on returns to education in 
Iran; however, even this study does not focus solely on Iran and is a cross-country study that 
investigates private returns to schooling for urban men in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. Estimates 
of returns to education in this study suggest that the returns to one additional year of 
schooling in Iran are 7.6%. However, these estimates cannot be interpreted as the causal 
effects of education on wages, as the authors ignore the issue of selectivity and endogeneity 
of schooling in their model and rely only on the naive results. They find that in Iran, returns to 
years of schooling are non-linear, which is contrary to the Mincer assumption of linearity on 
returns to schooling. Supporting the previously mentioned papers, they also suggest that 
secondary and tertiary degrees have the highest returns. We further examine this latter point 
(whether there is linearity in returns to schooling in Iran) in this chapter of the thesis, in which 
we use a non-linear Mincer function and will employ educational levels instead of years of 
schooling. It is worth noting that while Salehi-Isfahani's (2009) paper studies only urban men 
in Iran (to maintain comparability with Turkey and Egypt), we look at both men and women in 
urban and rural areas of Iran.  
Many related studies have not been published in a journal but are available to read 
online. For instance, Dah and Hammami (2002) investigate the rates of return on education 
for males and females in urban Lebanon. They collect primary data for 6,626 individuals and 
employ a basic OLS model. Their results suggest that the rate of return on education is high 
for vocational and university education. They also emphasize that the rate of return is higher 
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for females than for males at almost all educational levels. For instance, returns to education 
for those with a tertiary education is 16% for women, and 13% for men, while for vocational 
education is 18% and 11% respectively. However, this study presents a very basic set of 
regressions on returns to education without mentioning issues such as selection mechanisms 
into higher education. As such, the results do not tell us much about what schools are doing 
to increase individuals’ earnings potential. 
Huitfeldt and Kabbani (2007) stress the non-linearity of returns to education in Syria 
and estimate the returns with OLS regressions and address the issue of selection bias using 
Heckman's two stage model. They include several additional variables in the selection 
equation, including marital status and the number of children between the ages of 0-5 (pre-
school) and 6-14. According to this study, higher education increases both wages and the 
probability of getting a job in the public sector. One of the important contributions of this 
study is that it investigates the returns to education for men and women, in the private and 
the public sector separately. They suggest that women with a university degree that are 
working in the public sector receive the highest return (135%), while men with primary school 
qualifications working in the public sector receive the lowest return to education (-11%) . 
Furthermore, they argue that the additional benefit of obtaining higher education is, declines 
in ‘queuing times for sought-after jobs in the public sector, and increases the opportunities for 
working abroad' (Huitfeldt and Kabbani, 2007, p. 12). Finally, they point out that since 2001, 
the Syrian government has stopped guaranteeing jobs to graduates of higher institutes, and 
hence these graduates have to look for jobs in the private sector, which do not necessarily 
match the training they received. They predict that future studies on returns to schooling in 
Syria will find that the rates of return on schooling will be much lower for university graduates. 
Said and El-Hamidi’s (2005) analysis of gender wage premia in Egypt and Morocco supports 
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Huitfeldt and Kabbani’s (2007) argument. Using the Oaxaca-Blinder wages-differential 
decompositions of sector and gender wage gaps for Egypt and Morocco, they suggest that 
selectivity-corrected returns to different levels of education indicate that a reduction in the 
role of the public sector leads to lower returns in the private sector and falling returns over 
time. Only at the university level are returns higher in the private sector in Egypt, indicating 
that employers place relatively little value on basic and secondary education (Said and El-
Hamidi, 2005, p.14).  
In summary, the few studies above on the returns to schooling in the MENA region 
have some important factors in common. First, the government’s role as the main employer 
of university graduates is evident for high returns to education in these countries. Second, the 
government’s role is fading away and most of these countries are displacing these policies, 
resulting in a decline in the returns to education in these countries. Finally, it seems that the 
sheepskin effect is evident in most MENA countries and contrary to Mincer's suggestion of 
diminishing rate of return on schooling, all of these studies show non-linearity in returns to 
schooling. Overall, such studies on MENA countries are less frequent than other regions, and 
specifically, as we are aware, there is only one study on returns to education in Iran by Salehi-
Isfahani (2009). Table 5.3 summarizes this literature on returns to schooling in MENA 
countries. 
Table 5.3: Summary of Literature Review on MENA 
Study Year Country Average Return (%)
Wahba 2000 Egypt 7.8%
Tansel 2016 Turkey Naïve: 8-10% Causal:1- 4%
Salehi-Isfahani 2009 Iran 7.6%
Dah and Hammami 2002 Lebonon 6-16%
Huitfeldt and Kabbani 2007 Syria 11-135%
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In this chapter, we employ Tansel (2016) and Salehi-Isfahani’s (2009) papers as a 
starting point for our analysis. Salehi-Isfahani (2009) suggests that the returns to education in 
Iran are about 7% and are non-linear. We adopt the same methodological approach (using a 
non-linear Mincer function and educational levels instead of years of schooling) to estimate 
returns to schooling in Iran. However, while their study focuses only on urban men, we employ 
a gender-specific approach and account for spatial differences by considering urban and rural 
differences. Furthermore, while Salehi-Isfahani (2009) presents only the naïve results for 
returns to education, our current study aims to provide further estimates of the causal returns 
to education in Iran by employing IV estimates. In doing so, we use the same approach as 
Tansel (2016) to report our IV estimates in terms of the educational expansion that occurred 
in the 1970s in Iran. Yet again, we contribute to Tansel's study by considering the effects of 
returns to education in urban and rural areas separately. We expect to provide more accurate 
estimates of the returns to education in Iran that will be of interest to policymakers and 
individuals in guiding their decisions to invest in education.  
5.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this chapter, we use the same data as in the previous chapter from the various 
cohorts of the HIES from 2008/09 to 2011/12 that monitors the income and cost living of 
households in Iran. We discussed the HIES characteristics and benefits in the previous chapter, 
and hence do not repeat it here.  
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 contain summary statistics for our sample. After accounting for non-
responses, merging all 5 annual surveys, and limiting our sample size to those aged between 
16 to 65, our sample size for urban areas is 211,862 individuals and for rural areas is 227,139. 
There is no minimum wage for working in Iran; however, most studies in Iran limit their 
samples to individuals aged 16 to 65 to maintain consistency with ILO regulations. Hence, we 
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adopt the same age category for our sample. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 describe the general 
characteristic variables such as age, and marital status, variables for education such as years 
of schooling and educational levels, and variables for employment status such as annual 
income, working status, working hours in a day, and working days in a week.  
5.3.1 Summary statistics of dependent Variable 
 
Our dependent variable in this section is the natural log of hourly wages. In terms of 
income, the HIES database provides three types of information: income or wages for those 
who are employees, income for self-employed, and other types of income, which includes 
retirement income, rents, benefits, and any other charities. We added two types of income 
for each individual as total income: income for wage-receivers and income for the self-
employed, and excluded other types of income. Unlike in developed countries, there is a high 
number of self-employed individuals in the Iranian labour market; hence, we include the 
wages of the self-employed as well as wage workers in our observations of income.In our 
sample, we have 13,901 observations for wage receivers and 8,909 observations for those 
who are working and are self-employed. This clarifies that one of the main characteristics of 
the Iranian economy is the high number of observations of self-employed workers, which we 
cannot ignore. Thus, we merged the income reports of the self-employed and wage receiving 
workers.  
Our income in the dataset is reported annually. In order to estimate hourly income, 
first we estimate daily pay by dividing annual income by the number of working days in one 
year, which was available in our datasets. Second, in order to estimate hourly pay, we divide 
daily income by average number of working hours, which was reported in our dataset. We 
deflated income according to the 2010 inflation rate and used the dollar exchange rate for 
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2010. Table 5.4 shows that while hourly income for men is 3.28$, for women, it is 3.21$, which 
suggests that men earn slightly more than women in Iran. 
5.3.2 Summary statistics of urban areas 
 
Table 5.4 provides descriptive statistics for urban individuals between 16 to 65 years 
old, which contains 211,863 observations (men and women combined). According to this 
table, the mean for age is about 34 years for both sexes. There are 107,196 observations for 
men in this sample and 104,666 observations for women.  
On observations for marital status, Table 5.4 suggests that for men, nearly 59% are 
married, while 40% were never married, and nearly 1% are divorced or widowed. For women, 
64% are married, 4.45% are widowed, 1.41% are divorced, and 30.55% are single. From our 
observations, we can interestingly note a high number of widowed women in urban areas, 
which indicates an interesting social characteristic of Iran. As we mentioned in Chapter 1, the 
war between Iran and Iraq between 1980 and 1988 shaped many socioeconomic 
characteristics of Iran, and one of these impacts was the high number of male casualties, which 
left many widows. 
We have three types of variables as indicators of education: a variable for literacy, a 
continuous variable for years of schooling, and a categorical variable for educational levels. 
According to our data, the average years of schooling is approximately 9 years for men and 8 
years for women. In Iran, compulsory education ends by the end of the 8th year, which is the 
end of lower secondary school. Hence, our average years of schooling suggests that most 
students might discontinue their studies after compulsory education ends.  
Table 5.4 also presents highest educational qualifications. Our dataset has information 
on individuals with qualifications from different levels of schooling. We have seven categories 
of levels of schooling: those with no qualifications, those with a qualification from primary 
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school, those with a qualification in lower secondary or high school (our dataset combines 
secondary and high school qualification), a vocational qualification, a certificate from a 
university BA degree, a certificate from a university Master’s degree, and the highest 
educational degree, a PhD qualification. 
According to Table 5.4, for our male participants nearly 13% have no qualification, 
while approximately nearly 30% have certificates of completion from primary education, 
24.12% from secondary or high school, 9.27% have a vocational qualification, 21.45% have a 
degree from a BA course, 2.58% have a Master’s degree, and 0.63% have a PhD. For women, 
the sample with no qualifications is much higher for women compared to men; nearly 29% of 
women in urban areas have no qualification compared to 13% for men. Following this trend, 
the number of women with a primary qualification is also lower than for men (20% for women 
versus 30% for men); however, this gender gap is much smaller for higher qualifications, and 
it seems that for secondary education and above, there are similar trends for men and women. 
A possible explanation for such a trend might be that as educational expansion occurred in 
Iran, younger women attained more schooling, and the gaps in lower levels of educations are 
for older individuals. Finally, we observe that more men have some type of vocational 
qualifications (10%) compared to women (5%). 
For employment status, we have information on working status in six categories: 
working, looking for job, unemployed with income, student, housekeeper, and others. 
Statistical information about employment status shows that nearly 61% of male participants 
are working and 12% are looking for jobs; 8.44% are not working, but have some sort of other 
income such as benefits, rental income, and so on; nearly 15.46% are students, and less than 
3% are housekeepers or in other types of employment status. Interestingly, for women only 
8.66% are working, and on the other hand, only 5.38% are unemployed (looking for a job). This 
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shows that women’s labour force participation is very low, even in urban areas. Around 6.23% 
of women are not working while receiving some sort of income, 16.23% are students, and 
nearly 61.86% are housekeepers. According to the World Economic Forum, the female labour 
force participation was 15% in 2015, hence selectivity into the labour market is likely to be a 
primary concern when examining women, and the correct estimation strategy should account 
for this process. 
Finally, Table 5.4 provides information on working hours/days for men and women. 
We see that on average, men work 8 hours a day, while women work approximately 6 hours 
a day, and both sexes work 5 days a week. Women's working days in a week are similar to that 
for men, which suggests that contrary to the labour market of most developed countries, 
where women work part-time, urban women work full-time, just as urban men do.  
5.3.3 Summary statistics of rural areas 
 
In this section, we observe the summary statistics for rural areas presented in Table 
5.5. However, we discuss only some interesting differences between these two areas, and will 
not repeat all of the descriptive statistics as in the previous section. Observing these 
differences will help us understand disparities between urban and rural areas and how to 
model our analysis in the next chapters. 
One of the main differences between the urban and rural populations can be observed 
from educational attainment in each region separately. Comparing Tables 5.4 and 5.5 shows 
that in general, the number of illiterate men and women is 10% higher in rural areas than in 
urban areas. Looking at years of schooling, we can also observe that rural areas lag behind 
urban areas: the years of schooling in rural areas is 6.81 for men and 5.37 for women, 
compared to urban areas with 9.03 years of schooling for men and 8.35 years of schooling for 
women. This indicates that on average, urban men have approximately 2 more years of 
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schooling than rural men do, while urban women have 3 more years of schooling than rural 
women do. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the gap between years of schooling for men and 
women in both areas is nearly zero, which indicates that regarding equality in education 
between men and women, the rural areas is progressing in line with urban areas of Iran.  
Looking at educational levels, we observe a much higher number of people with no 
qualification, especially among women: nearly 35% of men and 61% of women have no 
qualification. We can also observe a very low number of individuals with university degrees 
(BA, Masters, or PhD) in rural areas. For instance, only 7.44% of men and 4.62% of women in 
rural areas have a BA degree compared to urban areas, where these estimates are 21.45% for 
men and 18.66% for women. There can be many explanations for the lower educational 
attainment of the rural population; as previously mentioned, compulsory education is 8 years 
in Iran, and hence the government might not invest in high schools and university as much as 
they do in primary and secondary schools. Another explanation for the lower years of 
schooling in rural areas could be that there is not enough demand for employees with higher 
education. Finally, the low number of individuals with university degrees in rural areas could 
be explained by a lack of university facilities in these areas. In other words, if a young individual 
is planning to continue their studies in higher education, they are more likely to move to urban 
areas. In addition, the number of working hours is approximately 1.5 hours less for women in 
rural areas whilst the work week is actually longer. For men there is less difference between 
urban and rural areas which suggests that employment patterns between men and women 
diverge as we move into more rural areas.  
A comparison of Tables 5.4 and 5.5 also provides interesting results in terms of 
employment status, especially for women. We observe that the number of women working in 
rural areas is nearly double (16%) that of women in urban areas (8%). This is comprehensible 
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with the available facts and characteristics of the Iranian economy, as the role of women in 
Iranian rural sectors as both housekeepers and workers in the agricultural sector has been 
accepted historically.  
Other statistical information about employment status shows that in rural areas, 
54.88% of male participants are working, 10% are looking for jobs, nearly 9% are not working 
but with an income, nearly 22% are students, and 4% are either housekeepers or have another 
type of unknown occupational status. For women, these numbers are 16.73%, 3.55%, 5.16%, 
and 10%, respectively, while 63.18% are housekeepers and 1.70% have another type of 
unknown occupational status.  
Observing hourly income, we can also see that rural women's hourly income is lower 
compared to their male counterparts (1.34$ for women compared to 1.80$ for men). Although 
the gender wage gap is also evident in urban areas, its magnitude is larger in rural areas. 
Considering the higher labour participation of rural women, this suggests that a gender wage 
gap exists in Iran, and especially in rural areas. It is also evident that the rural population earns 
much less than the urban population: for instance, rural men’s hourly income is 1.80$, while 
urban men's hourly income is 3.28$. These rates are 1.34$ for rural women and 3.21$ for 
urban women. 
Overall, our descriptive section suggests that while the Iranian government succeeded 
in expanding educational attainment of the youth, rural areas are still lagging behind the urban 
areas, especially in terms of literacy rates and higher education. However, it seems that in 
terms of gender equality in education, both urban and rural areas have very low inequality. 
For instance, we observe that in both regions, the average years of schooling are similar for 
both men and women. This is compatible with the current literature and available data that 
suggests substantial improvements in educational attainment in terms of gender equality.  
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However, the most striking failure of the Iranian government can be observed in its 
failure to improve labour market characteristics, which suggests that equality of education has 
not been transformed into equality of opportunity within the labour market. This is evident in 
our descriptive section, where we observe very low labour force participation for women, 
especially in urban areas (around 8%). Our descriptive data suggests that women's labour 
force participation is much higher in rural areas (16%). Discrimination against women as regard 
a gender wage gap exists, and is more evident in rural areas. 
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Table 5.4: Summary Statistics Urban Areas12 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev.
Continuous
Age 107,196 34.32 13.56 104,666 34.48 13.24
Year of Schooling 106,442 9.03 4.31 104,148 8.35 4.96
Working hours a day 68,391 8.05 2.9 9,606 6.16 2.66
Working  days a week 68,391 5.50 1.46 9,606 5.17 1.40
Hourly Pay($) 66,530 3.28 8,485 3.21
Categorical Variables
Literacy
Literate 99,758 93.06 88,082 84.16
Illiterate 7,438 6.94 16,581 15.84
 Education Certificate
No qualification 7,462 12.61 16,591 28.79
Primary Education 17,370 29.34 11,401 19.78
Secondary/highschool Education 14,280 24.12 14,995 26.02
Vocational Qualification 5,490 9.27 2,785 4.83
BA Qualification 12,695 21.45 10,752 18.66
Masters Qualification 1,526 2.58 919 1.59
PhD 370 0.63 183 0.32
 Working status
Working 65,576 61.18 9,060 8.66
Looking for job 12,863 12.00 5,628 5.38
Unemployed with income 9,047 8.44 6,522 6.23
student 16,572 15.46 16,984 16.23
Housekeeper 165 0.15 64,748 61.86
Others 2,971 2.77 1,722 1.65
Marital Status 
Marrried 63,123 58.89 66,560 63.59
Widowed 504 0.47 4,652 4.44
Divorced 680 0.63 1,479 1.41
Single 42,889 40.01 31,974 30.55
Men Women
 
Source: HIES 2008-2012. Age 16 to 65. Note: Hourly wages are deflated and has been converted to dollars 
                                                           
12The descriptive statistics for the samples the equations are estimated are presented in Appendix C(table c1) 
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Table 5.5: Summary Statistics Rural Areas13 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev.
Continuous
Age 117,737 34.53 13.85 109,402 34.48 13.68
Year of Schooling 116,382 6.81 4.18 108,900 5.37 4.53
Working hours a day 89,736 7.16 3.09 19,180 4.68 2.64
Working  days a week 89,736 5.42 2.11 19,180 5.70 2.51
Hourly Pay($) 82,359 1.80 7,321 1.34
Categorical Variables
Literacy
Literate 98,178 83.39 74,427 68.03
Illiterate 19,559 16.61 34,974 31.97
 Education Certificate
No qualification 19,569 34.82 34,981 61.21
Primary Education 19,839 35.30 10,806 18.91
Secondary/highschool Education 9,217 16.40 7,302 12.78
Vocational Qualification 3,043 5.41 1,239 2.17
BA Qualification 4,183 7.44 2,640 4.62
Masters Qualification 312 0.56 157 0.27
PhD 35 0.06 21 0.04
 Working status
Working 86,356 54.88 18,305 16.73
Looking for job 11,848 10.39 3,884 3.55
Unemployed with income 4,224 9.02 5,641 5.16
student 12,121 22.04 10,605 9.69
Housekeeper 257 0.26 69,116 63.18
Others 2,928 3.41 1,849 1.69
Marital Status 
Marrried 73,575 62.49 69,637 63.65
Widowed 544 0.46 5,434 4.97
Divorced 472 0.40 1,089 1.00
Single 43,142 36.64 33,240 30.38
Men Women
Source: HIES 2008-2012. Age 16 to 65. Note: Hourly wages are in real terms, deflated and has been converted to dollars
                                                           
13The descriptive statistics for the samples the equations are estimated are presented in Appendix C(table c2) 
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5.3.4 Initial correlation 
 
To examine the impact that schooling might have on wages in Iran, we first examine 
the basic bivariate relationships between education and earnings. Such results are non-causal, 
of course, but serve as a useful reference point for later multivariate analysis. To investigate 
possible issues of non-linearity, we estimate non-parametric smoothers as opposed to basic 
correlates. This allows us to display the data graphically and observe any particular non-linear 
effects for possible consideration in later multivariate analyses.  
Figure 5.1 shows a nonparametric relationship between earnings and years of 
schooling in both urban and rural areas. There is a positive relationship between years of 
schooling and earnings. Both the rural and urban graphs are relatively ‘shallow’ until 13-15 
years of schooling, after which total income accelerates rapidly. After approximately 18 years 
of schooling, the slope diminishes again and there is some evidence of a negative return 
beyond 20 years of schooling. This suggests that the returns to education in Iran are possibly 
non-linear. In particular, there is evidence that higher-level qualifications, such as university 
degrees, have an important effect on earnings, but that very high qualifications may reduce 
potential earnings, especially in rural areas. However, it is worth noting that relatively few 
individuals have more than 18 years of schooling, resulting in a high 95% confidence interval 







Figure 5.1: Local polynomial smoother for total income and years of schooling 
Urban Areas                                                    Rural Areas 
 




In this chapter, we use the Mincer earnings function to identify returns to schooling in 
Iran. We employ several variants of this equation: the standard version with linear years of 
schooling, and a non-linear version with quadratic years of schooling and levels, instead of 
years, of schooling. Finally, in order to investigate the issue of endogeneity and causal 
estimates of returns to education, we employ an IV analysis.  
5.4.1 Standard Mincer function 
 
We begin by estimating the conventional human capital earnings function, where the 
dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages. We use reports of individuals’ annual 
incomes. In order to calculate the hourly wage, we first calculated daily income by dividing 
annual income by average working days per year. Then, we divided this by average working 
hours per day. 
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The explanatory variables are age, age squared (both as a proxy for experience), years-
of-schooling (and later on, educational levels), controls for region (using the 30 standard 
regions) in order to pick up regional real wage differentials, and finally dummies for marital 
characteristics. Montenegro (2013) argues that adding many independent variables in studies 
of returns to education reduces part of the effect of education on earnings. 
‘Of course, researchers who include other variables, such as occupation dummies, in 
earnings functions do so because they are interested in modelling earnings, not necessarily 
in estimating the rate of return on schooling. Obviously, such practices create a problem 
when others interpret the schooling coefficient as a rate of return’. (Montenegro, 2013, p. 3) 
Since we are interested in interpreting the effects of schooling on wages, we employ 
few independent variables in our models. The Mincer equation (1974) is the basis for 
economic studies of education and has been estimated using data from a variety of countries 
and periods. In one equation, Mincer’s framework captures two distinct economic concepts: 
(a) a pricing equation or hedonic wage function revealing how the labour market rewards 
productive attributes like schooling and work experience, and (b) the rate of return on 
schooling, which can be compared with the interest rate to determine the optimality of human 
capital investments. We employ the standard Mincer equation (Mincer, 1974) to examine the 
rate of returns to education in Iran: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝜒𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖(5.2) 
where 𝑌𝑖  represents individual i, 𝑆𝑖is an indicator of years of schooling for individual 
i,𝑃𝑖 is age as a proxy for experience, 𝑃𝑖
2 is a quadratic term for age, and 𝜒𝑖 is a vector of control 
variables including marital, and regional dummies. 
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𝛽1̂ is the estimated contribution of full-time schooling to earnings, which represents 
the rate of return on an additional year of schooling, 𝛽2̂and𝛽3̂ are the return on experience 
and generally trace a concave earnings path across the lifecycle of an individual.  
5.4.2 Non-Linearity 
 
Although the standard Mincer equation in the previous section is the most commonly 
used, there are several reasons why a simple linear specification for years of education may 
be inaccurate. For example, log earnings may be a concave function of years of schooling in a 
simple human capital investment model in which individuals have different preferences 
(discount rates), but all face the same concave production function (the return on a year of 
schooling declines as years of schooling increase). More generally, Mincer (1997) shows that 
in Becker’s (1975) model where individuals are heterogeneous in their preferences and 
earning opportunities, average log earnings may be either a convex or concave function of 
years of schooling. Another possibility is that in addition to years of schooling per se, 
educational credentials also have a direct impact on earnings. Moreover, evidence from our 
initial correlations (Figure 5.1) suggests the presence of potential increasing returns to 
education as years of schooling increase. 
In order to test for the first type of non-linearity (the notion of diminishing returns to 
education), in our samples, we relax the linearity assumption and modify equation (2) by 
adding a quadratic term for years of schooling: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐼 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖
2 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝜒𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖(5.3) 
where Yi is hourly wages, 𝑆𝑖is an indicator of years of schooling, 𝑆𝑖
2is the quadratic 
term for schooling, 𝑃𝑖 is a proxy for experience, 𝑃𝑖
2 is age squared, and Xi is a vector of control 
variables including region, and marital status.  
 160 
However, we can get a more precise idea of the convexity using levels instead of years 
of schooling. This is also motivated by the evidence that degrees matter over and above years 
of schooling (the sheepskin effect)(Heckman, 1977). In our regression, we divide schooling 
levels into seven categories: less than primary (illiterate), primary, lower secondary, upper 
secondary, tertiary, PhD and above, and other types of educational levels. The omitted 
category is level 0, which is no qualification.  
Our estimated equation for levels is 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝑃𝑖
2 + 𝜒𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 (5.4) 




Griliches (1977) argues that the OLS estimates of returns to schooling are biased and 
inconsistent. Nevertheless, researchers still use OLS estimates in studies of returns to 
education to evaluate signs and amounts of bias. According to Griliches, these results could be 
both an upward and a downward bias. Some authors argue that upward bias is only true if one 
analyses the wages of older workers (Blackburn and Neumark, 1993), although the upward 
bias results are the conventional wisdom (Ehrenberg and Smith, 2016). Calculation by IV and 
fixed effects gives, instead, a downward bias. 
These contrasting empirical results are due to econometric problems: omitted 
variables and measurement errors could involve opposite distortions without specifying which 
one prevails. A general framework to describe the problem could be found if we focus on the 
potential endogeneity of education in the wage function. 
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To identify the causal effect of education on wages, we follow the standard approach 
of using IV methods (see for example, Machin, et al. 2011). This version constitutes a very 
useful general framework to understand distortions in returns to schooling and to interpret 
the IV estimates. In order to do so, we employ two types of instruments: the first is parental 
education and the second is educational expansion, which happened as a result of the Islamic 
revolution in 1979. 
In this approach, a causal effect of education is estimated by including a variable for 
parental education (and later on, a dummy variable for educational expansion as a result of 
the Islamic revolution in 1979) in the first-stage education regression in a 2SLS framework. By 
arguing that parental education (educational expansion) is an exogenous occurrence that 
increased levels of education randomly, we can obtain a causal IV estimate as follows: 
 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝒙𝒊
′𝛾1 + 𝜀1𝑖  (5.5) 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐸𝑖 + 𝒙𝒊
′𝛾2 + 𝜀2𝑖  (5.6) 
 
where equations (5.4) and (5.5) are the reduced form equations for education 𝐸𝑖  and 
log hourly wages 𝑌𝑖  respectively; 𝛽1 is the estimate of parental education(education 
expansion) measured in years of schooling, whilst 𝛽2 is the estimated effect of parental 
education on log hourly wages. 𝒙𝑖is a vector of our additional control variables (such as age, 
age squared, marital status, and regional dummies) with parameter estimates 𝛾. Finally, 𝜀1𝑖  
and 𝜀2𝑖  are two normally distributed error terms with mean zero. The structural form for 
earnings 𝑌𝑖  is then given by: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑖 + 𝒙𝒊
′𝛾3 + 𝜀3𝑖  (5.7) 
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where the IV estimate of 𝛽3 in (5.6) is given by the ratio of the reduced form coefficients in 
(5.1) and (5.2), 𝛽3 = 𝛽2/𝛽1.  
Below, we introduce our IVs and present the justification for choosing these instruments in 
our models. 
5.4.3.1 Parental education 
 
First, we employ the number of years of schooling for an individual’s parent as an 
instrument by reporting the highest years of schooling of the parent. For instance, if an 
individual’s father has 7 years of schooling and the mother has 20 years of schooling, we 
appoint 20 years as the parental education. Card's (1992) study implicitly mentions the 
substantial influence of family background. He claims that parental education influences 
schooling choices, and therefore incorporates it into his instrument sets. This confirms that 
family background is significant for an individual’s schooling. Furthermore, parental education 
might be a good indicator to capture and quantify family background. 
Maluccio (1998) uses parental education as an IV to examine the return on education 
in the Bicol region of the Philippines. He argues that incorporating parental education in IVs is 
important because they serve as a proxy for permanent income, reflect parental preferences, 
and may affect the education production process.  
Another study employing parental education as an instrument was conducted by 
Arcand et al. (2004). They argue that using parental education as an instrument should meet 
the orthogonality conditions in countries with communist characteristics, where the 
intergenerational transmission of wealth and social background is only obtained through 
educational attainment. Arcand et al. (2004) prove empirically that using parental education 
as an instrument is feasible in studies of countries with these characteristics. We believe that 
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this is also the case with Iran, especially for the period we observe. Note that it is only 38 years 
since the revolution, and many individuals in our sample were affected by revolutionary 
slogans because they were studying and working at the time. For instance, after the Islamic 
revolution, the main slogan was that the revolution is for the poor and unprivileged families 
and ensured policies to attract the vote of the mass population, which is evident in official 
surveys. For instance, according to the World Bank, immediately following the Revolution, 
overall inequality fell substantially, by about 10 Gini points, from 0.56 to 0.46 (World Bank 
indicators, 2017). Hence, for many children, having a wealthy family was mainly a 
disadvantage. Consequently, many elite families emigrated from the country after the 
revolution. These pro-poor (or anti-rich) family policies suggest that Iran has characteristics 
that are close to communist countries. According to Arcand (2004), this feature makes these 
countries the most plausible for using parental education as an IV. 
5.4.3.2 Educational expansion of the 1970s 
 
Our second IV estimator uses an exogenous change in the educational expansion of 
the early 1980s due to the Islamic revolution in Iran. This type of instrument was used by Duflo 
(1999) for Indonesia and James (2015) for the UK.  
Duflo’s (1999) estimation is based on individuals’ exposure to a massive education 
investment program in Indonesia in the early 1970s. Individuals were assigned to the 
treatment based on their date of birth (pre- and post-reform) and the district they lived in (as 
investment was a function of a local level needs assessment). James (2015) pursues a similar 
strategy in an analysis of reforms in the UK in 1980s and 1990s that expanded UK’s post 
compulsory education. The expansion resulted in a rapid increase in education over the whole 
education distribution. We also follow a similar approach in looking at a fundamental change 
in the educational system in 1980s Iran, which affected the entire population of school going 
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individuals, and educational attainment increased rapidly. This allows us to generate IVs that 
permit consistent estimates of the return on schooling for the whole population.  
We believe that one of the most important factors in the growth of education 
participation after the Islamic revolution in 1979 is the Islamisation of the schools (features of 
this Islamisation are explained in detail in Chapter 1 of this thesis). One of the most important 
aims of the revolution was to reshape the educational system and change it according to the 
rules of Islam. For instance, they introduced separate schools in all levels of education (apart 
from university). Some social researchers argue that this separation of schools had an 
important impact on religious parents, as they felt it was safe to send their children to schools 
that are separate and teach the rules of Islam. This especially had an impact on women and in 
rural areas of Iran, where more traditional families lived. The available data also suggests that 
this argument could be correct. For instance, for rural women, the average years of schooling 
increased from about 40% of their male counterparts for women born in the 1960s to about 
90% for those born in the 1970s (Salehi-Isfahani, 2009). Furthermore, the Gini index of 
inequality in years of schooling for adults born in the 1950s was in excess of 0.60 compared to 
0.35 for cohorts born 20 years later, which is a substantial decrease in education inequality in 
just one generation. Hence, it seems that after the Islamic revolution in 1979, due to the 
Islamisation of schools, average years of schooling increased substantially because many 
religious families were now encouraged (or felt it was safe) to send their children to schools.  
Hence, we create a dummy variable for those born in 1970, who would attend school 
after the Islamic revolution. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the rapid increase in participation over 
the period, represented by a significant step change, which provides a justification for using 
this type of IV. 
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In this section, we report our results for the returns to education with special attention 
to urban and rural and gender differences. Our dependent variable is log of hourly wages, 
while our explanatory variables are years of schooling (educational levels), age as a proxy for 
experience, age squared, marital status, and regional dummies. Most studies on returns to 
education (for example Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2009; Tansel, 2016) employ a limited number of 
explanatory variables, and we follow the same route. Furthermore, our sample is individuals 
between 16 to 65 years of age and is conditioned on people that are working. Two problems 
of selection bias might appear due to the latter condition. The first is selection bias because 
individuals, and especially a high number of women, not working create an issue of selectivity 
in our estimates. Secondly some individuals stated that there are working but do not report 
their income in the dataset, we address this selectivity issue in our data in Section 5.3 with our 
causal estimates. 
In order to explore returns to education in Iran, we first report the estimates of such 
returns using an OLS model. Table 5.6 presents the results, where we report returns for men 
and women in urban and rural areas separately. Second, we test for non-linearity of returns 
to education in Iran using two models: an OLS model and a quadratic term for schooling. We 
provide these results in Table 5.7. Additionally, to check further for non-linearity, we use 
educational levels instead of years of schooling and provide the results in Table 5.8. Finally, in 
order to test for causal estimates of returns to education on earnings, we employ IV estimate 
techniques with two IVs: parental education and educational expansion of the 1970s. We 
present the results of our IV estimates in Tables 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12. 
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5.5.1 OLS model 
 
Table 5.6 displays the OLS estimates of the returns to schooling for those between 16 
to 65 years of age in urban and rural areas using a standard Mincer function.  
Our OLS results for urban areas show that one additional year of schooling increases 
log gross annual income by approximately 5.3%. Separating these returns by gender shows 
that the return for men is approximately 4.5%, whilst for women, the return onan additional 
year of schooling is 10%. This difference is statistically significant. On the other hand, our 
results for rural areas suggest that the returns to one additional year of schooling are very 
similar in urban areas for both sexes. These results are roughly in line with the existing 
literature, which generally suggests that the coefficient of schooling is between 5% and 15% 
(Psacharopoulos, 1994). Furthermore, their estimates usually yield returns to education that 
are higher for women than for men (Van der Sluis et al., 2008). We can also observe that in 
both urban and rural areas of Iran, women are experiencing higher returns to their wages 
compared to men. One of the reasons for higher returns to education in both urban and rural 
areas for women may be explained by the problem of selection bias in Iran. As we discussed 
previously, women’s labour force participation is very low in Iran (16%), and it seems that 
discrimination against women exists in the Iranian labour market. Because those who are 
already working in the market might have some characteristics such as higher ability or 
motivation that affects their wages, we address this selectivity issue in our data in Section 5.3 
with our causal estimates. It is also interesting that returns to education are similar in both 
urban and rural areas of Iran. This is contrary to the existing literature that suggests that such 
returns are usually higher in urban areas (for example, Dudenhefer, 1993). 
We use age as a proxy for the coefficients for the experience variable, where we 
observe that for both regions that the returns to experience rise with each year of additional 
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experience, but at a diminishing rate, from the slope coefficients of age squared. The inflection 
point is approximately 28years after starting age (16 in this case), which suggests a peak 
earnings age of 44 years. This is consistent with evidence from other countries. We can also 
detect a similar trend in returns to experience by gender, which suggests that after full-time 
schooling ends, and both sexes are active in the labour market, no substantial differences in 
earnings between men and women emerges. 
We also include other types of explanatory variables such as marital status and proxies 
for location. We observe that compared to those who are married, other types of marriage 
decrease returns to education for both sexes in both regions. The only exception is for rural 
women, where no marriage category is significantly related to their returns to education, while 
rural men follow the same trend as their urban counterparts. 
Finally, it is important to note that the sample sizes for men and women are 
significantly different. As noted previously, employment statuses amongst men and women 
are radically different. Whilst more than 61% of the male population is working, only 16% of 
women can be classified as working. This is reflected in the sample, with only 8,395 
observations for women and 65,730 observations for men in urban areas, and 6,935 
observations for women and 79,555 observations for men in rural areas. However, we should 
also note that the R-squared for women is much higher than for men (0.44 compared to 0.27 
in urban areas and 0.28 and 0.18 in rural areas), which suggests that the Mincer function 
explains a higher proportion of the variation in earnings for women, especially urban women, 
than for men. This suggests that our explanatory variables, including years of schooling, are 
one of the key drivers in women’s earnings in Iran. 
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Table 5.6: OLS Results (Urban and Rural Areas) 
All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Continous
Years of Schooling 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.102*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.100***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Age 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.119** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.073**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Categorial
Marital Status(Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.257* -0.185* 0.138** -0.235** -0.222* 0.162
(0.044) (0.044) (0.022) (0.035) (0.057) (0.070)
Divorced -0.301** -0.374*** 0.054 -0.350* -0.314* 0.026
(0.033) (0.020) (0.048) (0.075) (0.098) (0.033)
Single -0.296*** -0.329*** -0.111* -0.285*** -0.279*** -0.094
(0.010) (0.012) (0.027) (0.017) (0.019) (0.050)
Regional dummies(22 regions) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 6.574*** 6.718*** 5.902** 7.902*** 7.899*** 7.471***
(0.255) (0.232) (0.523) (0.221) (0.211) (0.410)
N 74,125 65,730 8,395 86,491 79,555 6,936
R2 0.285 0.278 0.445 0.193 0.188 0.283
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
Urban Rural 
 




Most studies on returns to education (Heckman and Polachek, 1974; Card and 
Krueger, 1992; and Card, 1999) assume that the marginal rate of return is constant over all 
levels of education, which means each year of schooling has the same value as another. 
However, some studies find that significant nonlinearities in the rate of return on 
schoolingexist (Hungerford and Solon, 1987; Belman and Heywood, 1991; and Trostel, 2004). 
For example, Trostel (2004) examines marginal rates of return on investment in schooling in 
12 countries and finds significant nonlinearity in the marginal rate of return. He then suggests 
that the marginal rate of return is zero for the first several years of schooling, and then 
increases rapidly until about year 12, after which it declines. Similarly, as mentioned in the 
literature review section, most studies of returns to education in the MENA region (Elhamidi, 
2006; Said, 2016; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2009) suggest that such returns are non-linear. Of 
particular interest is Salehi-Isfahani et al. (2009), who compare returns to education in Iran, 
Turkey, and Egypt for urban men. In order to examine nonlinearity, they relax the linearity 
assumption in two ways, first by including the quadratic terms for schooling, which deals with 
the first type of non-linearity; and later by using schooling levels instead of years of schooling, 
which deals with the second type. They reveal that considerable nonlinearity exist in all three 
countries, and for Iran, urban men with tertiary education enjoy the highest returns to 
education, at 102%.  
We adopt the same approach as Salehi- Isfahani et al. (2009) to test for nonlinearity. 
They find considerable non-linearity for urban men where returns to education were -1.7% 
for the year 2006. Our results in Table 5.7 also show considerable non-linearity in both areas; 
the coefficients on 𝑆2 is positive and statistically significant for both men and women (except 
urban women), indicating that the returns to education increase with schooling. The 
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estimated parameters are difficult to interpret as both the coefficient on years of schooling 
and years of schooling squared must be taken into account jointly. We present our findings 
graphically but before we turn to these note that all the results show evidence of convexity, 
not concavity. The positive terms on years of schooling squared suggest that returns to 
schooling accelerate in Iran and do not inflect at some point, like a standard age-earnings 
lifecycle profile. Also noteworthy is the fact that the other estimated coefficients on age, 
marital status and regions do not appear to have changed much from the linear model 




Table 5.7: Results (Urban and Rural Areas) 
Urban Rural
All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Continous
Years of Schooling 0.035** 0.029** 0.073** 0.034** 0.027* 0.023
(0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Years of Schooling Squared 0.001** 0.001** 0.002 0.001* 0.001* 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.129*** 0.130*** 0.120** 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.070**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012)
AgeSquared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marital Status(Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.267** -0.185* 0.125* -0.250** -0.226* 0.146
(0.043) (0.044) (0.023) (0.036) (0.056) (0.070)
Divorced -0.302** -0.373*** 0.062 -0.352* -0.312* 0.032
(0.033) (0.021) (0.047) (0.075) (0.098) (0.038)
Single -0.299*** -0.330*** -0.114* -0.292*** -0.285*** -0.109
(0.010) (0.012) (0.026) (0.018) (0.019) (0.049)
Regional dummies(30 regions) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 6.635*** 6.774*** 5.980** 7.955*** 7.947*** 7.752***
(0.263) (0.236) (0.501) (0.219) (0.207) (0.378)
N 74,125 65,730 8,395 86,491 79,555 6,936
r2 0.286 0.279 0.446 0.193 0.188 0.293
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
Source: HIES 2008/09 to 2011/12
 173 
Figure 5.4 depicts the effect of years of schooling on log wages using the estimated 
coefficients in Table 5.7 graphically. We observe that all profiles are convex, showing 
increasing returns to years of schooling. Interestingly, we observe that non-linearity is more 
visible for women in both regions. This suggests that women’s education results in higher 
returns as their education increased in rural areas compared to urban areas. Moreover, 
women with low levels of schooling have lower returns than men, especially in urban areas. 
A possible explanation for this trend is that since there are more lower educated women than 
men in Iranian urban areas, therefore less educated women may face additional penalties in 
the labour market when compared to men. 
Figure 5.4: Nonlinearity of Returns to Schooling 
 
 
Source: Authors own estimation from HIES 2008-2012
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While the results in Table 5.7 present strong evidence of non-linear effects of education, one 
may question whether these returns can be captured by just including a quadratic term. We 
pursue this further by allowing for an even more flexible specification in Table 5.8. This is 
motivated by evidence that particular qualifications (such as high school diplomas and/or 
degrees) matter over and above years of schooling (the sheepskin effect; see, for example, 
Hungerford and Solon, 1987). 
In our regression, we divide schooling levels into seven categories: no qualification, 
primary school qualifications, secondary or high school qualifications, BA qualification, 
Master’s degree, and the highest degree, a PhD. The omitted category is no qualification. 
The results in Table 5.8 confirm the non-linear nature of returns to education in Iran. 
Note that our sample includes only individuals with qualifications, which reduces it to 48,081 
observations for rural areas and 45,162 observations for urban areas. Observing Table 5.8 
suggests that, for urban areas, these returns accelerate as individuals gain higher 
qualifications, and this applies for both men and women; however, women enjoy a much 
bigger increase. For instance, having a secondary-level certificate increases returns marginally 
compared to those who have no qualifications (51% for men and 118% for women). Having a 
BA degree increases returns by approximately 70% for men and 182% for women (compared 
to no qualification/studies). Having a Master’s degree increases the returns by approximately 
85% for men and 195% for women, meaning that women with a Master’s degree earn 195% 
more than women with no qualifications, whilst men with a Master’s degree earn 85% more 
than men with no qualification. Finally, urban men and women with PhDs enjoy the highest 
increase in their hourly wages: 145% for men and 232% for women. In terms of vocational 
training, we find that the returns are higher compared to those with no qualification, and the 
effect is higher for women (125%) than for men. These results are also in harmony with Salehi-
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Isfahani’s et al (2009) findings. For instance, they found out that for 2006 data, returns to 
wages is 102% for urban men with a tertiary degree, compared to 48% for vocational studies, 
57% for upper secondary, and 16% for basic education.  
For rural areas, returns to education for primary qualification starts with 38% for men 
and 60% for women, and increases substantially for each level. The coefficients on secondary 
and high school certificates are 51% for men and 101% for women. Vocational training also 
gives very high returns to wages for both men and women, at 53% and 81%, respectively. 
However, in contrast to urban areas (where women with vocational training had higher 
returns than women with high school training), women with vocational certificates earn less 
than those with academic certificates do, while for men, the returns are very similar. 
Furthermore, we reveal that a university degree increases earnings substantially. For 
instance, the coefficients for BA certificates are 85% for men and 182% for women. 
In summary, results provided in this section suggest strong evidence against the linear 
Mincer specification that is common in the literature and used in the previous section. 
Additionally, our results show large sheepskin effects, with the returns to credentials 
exceeding the returns to years of education. These effects are larger for urban areas than for 
rural areas are, and for women than for men. Finally, as the tables show, the R squared is 
higher for women compared to men, suggesting that education is a good predictor of 
women’s earnings in Iran, especially in urban areas where we are able to explain over 40% of 
the variation in women’s hourly wages.  
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Table 5.8: Regression results using educational levels for urban and rural areas 
Urban Rural
All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Education Levels
Primary 0.477*** 0.350*** 0.772** 0.513*** 0.387*** 0.604***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.079) (0.020) (0.021) (0.041)
Secondary/High School 0.603*** 0.511*** 1.186*** 0.629*** 0.515*** 1.013***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.078) (0.024) (0.022) (0.054)
Vocational 0.671*** 0.544*** 1.252*** 0.665*** 0.538*** 0.810**
(0.032) (0.036) (0.045) (0.016) (0.020) (0.102)
BA Degree 0.802*** 0.702*** 1.827*** 0.980*** 0.854*** 1.829***
(0.039) (0.034) (0.071) (0.045) (0.052) (0.030)
Masters Degree 0.959*** 0.852*** 1.950*** 1.282*** 1.179*** 1.770**
(0.044) (0.040) (0.088) (0.063) (0.053) (0.160)
PhD Degree 1.510*** 1.453*** 2.325** 1.725*** 1.539*** 2.719***
(0.056) (0.017) (0.194) (0.104) (0.061) (0.206)
Age 0.131*** 0.137*** 0.137** 0.084** 0.092*** 0.085**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.020) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Marital Status
Widowed -0.578*** -0.212* 0.067 -0.611** -0.284* 0.109
(0.036) (0.058) (0.029) (0.048) (0.087) (0.064)
Divorced -0.465*** -0.359** -0.033 -0.439** -0.208 0.011
(0.031) (0.057) (0.065) (0.050) (0.067) (0.010)
Single -0.324*** -0.328*** -0.137* -0.334*** -0.307*** -0.197*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.038) (0.022) (0.022) (0.036)
Regional controls(30 regions) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 14.395*** 14.475*** 12.928*** 15.311*** 15.323*** 14.380***
(0.281) (0.222) (0.538) (0.263) (0.250) (0.309)
N 48,081 41,471 6,610 45,162 41,005 4,157
R2 0.260 0.265 0.404 0.188 0.173 0.299
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
Source: HIES 2008/09 to 2011/12
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5.5.3 IV Estimates 
 
In this section, we investigate the causal effect of education on wages using two types 
of instruments: a non-experimental instrument, which is parental education based on 
parents’ years of schooling, and an experimental instrument based on the educational 
expansion resulting from the Islamic revolution in Iran. Tables 5.9 (urban) and 5.10 (rural) 
report the results for parental education, while Tables 5.11 and 5.12 provide the results for 
educational expansion.  
5.5.3.1 Parental education IV results 
 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 report the casual impact of education on earnings when employing 
parental education as our IV estimate. It should be noted that our subsample are children 
older than 16 years that are still living with their parents, as otherwise we would not have 
access to their parental education. This, of course, leads to a substantially different sample 
composition when compared to our previous, naïve, results. It is therefore important to 
investigate this sample in order to contextualise our results appropriately.  
Figure 5.6 provides age information about the subsamples used in the regression 
results. The red line reports our previous, whole, sample, which was all individuals between 
16 and 65. On the other hand, the blue line shows the results for the subsample of children 
older than 16 years old that are living with their parents and are working. It is clearly 
noticeable that this current sample has a considerably different age distribution with primarily 
younger individuals aged mid-20 being captured. However, as mentioned, this was necessary 
to gain access to the parental education information. We therefore complement our IV results 
with additional OLS results that estimate the return to schooling for this new subsample to 
help us contextualise our results across all samples. 
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Figure 5.5: Comparison of the whole sample versus our subsample 
 
Source: Authors own estimation from HIES 2008-2012 
 
5.5.3.1.1 OLS results 
 
The first three columns of these tables report the OLS model for our subsample of 
children older than 16 years that are living with their parents. Note that in Iran, like in many 
Middle Eastern countries, it is not odd for children to live with their parents until they are 
married. This is especially the case in urban areas, where the youth marriage age has been 
especially delayed. However, in rural areas, the traditional structure of the community is 
based such that individuals marry at much younger ages, which shows in our subsamples, 
where the number of children living with their parents in rural areas is much lower than in 
urban areas. In urban areas, we have 14,395 observations for men and 2,266 observations for 
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women; while in rural areas, we have 17,364 observations for men and 1,101 observations 
for women. 
Our OLS estimates for our subsample (children older than 16 living with their parents) 
suggest that in urban areas, education increases the hourly wages of urban men by 1.5% and 
urban women by 7.3% per year of education. There is also the standard non-linear concave 
impact of experience for both men and women. Our OLS results for rural men and women of 
our subsample also suggest a positive effect of schooling and experience for both sexes, 
though the impact of schooling for rural men is much lower at 0.6%, while for rural women it 
is very close to that of urban women, of 7.1% and 7.3% respectively. Finally, our estimates of 
R squared are bigger for women than for men in both areas. In urban areas, we have 0.35 for 
women compared to 0.28 for men; while in rural areas, we have 0.32 for women compared 
to 0.21 for men. 
5.5.3.1.2 Reduced form results 
 
Columns 5 to 7 of Tables 5.9 and 5.10 reveal our results for our reduced form 
estimates. Our estimates on parental education are positive in both areas and for both sexes, 
which suggest that a positive correlation between parental education and child education; 
the coefficient on parental education is 0.2 for both men and women. Each additional year of 
parental schooling adds 0.2 years of child schooling. Interestingly, these results suggest that 
the coefficient for rural women is the biggest, suggesting that the strongest relationship 
between parental education and child education is for rural women (0.3). 
5.5.3.1.3 Restricted estimate results 
 
Observing columns 8 to 10 in Tables 5.9 and 5.10 suggest that our IV estimates are 
substantially higher than the corresponding OLS estimates. For urban areas, the estimated 
return on education increases to 6.5% (from 2.3% using OLS). Observing men and women 
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separately, we predict that for men, the estimated return on education increases to 3.9% 
(from 1.5% using OLS), while for women, the estimated return on education increases to 20% 
(from 7.3% using OLS). This suggests significant differences in the rate of return on education 
between genders, although the IV adjustment results in a common increase of approximately 
3 times for both genders.  
 Observing our IV estimate for parental background in rural areas, we can also detect 
a higher coefficient for returns to education for both sexes. Here, we observe that one 
additional year of schooling increases men's hourly income by 0.1% (compared to 0.06% in 
the OLS model), while women's hourly income increases by 15.7% (compared to 7.1% in the 
OLS model). Overall, our results here suggest that standard OLS estimates under predict the 
“true” rate of return to education by a factor of between 2 and 3. 
Such results are in line with most studies of the returns to education; for instance Card 
(1999), Bound and Jaeger (1996), and Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (1999) argue that the returns 
to schooling are heterogeneously distributed across the population, and this explains the 
higher coefficients when we employ an IV estimate. There are two explanations for the 
appearance of this heterogeneity. The first explanation is related to the non-linearity of 
education and the assumption that returns to education are decreasing with levels of 
schooling. If parental education has the highest impact on individuals’ educational choices at 
the lower end of the distribution of schooling, then the IV estimates will yield a return that is 
higher than it should be in the population as a whole. However, this explanation does not 
apply to our data, since we already find that returns to education are increasing with years of 
schooling in our dataset. The second explanation is more plausible in our scenario. Educated 
parents will more easily distinguish the ability levels of their children and hence encourage 
those with high ability to continue their studies.  
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We should note that both instruments are statistically significant in the first stage 
suggesting that parental education as an instrument have a statistically significant impact on 
the probability to select into more or less education in both areas. The relevant F-statistics 
for urban and rural areas are 13 and 14 respectively which suggests that parental education 
as our first IV the instruments are sufficiently strong. 
Finally, our sample size decreased substantially because our IV estimates are based on 
a subsample of children living with their parents, and thus these results should only be seen 
as indicative results for the larger, population-based sample used in our main analysis. We 
have 10,528 men and 1,557 women in urban areas and 12,197 men and only 1,101 women 
for rural areas. 
However, these results remain of potential interest because they mirror other studies 
using this type of instrument Card (1999) and suggest that, as for many countries, OLS 
estimates may underestimate the true returns to education. If the above results are to be 
believed, then a conservative estimate of two times our primary OLS coefficients may reflect 
the true return oneducation in Iran more closely. However, parental education has been 
criticised in various studies (for example Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004; Trostel et al, 
2002, Arcand et al, 2004) as possibly not being an appropriate choice of instrument. This is 
because parent's education isoften correlated with earnings, as the result these variables 
don't meet 'the strict validity assumption that is required for IV regressions'(Hoogerheide et 
al, 2012, p516). We thus attempt to ‘triangulate’ our estimates using a second IV procedure 










Table 5.9: IV (Parental Education) Results (Urban Areas) 
OLS
First Stage Second Stage
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Parental Years of Schooling . . . 0.235*** 0.239*** 0.202*** . . .
. . . (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) . . .
Years of Schooling 0.023* 0.015* 0.073** . . . 0.065*** 0.039*** 0.207***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.011) . . . (0.008) (0.009) (0.028)
Age 0.267*** 0.292*** 0.147*** 0.905*** 0.849*** 1.215*** 0.245*** 0.277*** 0.026
(0.013) (0.018) (0.008) -0.041 (0.045) (0.103) (0.015) (0.016) (0.055)
Age Squared -0.004*** -0.004** -0.002***  -0.014 *** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Maritial Status(Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.311 -0.279 0.074 -0.311 -0.509 -3.353*** -0.332 -0.401 0.599*
(0.134) (0.142) (0.209) (0.541) (0.654) (0.890) (0.177) (0.142) (0.353)
Divorced -0.228** -0.209*** 0.001 -0.513 * -0.781** -1.423** -0.179 * -0.155* 0.256
(0.025) (0.012) (0.085) (0.027) (0.277) (0.421) (0.076) (0.090) (0.164)
Single -0.165** -0.166** -0.032 0.615*** 0.518*** 0.239    -0.198** -0.184** -0.090
(0.017) (0.014) (0.092) (0.068) (0.070) (0.076) (0.023) (0.023) (0.080)
Regional controls(22 regions) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 5.074*** 4.820*** 6.045***  -6.334 *** 11.502*** -9.781*** 5.089*** 4.841*** 6.613***
(0.328) (0.372) (0.465) (0.566) (0.195) (0.431) (0.194) (0.203) (0.431)
N 12,085 10,528 1,557 12,085 10,528 1,557 12,085 10,528 1,557
r2 0.277 0.288 0.352 0.363 0.303 0.495 0.2859 0.310 0.267
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
IV Estimate
 
Source: HIES 2008/09 to 2011/12 
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Table 5.10: IV (Parental Education) Results (Rural Areas) 
First Stage Second Stage
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Parental Years of Schooling . . . 0.222*** 0.209*** 0.306*** . . .
. . . (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) . . .
Years of Schooling 0.016** 0.006 0.071*** . . . 0.033** 0.010*** 0.157**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) . . . (0.011) (0.012) (0.029)
Age 0.172*** 0.179*** 0.109* 0.761*** 0.707*** 1.125*** 0.183*** 0.191*** 0.062
(0.012) (0.010) (0.031) -0.041 (0.045) (0.127) (0.015) (0.016) (0.051)
Age Squared -0.002** -0.002** -0.001  -0.012 *** -0.011*** -0.019*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maritial Status(Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.333 -0.265 -0.224 -1.098 -0.947 -1.078 -0.445 -0.470 0.032
(0.165) (0.283) (0.362) (0.673) (0.728) (1.885) (0.212) (0.231) (0.566)
Divorced -0.269* -0.282 -0.061 -0.514 * -0.881** -0.487 -0.282 * -0.166* -0.308
(0.046) (0.114) (0.139) (0.286) (0.333) (0.686) (0.090) (0.106) (0.206)
Single -0.241** -0.213** -0.255 0.615*** 0.606*** 0.134    -0.230*** -0.198*** -0.255**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.130) (0.066) (0.067) (0.316) (0.023) (0.022) (0.092)
Regional controls(22 regions) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 7.076*** 6.987*** 7.653***  -3.426 ***  -2.825 ***  -5.908 *** 6.801*** 6.787*** 7.540***
(0.342) (0.310) (0.570) (0.547) (0.584) (1.842) (0.174) (0.186) (0.569)
N 13,298 12,197 1,101 13,298 12,197 1,101 13,298 12,197 1,101
r2 0.213 0.212 0.320 0.167 0.152 0.371 0.211 0.216 0.246
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses




Source: HIES 2008/09 to 2011/12
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5.5.3.2 Educational Expansion IV Results 
 
 In this section, we report our results when our IV is educational expansion after the 
Islamic revolution in 1979. Table 5.11 reports the estimates of our results in urban areas, while 
Table 5.12 reports the results of our second IV for rural areas. This analysis uses our main 
sample of all individuals between 16 to 65 years old. Hence, we have 74,125 observations in 
urban areas and 84,491 observations for rural areas. 
5.5.3.2.1 OLS results 
 
The first columns of Tables 5.11 and 5.12 report our OLS estimates, which are similar 
to our initial OLS estimates in Table 5.6, so we will not describe them in detail. The coefficient 
for urban areas suggests that one extra year of schooling increases wages by 5.3% in urban 
areas and 5.2% in rural areas. We observe that returns to education are much higher for 
women and it nearly double, while they are very similar for urban and rural areas. 
5.5.3.2.2 Reduced form results 
 
Columns 4 to 6 of Tables 5.11 and 5.12 report our estimates in the first stage of our 
model. Here, we observe that the educational expansion had a positive impact on both men 
and women and in both urban and rural areas of Iran. Interestingly, we also observe that in 
urban areas, the positive impact of the Islamic revolution is bigger for men than for women 
(0.55 for men, and 0.30 for women), while in rural areas, the positive impact of educational 
expansion is much bigger for women than for men (0.22 for men and 1.88 for women). 
Furthermore, our estimates for age and age squared have the expected signs.  
5.3.2.3 Restricted estimate results 
 
We should note that our second instrument is also statistically significant in the first 
stage suggesting that educational expansion had a statistically significant impact on the 
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probability to select into more or less education in both areas. The relevant F-statistics for 
urban and rural areas are 16 and 13 respectively which suggests that our second IV 
instruments are also sufficiently strong. 
According to our second IV, the estimated return on education increases to 22% (from 
5.3% using OLS) in urban areas, while this coefficient is 15 % (compared to 5.2%) in rural areas. 
Observing men and women separately, we find that for men, the estimated return on 
education increases to 26% (from 4.5% using OLS) in urban areas and 17.6 % (compared to 
4.4) in rural areas. For urban women, the estimated return on education increases to 29.7% 
(from 10.2% using OLS), while for rural women, our coefficient rises to 12.7% (from 10%). 
These results suggest that when we account for the endogeneity of schooling, the return on 
an additional year of schooling increases substantially, which is in line with international 
evidence and suggests that OLS under-estimates the returns to schooling. Note that the 
highest rise in the coefficient is for men, especially those in urban areas. Moreover, the 
multiplier on our OLS results is remarkably similar to our previous estimated results using 
parental education as an instrument. This suggests our ‘triangulation’ has had some success 
and produces consistent results. 
Overall, our IV estimates are consistent with the existing literature; for instance, 
existing IV estimates for the UK that examine the effects of 'School Leaving Age Reforms' on 
wages suggest IV estimates that range between 5% and 20% (for example, see Dickson, 2013 
and 2011; Harmon, 1995 and 2000). We also observe that for women, the IV estimates are 
between 29% (urban) and 12% (rural), whilst for men, they range between 25% (urban) and 
12% (rural). We can therefore, with some degree of confidence, argue that our analysis 
suggests that prior studies on the return to education in Iran (Salehi-Isfahani et al, 2009) 





Table 5.11: IV (Educational Expansion) Results (Urban Areas) 
First Stage Second Stage
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Education Policy . . . 0.622*** 0.556*** 0.303* . . .
. . . (0.051) (0.008) (0.171) . . .
Years of Schooling 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.102*** . . . 0.224** 0.258*** 0.297*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) . . . (0.014) (0.029) (0.029)
Age 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.119** 0.375*** 0.366*** 0.423*** 0.065*** 0.055*** 0.040
(0.006) (0.005) (0.016) -0.007 (0.045) (0.127) (0.015) (0.016) (0.051)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**  -0.005 *** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maritial Status(Reference: Married) . . . . . . . . .
Widowed -0.333 -0.265 -0.224 -1.991 -0.947 -1.078 -0.445 -0.470 0.032
(0.165) (0.283) (0.362) (0.673) (0.728) (1.885) (0.212) (0.231) (0.566)
Divorced -0.269* -0.282 -0.061 0.016 * -0.881** -0.487 -0.282 * -0.166* -0.308
(0.046) (0.114) (0.139) (0.286) (0.333) (0.686) (0.090) (0.106) (0.206)
Single -0.241** -0.213** -0.255 1.236*** 0.606*** 0.134    -0.230*** -0.198*** -0.255**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.130) (0.066) (0.067) (0.316) (0.023) (0.022) (0.092)
Regional controls(22 regions) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 7.076*** 6.834*** 7.653***  3.862 ***  -2.825 ***  -5.908 *** 6.801*** 6.787*** 7.540***
(0.342) (0.310) (0.570) (0.547) (0.584) (1.842) (0.174) (0.186) (0.569)
N 74,218 65,820 8,395 74,218 65,820 8,395 74,218 65,820 8,395
R2 0.285 0.278 0.445 0.317 0.258 0.527 0.07 0.05 0.106
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
OLS IV Estimate
 
Source: HIES 2008/09 to 2011/12
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Table 5.12: IV (Educational Expansion) Results (Rural Areas) 
First Stage Second Stage
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay Log Hourly Pay 
Education Policy . . . 0.889*** 0.224*** 1.882*** . . .
. . . (0.044) (0.008) (0.171) . . .
Years of Schooling 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.100*** . . . 0.157** 0.176*** 0.127**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) . . . (0.014) (0.012) (0.029)
Age 0.084*** 0.088*** 0.073** 0.216*** 0.224*** 0.162*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) -0.007 (0.045) (0.127) (0.015) (0.016) (0.051)
Age Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*  -0.003 *** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Maritial Status(Reference: Married) . . . . . . . . .
Widowed -0.333 -0.265 -0.224 -1.991 -0.947 -1.078 -0.445 -0.470 0.032
(0.165) (0.283) (0.362) (0.673) (0.728) (1.885) (0.212) (0.231) (0.566)
Divorced -0.269* -0.282 -0.061 0.016 * -0.881** -0.487 -0.282 * -0.166* -0.308
(0.046) (0.114) (0.139) (0.286) (0.333) (0.686) (0.090) (0.106) (0.206)
Single -0.241** -0.213** -0.255 1.236*** 0.606*** 0.134    -0.230*** -0.198*** -0.255**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.130) (0.066) (0.067) (0.316) (0.023) (0.022) (0.092)
Regional controls(22 regions)
Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 7.076*** 6.987*** 7.653***  3.862 ***  -2.825 ***  -5.908 *** 6.801*** 6.787*** 7.540***
(0.342) (0.310) (0.570) (0.547) (0.584) (1.842) (0.174) (0.186) (0.569)
N 86,491 79,555 6,936 86,491 79,555 6,936 86,491 79,555 6,936
R2 0.193 0.188 0.283 0.298 0.286 0.465 0.073 0.061 0.276
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001" ="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"
OLS IV Estimate
 
Source: HIES 2008/09 to 2011/12
5.5.3.3 IV Diagnostics 
As mentioned in the methodology, for the excluded instrument to be valid, it must be sufficiently 
correlated with the included endogenous regressor but uncorrelated with the error term. Whilst 
the correlation with the error term cannot be empirically tested and must be defended on 
theoretical grounds, the correlation of the instrument with the endogenous regressor can be 
tested. A significant literature exists that highlights the dangers of using ‘weak’ instruments in an 
instrumental variable setting and how they might lead to misleading results (see for example, 
Cragg and Donald, 1993; Staiger and Stock, 1997; Stock, Wright and Yogo, 2002 and Stock and 
Yogo, 2005). 
 To address these concern Table 5.13 and 5.14 presents a series of diagnostic statistics 
associated with our instrumental variables results in Tables 5.10 to 5.12. It presents the Durbin 
and Wu-Hausman test that all variables can be treated as exogenous (H0). It also presents a range 
of tests on the strength of the instrument in the first stage thereby allowing us inference on 
whether we should consider any of our instruments weak.  
 With respect to the tests of endogeneity, for all but one set of regressions the presented 
test statistics from the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test statistics are significant at the 0.1% level (or 
less) suggesting that the null-hypothesis that all variables are exogenous can be rejected. Only in 
the female regression using educational expansion as an instrument is there a suggestion that 
the variables could be considered as exogenous. Here, for both urban and rural areas the 
associated Durbin and Wu-Hausman statistics are non-significant suggesting that the included 
regressors are exogenous. However, we caution against such a formal interpretation as few in 
the related literature would consider schooling as exogenous.  
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 To test the instrument strength we present a further series of diagnostics. The F-statistic 
denotes the joint significant of the coefficients on the exogenous regressors and the instrument. 
Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) suggest that the F-statistic should exceed 10 when there is one 
endogenous regressors. All but two regressions exceed this statistics significantly. The first stage 
regression for women using educational expansion only has an F-statistics of 9.07 in urban areas 
and 7.94 in rural areas, suggesting the relevant instrument may be weak here. In addition to the 
F-statistic we also present the adjusted R2 and partial R2 both of which can be used as further 
indicators of instrument strength. A high adjusted R2 suggests a good model fit whilst the partial 
R2 provides evidence on the additional contribution to R2 that the instrument adds to the first 
stage. We observe that our regressions with the instrument parental education have higher R2 
and partial R2 than our regressions using educational expansion, suggesting that parental 
education is potentially less likely to be a weak instrument. However, parental education appears 
to work best in urban areas whilst its effect on R2 diminishes in rural areas. Nonetheless, in both 
areas parental education appears to have a stronger impact on R2 than educational expansion. 
Moreover, the diagnostic evidence suggests that the female regression using educational 
expansion is particularly weak in both areas with a very low partial R2 whilst the adjusted R2 is 
high, suggesting that the instrument adds little to an already robust model.  
 Finally, we also present the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for a 2-stage least square 
size of nominal 5% Wald test. This characterisation defines our instrument to be weak if a Wald 
test at the 5% level can have an actual rejection rate of no more than 10%, 15%, 205% or 25%. In 
our results the relevant Cragg and Donald (1993) eigenvalue statistic is higher than virtually all 
our critical threshold suggesting we can reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments. However, 
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the relevant eigenvalue for females in both urban and rural using educational expansion as an 
instrument is 9.07 and 7.94 respectively. This is less than the 10% critical threshold of 16.38. This 
further suggests that the educational expansion acts as a weak instrument in the female 
regression.  
 Overall then, we can conclude that the majority of our instruments are strong whilst some 
caution should be applied to estimates from the female regression using educational expansion 











Table 5.13: IV Diagnostics (Urban Areas) 




32.46 10.52 28.02 76.84 103.08 2.41
Wu-Hausman 32.40 10.48 27.53 76.86 103.16 2.40
Tests of Instrument Strength
F-statistic 1415.01 1271.74 170.29 229.30 166.48 9.07
Adjusted R
2
0.36 0.30 0.48 0.27 0.21 0.41
Partial R
2
0.11 0.11 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.01
Cragg and Donald Minimum Eigenvalue 1415.01 1271.74 170.29 229.30 166.48 9.07
Stock and Yogo 2 SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test
10% 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
20% 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66
25% 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53
Instrument = Educational ExpansionInstrument = Parental Education
 
 
Table 5.14 IV Diagnostics (Rural Areas) 




12.49 13.60 3.45 10.06 15.14 4.62
Wu-Hausman 12.36 13.44 3.09 10.06 15.12 4.55
Tests of Instrument Strength 164.16 111.97 35.19 114.01 87.11 7.94
F-statistic 0.18 0.15 0.39 0.13 0.11 0.31
Adjusted R
2
0.17 0.14 0.32 0.12 0.11 0.30
Partial R
2
0.06 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02
Cragg and Donald Minimum Eigenvalue 164.16 111.97 35.19 114.01 87.11 7.94
Stock and Yogo 2 SLS Size of nominal 5% Wald Test
10% 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
20% 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66 6.66
25% 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53 5.53














In this chapter of the thesis, we have sought to investigate the returns to education in 
terms of wages in Iran. There is one study conducted on returns to education in Iran by Salehi-
Isfahani et al. (2009), however, this study does not differentiate between urban and rural 
regions/areas, and by gender. On the other hand, as various studies (such as Tokila, 2011) point 
out, there are differences between rates of return in different regions, and it is important to shed 
the light to these differences (Tokila, 2010). Furthermore, most of the existing literature 
(Dougherty ,2005, Trostel et al.,2002) points out that it is important to differentiate between 
returns to education for men and women, as returns to education are different between them 
(usually higher for women). This is especially important in developing countries, where cultural 
and religious factors might overshadow economy, and might affect policymakers' decisions 
(Huitfeldt and Kabbani, 2007).  Hence, our contribution to existing literature on returns to 
education in Iran comes from differentiating between these two areas, while also examining 
gender differences. Another contribution of this chapter is that while most of the current studies 
on return to education in MENA(Assaad,1997; Dah and Hammami, 2002)and the only existing 
study on Iran(Isfahani et al.,2009) have sought to assess naive estimates of returns to education, 
we attempt to estimate both the naive and causal returns to education.  
Our naïve (OLS) results reveal that the return to an additional year of education 
(schooling) is approximately 5% for both urban and rural areas. This is consistent with the existing 
literature on returns to education for most developed countries; for instance, Psacharopoulos 
(1994) collection of studies on returns to education suggests that in most countries, estimates of 
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returns to education are between 5% to 15% (Psacharopoulos, 1994). Our naive results also 
suggest that returns to schooling for Iranian women are higher than for men which is also 
consistent with the existing literature (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). However, our 
estimates also reveal that returns to education are similar between urban and rural areas, which 
is in contrast to the existing literature (such as Goetz, 2004; Flink, 2016). In terms of linearity, our 
results provide strong evidence for non-linearity, which is in contrast with Mincer's assumption 
of linear returns to education. However, the existence of non-linearity has been proved by many 
studies of developing countries (for example Elhamidi, 2006; Said, 2016; Salehi-Isfahani, 2009). 
Finally, our causal (IV) estimates appear significantly higher than our naïve (OLS) estimates; 
approximately 4 times higher from 5% to around 20%. Many studies (Dickson, 2013; Walker, 
2002) have also found that IV estimates that are higher than OLS estimates, although usually only 
around two to three times as high. Finally, we should note that, while our OLS results suggested 
that returns to education are similar in urban and rural areas, IV estimates suggest that returns 
to education in rural areas are lower than urban areas.  
Our results provide important policy implications. For instance, existence of high returns 
to education in terms of wages in Iran justifies both public and private investment in education. 
This suggests that one way to tackle poverty and inequality in Iran is through public, or/and 
private investment. Furthermore, the fact that returns to education are non-linear, confirms our 
findings in the previous chapter regarding possible existence of inequality in education, and 
consequently existence of intergenerational mobility. Non-linearity in education implies that 
individuals with higher education earn more money, and since usually children of wealthier and 
more educated parents receive more education, they then earn more wages in future, while 
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children of less well-off families usually study until education is complementary (8th grade in case 
of Iran), which hints that they (especially women) will earn less in future, and this cycle will 
continue through the life-cycle of individuals. All this suggests that Iranian policy makers need to 
encourage less wealthier children, and specially girls, to continue their studies into higher 




















The final chapter of this thesis analyses the determinants of job mismatches in terms of 
under/over unemployment in Iran. In this thesis, we have conducted a systematic empirical study 
of the links between private education and the labour market in Iran, with a particular focus on 
uncovering the potential for different factors to be at work in rural and urban settings. In order 
to do so, Chapter 4 modelled the determinants of household educational expenditure on 
children, where we examined various socio-economic factors that determine such decisions. On 
the other hand, in Chapter 5, we examined returns to human capital in Iran in terms of wages, as 
we consider such returns as a key motivation for investment in education. Another important 
impact of investment in human capital is its effects on individuals’ employment. Many scholars 
mention the causes and significance of unemployment in Iran, especially among the educated 
youth (such as Valadkhani, 2003; Moghaddam, 1995; Amuzegar, 2005; Isfahani, 200), which we 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. In fact, one can argue that the topic of unemployment and 
its costs has received the most attention by Iranian researchers over previous decades. On the 
other hand, one aspect interrelated with employment and often overlooked, is the potential for 
under- and over-employment amongst the working population, which is likely to be especially 
pertinent to the situation of Iran. Since there is an adequate amount of research on 
unemployment and its consequences in Iran, and no research on the issue of job mismatch, this 
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chapter focuses on a more specific subject of employment in Iran, namely under/over 
employment14.  
Scholars of the Iranian economy (such as Sadat, 2016; Harani, 2004) criticise the 
government as they see under-employment as a way of hiding high rates of unemployment. For 
instance, in 2014, Iran’s Tasnim Newspaper claimed that the government’s announced 
unemployment rates were kept constant compared to previous years due to high rates of under-
employment in Iran. These claims can be correct when one examines arguments related to the 
employment crisis in the Iranian parliament and government committees. For instance, in 2006, 
one Member of Parliament claimed that the short-term remedy to high unemployment in Iran is 
that those who are working now should halve their working hours, and instead more unemployed 
persons would get jobs.  On the other hand, in 2012, the Research Centre of the Iranian 
parliament claimed that in Iran, where the self-employed and unpaid family workers constitute 
a large portion employed persons, the concept of over-employment might become as important 
as employment itself. According to this study, the unemployed, and especially unemployed 
youth, has no choice but to accept jobs that offer hard situations such as more working 
hours/days than they desire, and this has particular relevance in the agricultural sector. All these 
findings suggest that job mismatch in Iran should be a central concern to academics, policy 
makers, and managers alike.  
                                                           
14However, we have also modelled returns to education in terms of employability, and provided the results in 




This chapter intends to make three contributions; Firstly, as mentioned above, although 
there are large number of studies of the dynamics and characteristics of employment in Iran such 
as by Valadkhani (2003), Moghaddam (1995), Amuzegar (2005), and Salehi-Isfahani (2007), to the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the determinants of under- and 
over-employment in Iran. The second contribution of this chapter is related to the data that we 
use in this chapter. The LFS has been available to researchers in recent years (2015), hence, up 
to our knowledge, no other studies have employed this data to analyse the Iranian labour market, 
and the author of this thesis is one of the first researchers that have accessed, analysed and 
studied this rich data source. Finally, while most existing studies of under-and over-employment 
only model one of these variables, our data provided us the opportunity to observe both under- 
and -over employment and the exact amount of the existing hours of mismatch, which allows us 
to investigate all aspects of working hour matches and mismatches of Iranian workers. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide a literature 
review of under- and over-employment. Our third section will illustrate our data, which we take 
from the Iranian Labour Force Survey. The fourth section will provide the methodological and 
analytical framework. We employ three econometric models to investigate various 
characteristics of under/over employment in Iran. Section 5 will provide our results, and we 
finally provide concluding remarks in section 6. 




In the labour market, the theoretical assumption is that suppliers of labour will naturally 
match the number of hours they want to the number of working hours offered to them (Golden 
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and Gebreselassie, 2007). However, in the real economy, various constraints make this 
equilibrium difficult to achieve. Accordingly, these constraints generate a mismatch between 
workers’ actual working hours and their desired working hours, which results in time-related 
under- and over-employment (Bonke, 2014). Time-related under-employment happens when 
workers’ wish to work additional hours in return for more wages. On the other hand, ‘time-
related over-employment reflects a desire for fewer working hours for less pay’ (Tam, 2010, 
p.10). However, we should note that a cyclical pattern of economic growth may also create job 
mismatch in the labour market (Simic, 2002). For instance, when the economy is growing fast, 
over-employment may rise and then decrease if economic growth slows down. For under-
employment, we would expect the opposite cyclical pattern. Furthermore, under- and over-
employment may take other forms; for instance, when there is a mismatch of skills required for 
the job and the skills possessed by the job-holder. This reflects the existence of under- and over-
qualification within the labour market (Tam, 2010). However, this chapter focuses only on job 
mismatch in terms of time-related under/over employment and overlooks other types of job 
mismatch, though we acknowledge their importance.  
6.2.2 Under-employment 
 
One of the broadest measures of labour utilization is the unemployment rate, however, 
it does not fully capture the degree of spare capacity (Borjas, 2012). For example, according to 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO), in many countries (including Iran) individuals 
working even just one hour during the week would be defined as employed. For this reason, the 
full capacity of the labour market would be more accurately determined by accounting for under-
employment (Simic, 2002). However, there are many operational definitions of under-
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employment. For instance, according to Friedland and Price (2003) the Labour Utilisation 
Framework (LUF) provides a definition of under-employment that is linked to the concept of the 
social organisation of the economy. According to the LUF, ‘under-employment is defined in terms 
of the adequacy of the exchange within the labour market between the household and the 
economy, and fairness is the criterion used to determine the adequacy of the exchange. 
Judgments regarding the adequacy of the exchange are made with the frame of reference being 
a minimally adequate exchange relative to social norms’ (Friedland and Price, 2003, p.33). From 
this perspective, the exchange can be inadequate in three dimensions; wages received from 
employment, duration of working hours, and provision of relevant skills (Friedland and Price, 
2003). This definition of under-employment suggests that workers may be under-employed in 
one of three ways: involuntary part-time work, low-income work, and skill mismatch. Mckee 
(2011) adds to this relatively comprehensive definition provided by the LUF by pointing to social 
status as one of the most important rewards of the labour market. The importance of social 
status was first studied by Burris (1983), where he finds that a considerable number of college 
graduates felt unsatisfied with their job because ‘they were denied the high-status positions that 
their education should have afforded them’(Friedland and Price, 2003, p.35). Friedland and Price 
(2003) then concludes that ‘these workers were concerned about reaping the status rewards 
their educational and familial backgrounds should afford them as much as they desired adequate 
hours and wages’. These studies suggest that it is simplifying to assume that workers look only 
for hours, income, and opportunities for skill use when entering the labour market, because ‘jobs 




Various studies point to under-employment becoming a more prevalent phenomenon in 
various regions and countries. For the USA, the Bureau of Labour Statistics (2008) reported that 
8.8 million workers are forced to work part-time because they are unable to find full-time jobs. 
While these studies focus on full- versus part-time definitions of under-employment, broader 
definitions suggest the existence of even higher rates of under-employment. For instance, when 
the definition is broadened to include workers who are overqualified for the jobs they hold, the 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics estimates that under-employment ranges from 17% to 22%. Green 
et al. (2010) point out that under-employment in the USA will rise to about one third of the 
workforce if we broaden our definition of under-employment, including over 20% who are 
considered ‘highly overqualified’. Vaisey (2006) also focuses on the importance of over-
qualification and claims that this observable fact is increasing in the USA in a positive, linear 
trend, as the average education of workers increases. In line with these arguments, Feldman 
(2009) also claims that there will be a greater possibility that workers will experience under-
employment if the supply of skilled jobs does not increase commensurably. In line with research 
conducted in the USA Allen and van der Velden's (2001) study on European countries also finds 
that under-employment is rising in most countries. They claim that half of their sample of higher 
education or vocational school graduates were either overeducated or employed outside their 
fields of study (Allen and van der Velden, 2001). 
This section suggests that under-employment is a multidimensional and complex concept 
that can/has been studied from a variety of research perspectives. For instance, management 
scholars can study under-employment from the organisational view, while economists 
investigate under-employment by focusing on the under-utilisation of the labour force and its 
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effects on the labour market. Sociologists study under-employment’s impact on society and 
social structures, while community psychologists might examine the health outcomes and 
community effects of under-employment. Accordingly, each area has its own way of defining 
under-employment, and research in each stream tends to follow unique discipline-specific 
traditions (Heyes et al., 2017). 
6.2.3 Over-employment 
 
Employment that involves working excessive hours is another side of inadequate 
employment situations. According to the ILO, some workers would accept a cut in their wages in 
exchange for a reduction in their working hours. However, the conventional model usually argues 
that such a mismatch is a short-term problem and workers and firms will eventually come agree 
to match the desired and required working hours; otherwise, in the long term, employers will 
lose their workers to other firms that offer shorter work hours. Nevertheless, most of the existing 
studies (Rubin and Richardson, 199; Kahn and Lang, 1995) agree that over-employment can 
persist indefinitely, where ‘optimizing employers regularly require longer hours than employees 
might prefer’ (Kahn and Lang, 1995, p.920) 
Boulin et al. (2006) point out that the design of the set of survey questions regarding over-
employment can affect observant reaction, and thus creating a true measurement of over-
employment is rather difficult. For instance, if the survey includes questions that provide an 
alternative option of obtaining higher income in return for more working hours, the proportion 
of respondents indicating a preference for fewer hours declines. This report then suggests that 
‘when presented simultaneously with the alluring more money option, choosing fewer hours may 
lose its relative appeal, even if such hours are not available at their current job’ (Boulin et al. 
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,2006, p.211). Green (2007) also argues that if the survey asks individuals to specify how many 
hours they prefer to work (instead of just indicating fewer working hours), then the proportion 
of over-employed workers will decline. However, he also claims that this kind of question is 
challenging because it is often unclear how workers would get their ‘preferred’ number of hours. 
For example, in the UK, while 12 million respondents indicated a preference for fewer hours, only 
3 million pointed out that they would accept less pay in return for fewer working hours (Simic, 
2002). Finally, if workers expect a period of high under-employment or unemployment in the 
near future, they might accept or ‘prefer’ longer working hours ‘as a hedge against anticipated 
future reduction of income’ (Boulin,2006, p.214). These arguments suggest that estimates of 
over-employment may be biased downward if survey questions ‘provoke ascertain implicit 
assumptions about the current income foregone, and the amount and dimensions of hours 
reduced and type of gains realised in time off’ (Green, 2007, p.217).  
We should note that over-employment can also be viewed from a macroeconomic 
perspective in three distinct types: structural, cyclical, and frictional. ‘Structural over-
employment occurs because of the presence of structural incentives inherent in labour-market-
related institutions or work organisation that lengthen hours demanded per worker. Such work 
organisation includes the growing use of mandatory (compulsory) overtime practices’ (Boulin, 
2006, p.216). These institutions include those that intensify the fixed cost associated with 
employing new workers (e.g., computerisation) (Hubler, 2000), training and hiring costs 
(Contensou and Vranceanu, 2000), and the cost of ‘premiums for employee health benefit 
coverage’ (Glosser and Golden, 2004; p.85). Cyclical over-employment occurs during cyclical 
booms, when demand is surging and the hours demanded per worker grows more rapidly than 
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workers’ preferred hours (the latter induced by rising wage rates if the substitution effect on 
labour supply is dominant) (Marcuro et al., 2015). Finally, frictional over-employment exists due 
to the ‘bundling of wages and hours in typical employment contracts and from incomplete 
markets and information’ (Boulin, 2006, p.219). In other words, due to existing barriers in the 
labour market, employers do not have perfect information about their employees’ preferences. 
Similarly, job applicants do not have perfect information about job requirements and alternative 
jobs; hence, such information asymmetries lead to mismatches in the labour market.  
6.2.4 Consequences of Under/Over Employment 
 
In contrast to the widespread existing literature on the negative effects of unemployment 
(Dooley et al., 1996), the relationship between under/over employment and well-being has not 
been studied extensively. In this section, we examine the few existing studies on the 
consequences of under/over employment, especially in terms of health and well-being. 
Most research designs that examine the relationship between under-employment and 
health employ cross-sectional analysis (Friedland and Price, 2003). However, the findings of such 
studies are not conclusive, and there is no consistent agreement that under-employment is 
necessarily harmful for workers’ health and well-being. Furthermore, indicators of well-being 
vary across studies. For instance, Burris (1983) and Khan and Morrow (1991) study the impact of 
under-employment on job satisfaction, while Beiser et al. (1993) examine its impact on 
depression. Accordingly, further research employs other factors such as life satisfaction (Feldman 
and Turnley, 1995), self-esteem (Johnson, 1986), and physical health (Herzog et al., 1991). On the 
other hand, many studies reject any relationship between under-employment and the same 
indicators of health and well-being (Burke, 1998; Feldman and Turnley, 1995; Herzoget et al., 
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1991). However, as Friedland and Price (2003) suggest, the relationship between under-
employment and health may result from three causal conditions: first, as discussed above, 
‘under-employment might affect health; the second possible scenario is that health affects the 
probability of under-employment; finally, it is possible that an ‘unmeasured third variable’ affects 
both under-employment and health’ (Friendland, 2003, p.35). 
On the other hand, few longitudinal studies on the relationship between under-
employment and well-being have assessed the links between the two. This type of study is more 
conclusive in its findings, which suggests that skill under-employment affects workers’ health and 
well-being of workers (Friendland and Price, 2003). For instance, Friendland and Price (2003) 
reveal that skill-under-employed workers experience ‘more depressive symptoms, lower life 
satisfaction, a more external control orientation, and lower perceived competence than do their 
adequately employed peers’ (Friedland and Price, 2003, p.35). Some studies examine 
underemployment in terms of income and hours. For instance, Prause and Dooley’s (1997) study 
reveals that poor self-esteem was associated with increased odds of hours- or income-under-
employment, and reports of alcohol abuse was higher for these workers 
Various studies examine the reverse effects of over-employment on workers’ well-being 
(Schor, 1991), although their findings are not conclusive, and they suffer from methodological 
limitations (Angrave, 2015). This is because studies based on cross-sectional data (e.g., Wilkins, 
2007) or longitudinal data ‘do not utilize within-person analysis’ (e.g. Friedland and Price, 2003) 
and ‘may be biased by failure to account for time invariant individual characteristics’ (Angrave, 
2015, p.4). According to Angrave (2015), it is necessary to use longitudinal data to capture the 
causal relationship between over-employment and well-being. However, only two studies 
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employ this methodology, and they provide contradictory findings. Wooden et al.’s (2009) 
research on Australia reveals that over-employed individuals reported lower life satisfaction, 
while evidence from Germanyby, Wunder, and Heineck (2013) finds no relationship between 
over-employment and life satisfaction.  
This literature review highlights several interesting points. First, the relationship between 
under/over employment and well-being varies by type of under/over employment and indicator 
of well-being. Second, employing a longitudinal design is the most appropriate methodology in 
order to minimize the possibility of obtaining spurious relationships. Finally, while the few 
longitudinal studies on the impacts of under-employment on well-being are more consistent and 
mostly agree on the negative impacts of under-employment, the few longitudinal studies on the 
impacts of over-employment are rather inconclusive and contradict each other.  
6.2.5 Determinants of Under-employment 
 
In this section, we investigate the various determinant of under/over employment. We 
divide these indicators into two separate factors: demographic factors such as the role of gender, 
marital status, number of children, and age; and work status factors such as industrial 
differences, employer size, trade unions, and temporary work. 
Many studies try to examine the impacts of age and gender on the likelihood of under-
employment (e.g., Wooden et al., 2009; Kjeldstad and Nymoen, 2012; Bell and Blanchflower, 
2011; Cam, 2004). As s McKee-Ryan (2011) state, we usually expect that under-employment is 
more prevalent among women than men ‘because of the disproportionate likelihood of being 
laid off, career disruptions, re-entry into the workforce after breaks, and the tendency to settle 
for lower salaries and positions to balance family demands’ (Harvey, 2011, p.993). Still, the results 
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from studies on the relationship between under-employment and gender are rather inconsistent. 
For instance, while some studies (Jefferson and Preston, 2010; Jensen and Slack, 2003) confirm 
greater under-employment among women, other studies find non-significant or near-zero 
relationships between gender and under-employment (e.g., Feldman et al., 2002; Holtom et al., 
2002; Johnson and Johnson, 2000a; Ruiz-Quintanilla and Claes, 1996). Some studies even claim 
that under-employment is higher among men than women (Chambel and Castanheira, 2006; 
Maynard et al., 2006; Tam, 2010). Just like gender, studies on the relationship between under-
employment and age are also inconclusive. Some studies (such as Erdogan and Bauer, 2009) find 
a positive correlation between age and under-employment, while some find a negative 
relationship (Maynard et al., 2006). Some studies claim that age is not significantly related to the 
likelihood of under-employment (e.g., Kraimer et al., 2009). Tam (2010) examines under-
employment by age category and claims that under-employment can exist within all age 
categories; however, his study reveals that under-employment is highest for those within the 18 
to 24 age range. Following this research, Harvey (2011) suggests that future research needs to 
focus on the potentially U-shaped relationship between under-employment and age, where both 
new entrants and older workers in the labour market are most likely to experience under-
employment. 
On the other hand, the existing research on the relationship between being a part of a 
racial minority group and under-employment is consistent and confirms a positive correlation 
between the two (De Jong and Madamba, 2001; Jensen and Slack, 2003). Mau and Kopischke 
(2001) reveal that women from minority groups were more likely to desire more working hours 
compared to their white male counterparts. However, this study also points to the importance 
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of choice of subject in university, and claims that minorities and women usually select subjects 
that are associated with lower job market demand.  
Finally, among the demographic factors, education can also be related to the desire for 
more working hours. However, results from studies on this relationship are also mixed and 
confounding. For example, some studies (such as Weststar, 2009; Holtom et al., 2002; Mason, 
1996) suggest that more education is associated with higher levels of under-employment, while 
Johnson and Johnson (2000) find no significant relationship between the two variables. 
Various work-related factors increase the likelihood of under-employment (Feldman, 
1996). For instance, Slack and Jensen (2004) examine the probability of under-employment in 
various industries and find that workers in oil and gas industries are more under-employed in 
comparison to mining. On the other hand, Feldman (1996) examined the likelihood of under-
employment among certain types of employees, and suggested that under-employment is higher 
among managers (the reference group was non-managers). Abrahamsen (2010) examines 
variations of under-employment across professions in Norway and finds that professional 
employees were less likely to be under-employed. However, a review of the literature on the 
relationship between occupation and under-employment reveals that under-employment affects 
employees across a wide range of occupations. For example, Feldman et al. (2002) reveal that 
under-employment exists among executives, while Lee (2005) pointed out that under-
employment is prevalent among expatriates. Various studies point out that under-employment 
might exist among university employees (e.g., for faculty members, Maynard and Joseph (2008); 
for business school graduates, Feldman and Turnley (1995); and for non-academic university 
employees Khan and Morrow (1991)). Other studies also point out that under-employment is 
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prevalent among retail workers (Erdogan and Bauer, 2009), medical and laboratory technicians 
(Watt and Hargis, 2010), hospital workers (Holtom et al., 2002), and professional and technical 
workers (Kinicki et al., 2000; McKee-Ryan et al., 2009). Finally, there is evidence that workers 
who have been laid off or were out of work for some time might experience higher levels of 
under-employment (Feldman, 1996). Various studies (Hijzen et al., 2010; McKee-Ryan et al., 
2009) find that post-layoff jobs are at lower levels in terms of wages and time mismatches. 
6.2.6 Determinants of Over-employment  
 
The relationship between over-employment and age has been examined extensively (for 
example Golden and Gebreselassie, 2007; Angrave and Charlwood, 2015), and there is usually 
agreement among these studies that over-employment is lower among young workers, but it 
rises with age. Another demographic variable that might affect over-employment is gender, and 
most studies agree that women are more likely to be over-employed. SousaPoza and 
Henneberger (2002) conduct a study of 21 countries and find that in all of them, over-
employment is more persistent among women than men. Golden and Gebreselassie (2007) find 
the same result for the USA and explain that women’s greater responsibilities at home explains 
this result. Additionally, they reveal that persistent gender inequalities within the work place 
might reduce women’s tendency to make labour market work their central priority (Reynolds, 
2005).  
Various researchers also study the relationship between income and desire to work fewer 
hours. However it is difficult to examine such effects (Fernandez and Lim, 2016). This is because 
according to the income effect, ‘an increase in income induces an increase in the allocation of 
time for leisure, which in turn reduces the likelihood of over-employment. On the other hand, an 
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increase in wages increases the opportunity cost of leisure; therefore, a higher wage may 
encourage workers to sacrifice leisure for work (due to the substitution effect), thus increasing 
the likelihood of over-employment’ (Fernandez and Lim, 2016, p.40). Reynolds and Aletraris 
(2007) find that for the USA, high income employees work longer hours than their lower paid 
peers do, but they have a higher desire to decrease their working hours. 
Family characteristics such as the presence of a full-time homemaker and/or childcare 
duties also determine the desire for longer working hours or vice versa. There is usually 
agreement among researchers (Jacobs and Gerson, 2001; Kaufman and Uhlenberg, 2000) that 
being a single parent and/or having dependent children increases the likelihood of over-
employment. According to Jacobs and Gerson (2001), workers have to allocate their time 
between working and their personal lives. Hence, single working parents or dual-earner couples 
with children are more likely to desire fewer working hours. Following this argument, Kaufman 
and Uhlenberg (2000) also argue that the head of a household who is the main breadwinner can 
work more hours because ‘they have spouses who perform unpaid domestic work’. Furthermore, 
‘these men may feel responsible for the economic well-being of their families’ (Kaufman and 
Uhlenberg, 2000, p.934), and this would increase their desire for additional work hours and 
reduce the likelihood of over-employment. Childcare duties, such as the number of children in 
the household and age of the youngest child are also important determinants of over-
employment. Findings for this relationship are conclusive and reveal that the probability of 
desiring fewer working hours increases as the number of children rises because both fathers and 
mothers want to devote more time with their children (Abendroth et al., 2014).  
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Finally, work-related factors such as hours of work, job satisfaction, and occupation can 
also contribute to over-employment. According to Sousa-Poza and Henneberger (2002), the 
percentage of workers who desire fewer hours of work rises as working hours increase. Empirical 
studies show that over-employment is significantly related to hours of work (Reynolds, 2004; 
2005). Golden and Gebreselassie’s (2007) study shows that being employed in full-time job 
increases the likelihood of being over-employed. Some studies also argue that job satisfaction 
has effects on workers experiencing job mismatches. (Reynolds and Aletraris, 2007). Last, the 
type of occupation is also related to over-employment, as certain types of jobs require more 
working hours. Golden and Gebreselassie (2007) suggest that the probability of being over-
employed is higher in salaried rather than hourly wages. They also point out that workers in 
occupations that are not obligated by ‘Overtime Laws’ are more likely to desire less working 
hours. Golden (2004) opine that white-collar workers in managerial and professional groups have 
significantly higher levels of over-employment, while blue-collar workers are less likely to 
experience over-employment.  
6.2.7 Over/Under Employment in Iran 
 
Various studies point to under-employment becoming a more prevalent phenomenon in 
various regions and countries. For instance, a Gallup (2013) report noted while in most MENA 
countries, the unemployment rate has decreased slightly during the last decade, the rate of 
under-employment has increased by 9.7% during the same period. However, in this report, 
under-employment was simply defined as part-time workers’ wish for a full-time job (Jacobe, 
2010).Habibi (2015) claims that while both unemployment and under-employment are rising in 
most countries of the MENA region, this problem is more severe in Iran than in any other Middle 
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Eastern country. He then describes this problem as ‘an unprecedented over-education crisis that 
is likely to get worse in the coming years’(Habibi,2015, p.10).Harani (2004) suggests that due to 
the high unemployment in Iran, the government decided that under-employment for young 
graduates could be a short-term remedy for the country’s current crisis. Consequently, part-time 
jobs are offered to full-time job seekers, or /and those who are looking for more working hours 
accept fewer working hours out of desperation. Despite these claims no empirical studies on the 
trends and determinants of under- and over-employment has been conducted in Iran. The issue 
has only been mentioned briefly in studies of over-education (Habibi, 2015) or unemployment 
(Valadkhani, 2003). However, as we mention previously, under-employment is even more 
relevant to less-developed countries like Iran with young university graduates, and the absence 
of unemployment insurance. Hence, this is the only study on under/over-employment in Iran, 
particularly as this thesis focuses on gender and urban/rural impacts on under- and over-
employment. 
 
6.3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section provides a brief introduction to the dataset used in this analysis and provides the 
descriptive statistics of key variables.  
6.3.1 Iranian LFS 
 
The data we analyse in this section are from the Iranian Labour Force Survey (IRLFS) 
conducted by the Iranian Statistical Centre on a seasonal basis across the nation using sample 
rotation to provide quarterly and annually estimates of labour force indicators in Iran. As the 
survey is completed, the outcomes are compared with those of the previous rounds to observe 
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the possible changes in indicators over seasons at the national, urban, rural, and provincial levels. 
The survey was first conducted in 2005 and since then occurs regularly in the middle month of 
every season. Another survey, the Household Employment and Unemployment Characteristics 
Survey (HEUCS), was implemented before LFS. The HEUCS was first taken in 1994 and repeated 
annually from 1997 to 2000 from October 23 to November 22. From 2001 to 2003, it was taken 
on a seasonal basis, in the middle month of every season, while in 2004, it occurred from April 
21 to May 21 and October 23 to November 22. To improve the HEUCS quality and its conformance 
with the international concepts, particularly those of the ILO, the survey plan was revised and 
became the current Iranian Labour Force Survey15. 
In this section, we use IRLFS data from 2008 to 2014, in which 4,333,492 questionnaires 
were completed. However, we limit our data to respondents between 16 to 65 years old who are 
working. We use question 1 in the IRLFS, which asks, ‘during the last week, did you work at least 
one hour to receive wages, salary, profit, and earnings?’ This decreases our data to 1,013,693 
observations. However, since the nature of our data is seasonal rather than annual, and according 
to the Iranian Statistical Centre, each individual is surveyed twice each year, then our sample 
contains around 500,000 working individuals between 16 and 65.  
6.3.2 Dependent Variables 
 
In this section, we outline our types of dependent variables. Our first dependent variable 
is willingness to work more hours, which is one of our indicators for under-employment, while 
                                                           





our second dependent variable is the difference between participants’ stated desired working 
hours and actual working hours. The rationale for choosing the second dependent variable is 
that, first, while the first dependent variable only models under-employment, the second 
provides information on both under- and over-employment. Hence, this allows us to investigate 
all aspects of working hour matches and mismatches of Iranian workers. Second, as mentioned 
in the literature review, the definition of under/over employment is based on respondents’ 
perceptions. While this common critique is applicable to the first dependent variable, it is not 
applicable to the second dependent variable, as we created this second dependent variable from 
two questions. This allows us to perform useful robustness and specification checks on the first 
analysis. Third, our second dependent variable allows us to examine the degree of mismatch in 
much more detail; specifically, we can identify large and small mismatches. The next sections will 
examine each dependent variable in detail. 
6.3.2.1 Willingness to Work More Hours 
 
Our first dependent variable examines willingness to work more hours during the week, 
which is provided in LFS question 21. This question asks participants, ‘during the last week, did 
you want to increase your working hours?’. Hence, it refers to the extra hours participants wish 
to work during the week. Respondents provide a yes or no answer; hence, a yes response points 
out that they would like to work more hours, and a no response shows that participants are either 
happy with their working hours or they want to decrease their working hours during the week. 
Table 6.1 presents respondents’ answers to the question according to gender. As 
mentioned in previous sections, female participation is very low in Iran (around 15%), and we 
have substantially fewer observations for women than for men; however, the large sample size 
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of the Iranian LFS still makes it feasible to analyse women separately. Consequently, while in 
Table 6.1 there are 1,000,638 responses from male workers to this question, there are only 
206,245 female responses. As we discussed previously, not all of these participants are unique 
individuals since our data is seasonal and each participant is surveyed twice. According to Table 
6.1, 21.53% of male participants are willing to increase their working hours compared to 13.38% 
of women. This suggests that men are almost twice as likely to wish for increased working hours 
when compared to women. Hence, this suggests that Iranian women are happier with their 
working hours than Iranian men are, or at least they do not want to increase their working hours, 
possibly implying that women are already over-employed and they have the desire to decrease 
their working hours. Since these participants are already working, a possible explanation for 
these results is that since women’s labour force participation is low, maybe the most educated 
and skilled women are working and hence already have high working hours. As mentioned in the 
literature, age, marital status, and number of dependent children are important factors when 
analysing over/under employment. Hence, another explanation might be that most working 
women are married. Therefore, their desire to spend more hours with their families and children 
is stronger than their desire to work more hours. Prior studies report similar findings in the USA 
(Golden and Gebreselassie, 2007). Furthermore, Tam (2012) finds that in the UK, women 
between 25 and 34 are twice as likely to be over-employed compared to men, which reflects that 
childrearing remains a predominantly female role in society. That is, compared to men in the 
same age range, women of childbearing age reported higher levels of over-employment, perhaps 
because they experience a greater desire to work fewer hours in order to spend more time with 
their children and family, as more time spent at work means less time spent at home and with 
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family. Major (2003) confirms the argument that disruption of work-life balance is a common 
consequence of over-employment, and is associated with increased work-family conflict and 
indirectly with psychological distress (Major et al., 2002).  
Table 6.1: Willingness to increase working Hours 
Male Female
Yes 215,465 21.53% 27,601 13.38%
No 785,173 78.47% 178,644 86.62%
Total 1,000,638 100% 206,245 100%
 
Source: LFS 2008-2014 
 
Observing under-employment over the period is also an important factor, as 
macroeconomic shocks and political and social events might have an impact on workers’ 
willingness to work more or less. Figure 6.1 illustrates the willingness to work more hours during 
2008-2014. We can observe that 2009 and 2010 have the highest percentage of people who are 
willing to work more hours (23.21% and 24.04%). After 2010, the proportion of individuals willing 
to work more hours drops to 20% and remains flat thereafter. If we separate our dependent 
variable (willingness to work longer hours) by gender, we observe that the willingness to work 
more is higher among men than for women. The highest willingness to work longer hours for 
men was in 2010 (25.87%), while for women, it was 16.09% in 2009. However, we can observe 
no significant difference between both trends, suggesting that macro-economic and time period 
effects affected both men and women similarly. One possible explanation for workers’ highest 
willingness to work more during this period is that the 2010-2011 international boycotts that 
included sanctions against the Iranian oil industry happened during this period, which was the 
peak of the Iranian government crisis with the international community. 
219 
 
Figure 6.1: Willingness to work more hours over years 
 
Source: LFS 2008-2014 
6.3.2.2 Amount of Mismatch 
 
We created our second dependent variable from two separate survey answers: the 
difference between respondents’ stated desired working hours and their actual working hours. 
A common criticism of studies of under-employment is that they is occasionally use definitions 
that refer to workers’ perceptions (Glyde, 1977; Jensen and Slack, 2003; Bell and Blanchflower, 
2011); even so, some additional specifications have been introduced in official definitions. We 
tried to mitigate this limitation to some extent by creating this dependent variable. The rationale 
is that with the previous dependent variable, it is not possible to pin down how strongly people 
want to have extra/fewer hours (Hussmans, 2007) and it does not allows us to examine over-
employment. This is particularly important in an economy in which people may adjust their work 
expectations to tighter job markets (ONS, 2011). The next section explains in detail how we have 





6.3.2.2.1 Calculating mismatch  
 
Question 16 in the LFS asks participants, ‘on average, how many hours do you work in this 
season?’ Clearly, this question represents participants’ actual working hours. Furthermore, 
question 27 asks participants, ‘how many hours in a week would you like to work in this season?’ 
Hence, the difference between these two questions is our second dependent variable. 
Figure 6.2 presents the distribution of our second dependent variable (difference 
between desired and actual working hours). According to this figure, the average working hours 
mismatch is 2.46 hours, suggesting that on average, individuals would like to work more hours 
per day. The standard deviation is 13.0, suggesting a significant variation around this mean. 
According to this figure, 67% have no desire to increase/decrease their working hours. In terms 
of over-employment, we can observe that 1.58% of participants are willing to work 12 hours less 
per week. Keeping that the Iranian work week has 6 days, this means that 1.58% hope to work 2 
hours less per day. For those who are willing to work more, 1.92% of participants are willing to 











Figure 6.2: Kernel Density estimate of Mismatch Hours 
 
 
Source: Authors own estimation from LFS 2008-2014 
 
Table 6.2 presents this dependent variable as a categorical variable. Our first dependent 
variable was based on the simple question, ‘do you wish to increase your working hours?’; hence, 
it only indicated under-employment in the market. However, here we have information on both 
over- and under-employment and the degree of their mismatch. Table 6.2 suggests that 11.50% 
of participants desired fewer working hours than what they are actually working, and hence are 
over-employed. On the other hand, 21.86% of participants desired more working hours than 
what they actually work, meaning that they are under-employed. Finally, 66.64% are happy with 





Table 6.2: Dependent variable as a categorical variable 






Source: LFS 2008-2014 
 
In conclusion, we find some interesting insights for further analysis. For instance, the fact 
that women appear less under-employed than men are in the Iranian labour market. 
Furthermore, we observe that over-employment is as important as under-employment in looking 
at the Iranian labour market; hence, if a study looks only at under-employment, it is missesa 
substantial proportion of workers who are over-employed, and thus their analysis of work 
mismatch may not be comprehensive enough.  
The next section will examine the independent variables we will employ in the 
methodology section. 
6.3.3 Independent Variables 
 
In this section, we provide the summary statistics of our independent variables. 
Demographic profiles are an important determinant of working hours within the labour market. 
For demographic characteristics we have individuals’ age, marital status, nationality, and 
educational characteristics. We also have workplace characteristics as our independent variables, 
including occupational characteristics, employment status, flexible work (i.e., part- versus full-
time), and establishment size. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 are providing descriptive analysis for urban and 
rural areas and for men and women separately. This is because various studies point to a higher 
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level of involuntariness among women than men (Bell and Blanchflower, 2010; Cam, 2014). As 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show, we have 517 237 observations for urban areas, and 580,127 
observations for rural areas.  
6.3.3.1 Summary Statistics for Urban Areas 
 
Table 6.3 provides summary statistics of our independent variables for urban areas. We 
run the multivariate regressions on our restricted sample of respondents between 16 and 65 
years old. In Table 6.3, we have information on demographic characteristics such as age, 
nationality, marital status, and educational characteristics. There are 499,627 observations for 
men and 80,500 observations for women who are working and are between 16 and 65 years old. 
Age categories are important determinants of under/over employment according to 
evidence from international studies. Ruiz-Quintanilla and Claes (1996), for example, highlight a 
higher risk of under-employment among younger workers, as Bell and Blanchflower (2011) do in 
the UK. This can be specifically true in the case of Iran and some Middle Eastern countries, which 
have a very young population. As Table 6.3 shows, nearly 60% of our working sample is below 40 
years old. This highlights the young population pyramid of the Iranian labour force, which is true 
for both men and women. 
We also provide a category for nationality because Iran is a host country for Afghan 
refugees and it has the biggest refugee camp in the MENA region. According to a report by 
OECD(2015) ethnicity can have a reverse impact on the likelihood of finding a suitable job, and it 
is usually accepted that refugees are either under-employed due to discrimination or are over-
employed because they work illegally in the host country. In Table 6.3, we can observe that more 
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than 1% of men and 0.81% of women in our sample are non-Iranian, specifically refugees from 
Afghanistan. 
As another demographic factor, marital status, specifically presence or absence of a 
spouse and dependent children, are important determinants of over/under employment. For 
instance, an aggregated analysis of mostly EU and other developed countries stresses that 
marriage diminishes the likelihood of under-employment (Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003). As 
Table 6.3 shows, nearly 75% men and 68% of women are working and married, while 24% of men 
and 26% of women are single. We have no evidence on the number of children, as our data is 
based on individual characteristics. 
Finally, education is an important and complex indicator of a person’s positions at work 
(Brown et al., 2011). For example, when involuntary part-time employment rose to 16 million 
during the economic downturn in the USA in the 1970s, Bednarzik (1980) cites low education and 
skills as the main reasons. Likewise, aggregated results from developed countries highlight that 
higher education reduces the likelihood of under-employment (Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003). 
In our sample, we have information about whether individuals are currently studying or not, 
whether they are literate, their stage of education, or their type of qualification. We categorise 
educational levels as primary, secondary, high school, pre-university, diploma, bachelor’s, 
master’s, PhD, and any other type of education. As mentioned in previous sections and cited by 
many scholars (Salehi-Isfahani and Eagle, 2009), the education status of young Iranians, and 
especially young Iranian women, has improved substantially since the Islamic Revolution, where 
women occupy most of the university seats (60%). Furthermore, the literacy rates among the 
Iranian population are very high (93%), especially among the younger generations. On the other 
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hand, researchers (Salehi-Isfahani, 2010) claim that there are some dispersions between rural 
and urban areas of Iran. We can observe from Table 6.3 that for urban men, nearly 26% of 
respondents have qualifications from primary school, while nearly 25% have qualification from 
secondary school, around 33% have education from high school, a pre-university degree, or a 
diploma degree (pre-university can be obtained in the fourth year of high school, while a diploma 
can be obtained after third year of high school16), and around 13% have university degrees, 
meaning either a bachelor or a master’s degree. Finally, nearly 1.60% of urban men and 2% of 
urban women have some other types of qualifications. Interestingly, the percentage of women 
with a university degree is much higher than for men, which confirms previous studies finding a 
high number of women with higher education in Iran. 
Several studies, such as that by Caputo and Cianni (2001), emphasize the importance of 
workplace characteristics as determinants of over/under employment. In Table 6.3, we include 
some workplace characteristics such as occupational characteristics, employment status, flexible 
work (i.e., part- versus full-time), and establishment size. Table 6.3 provides employment 
characteristics of workers in urban areas of Iran. We divide employment status into four 
categories: self-employed, entrepreneur, unpaid family workers, and wage and salaried workers. 
Our data suggests a high percentage of self-employed workers in Iran: nearly33% of men and 
23% of women. Apart from the high number of self-employed individuals, 60% of men and 67% 
of women in urban areas are salaried workers. 
Another workplace characteristic in Table 6.3 is number of part-time versus full-time 
workers. Here, 75% of men are work full-time compared to 24% of men working part-time. 
                                                           
16 For more information on the Iranian educational system, refer to Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
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Strikingly, but not surprising, we can observe very high percentages of women who work part-
time in Iran: 61% of urban women are working part-time. Although it has been accepted in most 
countries that the percentages of women working part-time are higher than for men (for example 
ONS, 2013), the magnitude of this difference in urban areas of Iran is striking.  
We also provide information about 3 industries in Table 6.3 for urban men and women: 
agriculture, industrial, and services. We can observe that nearly 7% of men are working in the 
agricultural sector, while 21% are in the industrial sector. Interestingly, we can observe very high 
percentages of men working in the service sector (72%). These numbers are 6%, 29%, and 65% 
for urban women, respectively. Again, we can observe some interesting and contradictory 
information. While in most countries, the number of women in the service sector is much higher 
than for men, we can see the opposite in Iran.  
Finally, we provide information on establishment size in five categories: small companies 
between 1 to 4 workers; medium-sized companies with 5 to 9, 10 to 19, and 20 to 49 workers; 
and bigger companies with more than 50 workers. We can observe that approximately 77% of 
men and women are working in small companies, which is consistent with the fact that there are 
high numbers of self-employed workers in Iran.  
Overall, in this section, we point to very interesting descriptive analyses of the workforce 
in urban areas of Iran. It seems that the Iranian workforce is characterised by a high number of 
self-employed individuals (similar to salaried workers), which is in contrast to the workforce in 
most developed countries, with more self-employed men than women. While a high percentage 
of workers in urban areas are employed in the service sector, interestingly, more men than 
women work in the service sector, again in contrast to existing evidence in most developed 
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countries. However, this might be related to cultural factors in Iranian society. Another notable 
observation is that unlike many MENA countries, the public sector is not the main employer for 
women; this can be related to the government’s religious stance. Finally, the very high number 
of urban women working part-time is another interesting observation. Although it is widely 
accepted in most developed countries that a higher percentage of women work part-time, the 






Table 6.3: Summary Statistics Urban Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean Frequency Mean
Age category
16 to 19 15,412 3.08 2,110 2.62
20 to 29 130,715 26.16 20,861 25.91
30 to 39 148,199 29.66 30,519 37.91
40 to 49 124,868 24.99 20,498 25.46
50 to 59 66,142 13.24 5,540 6.88
60 to 65 14,291 2.86 972 1.21
Nationality
Iranian 491,280 98.33 79,819 99.15
Afghan 8,005 1.60 651 0.81
Others 342 0.07 30 0.04
Education level
Primary education 120,245 25.78 10,219 13.68
Secondary Education 120,542 25.85 7,287 9.75
High School 4,621 0.99 469 0.63
Pre-university 121,440 26.04 14,792 19.80
Diploma 28,625 6.14 10,191 13.64
Bachelor 52,370 11.23 25,694 34.39
Masters 10,034 2.15 3,694 4.94
PhD 948 0.20 291 0.39
Any Other type of studies 7,519 1.61 2,067 2.77
Marital Status 
Marrried 393,325 75.24 54,850 68.14
Widowed 1,319 0.36 2,875 3.57
Divorced 2,482 0.33 2,019 2.51
Single 102,501 24.07 20,756 25.78
Any Other type of studies 7,519 1.61 2,067 2.77
Employment Status
Self-employed 168,435 33.71 18,456 22.93
Entrepreneur 21,039 4.21 820 1.02
Unpaid family worker 10,003 2.01 7,054 8.76











Part Time 123,105 24.64 49,101 61.00
Full Time 376,522 75.36 31,399 39.00
Industry
Agriculture 34,607 6.93 4,689 5.82
Industrial 104,738 20.96 23,321 28.97
Services 360,282 72.11 52,490 65.20
Establishment Size
Between 1 to 4 305,019 77.43 34,154 76.09
5 to 9 36,236 9.20 4,566 10.17
10 to 19 17,413 4.42 2,514 5.60
20 to 49 11,877 3.02 1,570 3.50
50 or more 23,371 5.93 2,085 4.64
Men Women
Source: LFS, 2008-2014. Age 16 to 65 
6.3.3.2 Summary Statistics for Rural Areas 
 
In this section, we observe the summary statistics for rural areas from Table 6.4. However, 
we discuss only the interesting difference between urban and rural areas, and will not repeat all 
of the descriptive statistics. Observing these differences will help us to understand whether 
disparities exist within the labour force in the Iranian economy in terms of urban and rural areas. 
There are 407,573 and 109,664 rural working men and women, respectively, aged between 16 
and 65 in our sample.  
Table 6.4 suggests that our rural area sample is also very young, which is similar to urban 
areas. It also suggests that rural areas have more refugees from Afghanistan compared to urban 
areas: 1.10% of rural men, though there are fewer female rural refugees than urban women, 
0.36% compared to 0.80%.  
We can observe a very interesting point from looking at qualifications in rural areas. 
Fewer rural men have some sort of university degree than urban men do. While in our sample, 
only 5% of rural men who are working have a university degree, this number is 13% for urban 
men. For women, this gap is even bigger: 40% of working urban women between 16 to 65 have 
a university degree, while this is only 5% for rural women. 
Table 6.4 also suggests that the number of rural men who are self-employed is much 
higher than the number of urban self-employed men: 46% compared to 33%, while for women, 
these numbers are similar, at between 22% to 24%. Another drastic difference can be observed 
in terms of the number of unpaid family workers, which is much higher in rural areas compared 
to urban areas: 2% of urban men are unpaid family workers compared to 8% for rural men. This 
difference is more drastic for women: 8% of urban women are unpaid family workers, while this 
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is 60% for rural women. Finally, there are also huge differences in the number of salaried workers 
between urban and rural areas: 60% of urban men are salaried workers, while it is 40% for rural 
men. Again, this gap is more drastic for women: 67% for urban women compared to 14% for rural 
women.In terms of working hours, we can observe that similar to urban areas, most rural women 
are working part-time. However, the percentage of women working part-time is even higher in 
rural areas than in urban areas, 75% compared to 61%. In terms of industry, we can observe that, 
not surprisingly, most workers are employed in the agricultural sector, and similar to urban areas, 
more men work in the service sector than women.  
Overall, observing Tables 6.3 and 6.4 suggests that in terms of labour force characteristics, 
there are drastic differences between urban and rural areas. It seems that working people are 






Table 6.4: Summary Statistics Rural Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean Frequency Mean
Age category
16 to 19 26,724 6.56 8,274 7.54
20 to 29 109,574 26.88 25,369 23.13
30 to 39 109,321 26.82 28,153 25.67
40 to 49 83,643 20.52 23,766 21.67
50 to 59 58,449 14.34 18,191 16.59
60 to 65 19,862 4.87 5,911 5.39
Nationality
Iranian 402,895 98.85 109,263 99.63
Afghan 4,497 1.10 393 0.36
Others 180 0.04 8 0.01
Education level
Primary education 151,659 44.76 34,225 51.99
Secondary Education 95,823 28.28 10,246 15.56
High School 5,236 1.55 747 1.13
Pre-university 52,976 15.63 7,326 11.13
Diploma 7,305 2.16 1,442 2.19
Bachelor 10,777 3.18 3,006 4.57
Masters 1,064 0.31 257 0.39
PhD 59 0.02 8 0.01
Any Other type of studies 13,943 4.11 8,573 13.02
Marital Status 
Marrried 306,676 75.24 76,799 70.03
Widowed 1,458 0.36 4,998 4.56
Divorced 1,335 0.33 999 0.91
Single 98,104 24.07 26,868 24.50
Employment Status
Self-employed 190,148 46.65 27,274 24.87
Entrepreneur 10,846 2.66 384 0.35
Unpaid family worker 36,092 8.86 65,969 60.16





Table 6.4 (Continues): Summary Statistics Rural Areas 
Variable Frequency Mean Frequency Mean
Occupation Status
Part Time 137,679 33.78 83,265 75.93
Full Time 269,894 66.22 26,399 24.07
Industry
Agriculture 171,718 42.13 72,327 65.95
Industrial 65,825 16.15 27,408 24.99
Services 170,030 41.72 9,929 9.05
Establishment Size
Between 1 to 4 329,342 86.54 96,306 91.95
5 to 9 29,100 7.65 6,541 6.25
10 to 19 8,508 2.24 1,109 1.06
20 to 49 5,226 1.37 405 0.39













Our goal in this chapter is to investigate the determinants of under- and over-employment 
in Iran. To do so, we employ three types of dependent variables in our regression analysis: our 
first dependent variable is a binary variable for willingness to increase working hours (i.e., under-
employment); our second dependent variable is a categorical variable that measures willingness 
to increase, decrease, or not change hours of work (i.e., under-, over-, and stable employment); 
and our third dependent variable is a continuous variable that measures the exact hours of 
mismatch as indicated by actual hours worked versus preferred hours worked. 
Since our three types of dependent variable differ in their construction, we need to 
employ a different regression model for each one. For the binary variable of under-employment, 
we employ a logit model that allows us to examine under-employment at the extensive margin. 
This methodology has been used in previous chapters, so we refrain from repeating this here. 
The continuous variables measuring exact hours of mismatch use an OLS methodology that was 
also used in previous chapters. Again, we will refrain from elaborating this methodology here. 
For our categorical variable that measures under-, over-, and stable employment, we employ an 
ordered probit model, whose methodology is outlined below.  
6.4.2 Ordered Probit Model 
 
We are interested in the determinants of both under- and over-employment. We can represent 
this process by the following equation: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽′𝒙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,                                                        (6.1) 
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where 𝑦𝑖  is a measure of employment mismatch, 𝒙𝑖is a vector of exogenous variables that affect 
employment mismatch(such as gender, age, qualifications, marital status, industry, 
establishment size and type of employment), and 𝜀𝑖  , is a normally distributed error term. 
However, we measure employment mismatch,𝑦𝑖 , on an ordinal scale in our dataset, which 
requires an extension to the previously used binary model in Chapter 4. We extend the previously 
used binary response model to an ordered response model, the ordered probit model. This model 
expands the choice set from a binary choice set [0,1] to [0, J] ordinal choices where the probability 
of a given observation is given by: 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑦𝑗 = 𝑖) = Pr(𝛾𝑖−1 < 𝛽
′𝒙 + 𝜀 < 𝛾𝑖)
= 𝛷(𝛾𝑖 − 𝛽




where Φ(. ) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 𝛾0is defined as −∞and 
𝛾𝑀is defined as ∞. Equation (6.2) states that the probability that alternative choice j is chosen is 
the probability that the latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗is between two boundaries (cutpoints), 𝛾𝑗−1and  𝛾𝑗. 
Therefore, we can write our specific employment mismatch model as:  
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝒙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖    εi ~ NID(0,1)  (6.3) 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 1, 𝑈𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑 if 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛾0 
𝑦𝑖 = 2, 𝑁𝑜 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑀𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ  if  𝛾0 ≤ 𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝛾1 
𝑦𝑖 = 3, 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑  if  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≥ 𝛾𝑗1 
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where 𝛾0  and 𝛾1 are associated cutpoints. We base the estimation on maximum likelihood 
estimation and the log likelihood is given by: 




𝑗=1             (6.4) 
Again, we report the marginal effects because the ordered probit model coefficients have no 
natural interpretation and refer to the underlying latent score. We calculate marginal effects 
representing changes in Pr (𝑦𝑖 = 𝑗|𝒙𝒊) and hold all other covariates at their mean.  
6.4.3 Endogeneity 
 
Our model outlined above is conditional on independent variables being exogenous in nature. 
However, it is possible that this assumption is violated. Moreover, as discussed in previous 
chapters, strong selection effects for women are a real phenomenon affecting this data. 
However, these issues are common in this area and below, we discuss some implications and 
possible solutions, as well as the issues in applying these. 
Certain demographic characteristics such as age and nationality are unlikely to be 
endogenous because these are predetermined at birth. Individuals thus have little influence on 
their status in this regard. However, variables such as marital status, educational characteristics, 
and industry are generally individual choices, which are potentially endogenous. For instance, 
married women might desire to work less hours, but not because they are married but because 
there is an unobservable component driving both their decision to marry and to work less. One 
could also argue, for example, that motivation and ability are positively related to desire to work 
more hours. Loughrey (2013) also suggests that health status can be an unobserved variable in 
studies of under-employment. 
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Without controlling for such an unobserved decision component, we might falsely infer 
that marriage has a causal, and possibly negative, effect on hours worked. It is thus important 
that when interpreting potential endogenous variables in our results that, we consider other 
unobserved effects and not draw a too strict inference with respect to causality. However, even 
as correlates, the analysis presented in this chapter will offer important insights into the current 
state of over- and under-employment in Iran.  
Whilst it is possible to correct our empirical estimates via more complicated methods such 
as instrumental variable models and/or sample selection models, we should note that, in 
practice, such models are often unconvincing because they rely on untestable, and often 
tenuous, theoretical arguments. We applied such models in prior chapters and noted the caution 
about interpreting such estimates. In this chapter we refrain from implementing similar models, 
mainly because of the lack of credible instruments; but argue that the type of data and topical 
innovation employed nonetheless makes a significant advancement to the related literature – 
even with a potentially weaker causal interpretation.  
6.5. Results 
 
As we discuss in the methodology section, we employ a logit model to observe under-
employment, an ordered probit model to observe categorical mismatch, and an OLS model to 
observe the exact hours magnitude of mismatch. To avoid overloading the results section with 
numerous tables, we present the results of our logit and OLS models in the appendix to this 
chapter. The primary results we present in this section are from our ordered probit analysis; 
however, we discuss all three sets of results. Overall, the results from all three models are very 
similar and provide a common narrative that we explore below. We divide the results section 
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into four subsections and discuss the results in terms of our variables. Hence, we first investigate 
results in terms of the effects of gender and regional (urban and rural) differences. Then, we 
examine the effects of age and marital on over/under employment, impact of education status 
on over/under employment, and the effects of work status factors on the likelihood of 
under/over employment. 
6.5.1 Gender and Region 
 
We present our results for the ordered probit model in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7. Table 6.5 
presents the results for both urban and rural areas, while Tables 6.6 and 6.7 demonstrates our 
results for urban and rural areas, respectively. In these tables, we can observe the magnitude of 
both under- and over-employment. In terms of under-employment, Table 6.5 shows that women 
are less likely to be under-employed compared to men; according to our findings, women are 14 
percentage points less likely to be situated in the under-employed category compared to men. 
Conversely, their probability of being overemployed is 10 percentage points higher compared to 
men.  Observing urban and rural areas separately, we reveal that this relationship differs by rural 
and urban areas. For instance, while in urban areas, women are 10 percentage points less likely 
than men to be under-employed; in rural areas, they are 17 percentage points less likely to be 
under-employed. Conversely, women have lower overemployment rates in urban areas when 
compared to rural areas (8 vs 11 percentage points). These results are also evident in the OLS 
and logit models presented in the appendix. For instance, our OLS model suggests that women 
in urban areas want to decrease their working hours by around 6 hours per week, while rural 
women want to decrease their working hours by 8. Note that gender is significantly related to all 
three categories (under-employment, over-employment, and no mismatch). Our findings are 
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consistent with existing results from developed countries. For instance SousaPoza and 
Henneberger’s (2002) research on 21 countries reveals that in all of these countries, over-
employment is more persistent among women than among men. Golden and Gebreselassie 
(2007) explain that women’s responsibilities at home is the reason behind their desire to work 
fewer hours in the labour market.  
One of the most important contributions of this thesis is that it recognizes disparities 
within urban and rural areas and tries to explain such disparities. In this chapter as well, we 
recognise the importance of urban and rural differences in determining under/over employment. 
Our results in Table 6.5 suggest that there are gender differences between urban and rural areas: 
rural men are more likely to be under-employed compared to urban men, while rural women are 
less likely to be under-employed compared to urban women. For instance, rural men are 0.9 
percentage points more likely to be under-employed compared to urban men, whilst rural 
women are 1.4 percentage points less likely to be under-employed. Again, these results are 
consistent with the results from our OLS and logit models. In terms of over-employment our 
ordered probit model results in Table 6.5 suggests the same trend: rural men are 0.7 percentage 
points less likely to be over-employed compared to urban men. On the other hand, women in 
rural areas are 0.9 percentage points more likely to be over-employed compared to women in 
urban areas.  
In summary, in examining the relationship between gender and under-employment, we 
show that men are more likely to be under-employed than women are, which is consistent with 
studies conducted by SousaPoza and Henneberger (2002). In terms of the relationship between 
region (urban and rural areas) and under-employment, our results suggest gender differences in 
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terms of job mismatch in urban and rural areas, and rural men are more likely to be under-
employed than urban men are, while rural women are less likely to be under-employed 
compared to urban women. On the other hand, rural women are more over-employed than 
urban women, while rural men are less likely to be over-employed than urban men are. However, 
we should interpret the effects of region (urban and rural areas) with caution. For instance, the 
fact that rural women are more over-employed than urban women can be explained by 
differences in the concept of ‘reservation hours’ in urban and rural areas. In other words, rural 
women might be more over-employed than urban women are, not due to longer working hours, 
but because their reservation hours are lower. In other words, cultural differences in these two 
areas might mean that rural women might not ‘expect’ or ‘desire’ more working hours. 
6.5.2 Age and Marriage 
 
Another important determinant of job mismatch in the labour market is age, and some 
existing studies (Erdogan and Bauer, 2009; Holtom et al., 2002; Lee, 2005) suggest that younger 
workers are more likely to wish for more working hours. Most of these studies explain higher 
under-employment among the youth by their lack of qualifications, skills, and experience, which 
prevent this group from obtaining their desired working hours (Barham et al., 2009). Our results 
in Table 6.5 also reveal that younger workers are more likely to be under-employed, and we can 
also detect that the youngest age category (individuals aged 20 and 29 years) compared to the 
reference category (individuals aged 16 to 19) have the highest possibility of under-
employment(4 percentage points). Observing men and women separately, we reveal that for 
men in the 20 to 29, 30 to 39, and 40 to 49 age categories are more likely to be under-employed 
241 
 
(the reference group is 16 to 19), while after the age of 49, men are less likely to be under-
employed compared to the reference group. We can also observe that men in the 20 to 29 age 
category are most likely to be under-employed. We can also observe the relationship between 
age category and women’s under-employment in Table 6.5, which shows that women in the 20 
to 29 and 30 to 39 age categories are more likely to be under-employed, and women after the 
age of 40 are less likely to be under-employed. Furthermore, just like men, women within the 20 
to 29 age category have the highest likelihood of under-employment (1.2 percentage points 
higher than the reference category). Looking at Tables 6.6 and 6.7 reveals that this trend is similar 
between urban and rural areas; however, for rural women, age is not significantly related to any 
of our three categories (under-employment, over-employment, and no mismatch). Once again, 
these results are consistent with our findings from the logit and OLS models reported in the 
appendix. Tables 6.5 to 6.7 also provide information about the relationship between over-
employment and age. Our results suggest that while men in the 50 to 59 and 60 to 65 age 
categories are more likely to be over-employed, for women, the likelihood of over-
employmentstarts earlier: from the 40 to 49 until the 60 to 65 age category. Finally, we can 
observe that for both men and women, the oldest age category (60 to 65) has the highest 
likelihood of over-employment. For instance, while men between the ages of 50 and 59 are 2.3 
percentage points more likely to be over-employed, men between 60 and 65 are 9 percentage 
points more likely to be over-employed. Similarly, women between the ages of 40 and 49 are 0.5 
percentage points more likely to be over-employed, while this is 3.3 percentage points for 
women in the 60 to 65 age category. This may be related to changing intertemporal consumption 
patterns over the lifecycle whereby older individuals place more value on leisure time when 
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compared to consumption (and hence work) time. Observing urban and rural areas separately, 
we find the same trend; in both areas, the probability of over-employment rises with the age, 
although similar to under-employment, age is not significantly related to probability of over-
employment for rural women.  
The existing literature also suggests that marriage is an important determinant of job 
mismatch in the labour market. For instance, Stier and Lewin-Epstein (2003) suggest that in most 
developed countries, marriage diminishes the likelihood of under-employment. Our results for 
the effect of marriage on under-employment in Table 6.5 have two dimensions. First, it is evident 
that while marital status is not an important determinant for the probability of under-
employment for men, it is significantly related to the under-employment of women. Second, our 
results suggest that single and divorced/widowed women are more likely to be under-employed 
compared to married women. For instance, we can observe from Table 6.5 that single women 
are 3 percentage points more likely to be under-employed compared to married women. We can 
see the same trend in urban and rural areas. Our logit and OLS results are also consistent with 
our findings from the ordered probit model. Finally, we should note that a possible explanation 
of the higher probability of under-employment among single, divorced, and widowed women is 
the cultural and religious context of Iranian society. We can also observe the relationship 
between marriage and over-employment from Tables 6.5 to 6.7: similar to under-employment, 
our results in these tables suggest that marital status is not significantly related to the likelihood 
of over-employment for men, and this is true for both urban and rural men. On the other hand, 
for women, we can observe that marital status is an important determinant of women’s over-
employment in both regions. Furthermore, compared to the married category, the other marital 
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categories are negatively related to over-employment. The fact that married women are more 
over-employed is consistent with the existing literature in most developed countries that suggest 
married women experience a greater desire to work fewer hours because they want to spend 
more time with their family.  
6.5.3 Education Status 
 
Education is another important indicator of job mismatch in the labour market, some 
studies point out (such as Brown et al., 2011; Stier and Lewin-Epstein, 2003) that in most 
developed countries, higher education reduces the likelihood of under-employment. Observing 
the relationship between under-employment and education provides some interesting insights. 
According to our findings in Table 6.5, education decreases the probability of being under-
employed for men. However, for women, as their education rises, the probability of over-
employment decrease whilst their probability of under-employment increase – with the 
magnitude being almost the exact inverse of the men’s effect. This suggests that the positive 
impacts of educational attainment have not been transferred to Iranian women in terms of less 
under-employment. For instance, women who have a master’s degree are 8.5 percentage points 
more likely than women with primary education to be under-employed. Compare this to men 
who have a master’s degree, who are 5.8 percentage points less likely than men with primary 
education to be under-employed. If we look at urban and rural areas separately, we can observe 
the same trend, although it seems that the reverse impact of education for women’s under-
employment is even bigger in rural areas. For instance, rural women who have a bachelor’s 
degree are 6.3 percentage points more likely than women with primary education are to be 
under-employed, while urban women with a bachelor’s degree are 4.6 percentage points more 
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likely to be under-employed. Interestingly, in both areas, women with the highest educational 
qualification (master’s degree) have the highest probability of under-employment (note that PhD 
is not significantly related to the probability of under-employment). A possible explanation for 
such developments might be that since the educational status of young women is already very 
high in Iran, educated women have already saturated the Iranian labour market, and there is high 
competition among educated women. Another probable explanation is the educated women’s 
‘expectation’ or reservation time is too high in Iran. Our logit and OLS model results are also 
consistent with our findings from the ordered probit model. For instance, our OLS model confirms 
that the negative impacts of under-employment for women are bigger in rural areas and as the 
level of qualification increases, the gap between urban and rural women also rises. For instance, 
if we look at urban women, we notice that those with a pre-university degree want to increase 
their working hours by 1.3 hours, while rural women with a pre-university degree want to 
increase their working hours by 1.7 hours, a difference of 0.4 hours. However, looking at higher 
qualifications such as master’s degrees, we can observe that urban women with a master’s 
degree want to work 4 extra hours, while rural women with a master’s degree want to work 7.5 
hours more, a difference of 3.5 hours. This is likely due to the differing nature of demand in the 
two types of region – women who want to work in high-skilled areas move to the city, and there 
is more demand for women with higher education in comparison to rural areas, where there is 
more demand for unskilled labour. Tables 6.5 to 6.7 also present our findings for the relationship 
between educational status and probability of over-employment. Examining the effects of 
education status on over-employment also brings some interesting observations: In both urban 
and rural areas, education status is significantly and positively related to the probability of over-
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employment among men, while in both regions, it is significantly and negatively related to the 
probability of over-employment among women. 
6.5.4 Work Status Factors 
 
Various studies examine work-related factors as an important determinant of job 
mismatch in the labour market (e.g., Feldman, 1996; Slack and Jensen, 2004; Caputo and Cianni, 
2001). We examine four work-related factors: employment status, establishment size, economic 
sector, and working hours (i.e., full time versus part-time).  
  According to Table 6.5, employment status is significantly related to all of our categories 
(under-employment, over-employment, no mismatch). Non-salaried workers are all likely to be 
have a lower probability of being under-employment, and this is true across both urban and rural 
areas and for both men and women. The only exception is for urban women, where we can 
observe that being self-employed increases the likelihood of under-employed compared to the 
reference group of salaried workers. Again, our logit and OLS results also confirm our findings 
regarding the relationship between under-employment and employment status. In terms of 
over-employment, Table 6.5 shows that compared to the reference category (salaried workers), 
all other categories are more likely to be over-employment. Yet again, the only exception is for 
urban women, where they are 1.4 percentage points less likely to be over-employed compared 
to the reference category. For instance, while an urban self-employed man is 2.5 percentage 
points more likely to be over-employed compared to a salaried worker, an unpaid family worker 
is 5.7 percentage points more likely to be over-employed compared to a salaried worker. 
However, for women, we can observe that only unpaid family workers are more over-employed 
compared to salaried workers.  
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Table 6.5 also provides information on employer size, where again we observe that this 
variable is significantly related to all of our categories (under-employment, over-employment, no 
mismatch). We also observe that workers in smaller companies are more likely to be under-
employed. These results appear to vary little by either gender or urban/rural region. In terms of 
over-employment, we can also suggest that compared to the reference group (1 to 4 workers), 
workers in the other categories are more likely to be over-employed.  
Tables 6.5 to 6.7 also provide information on full-time versus part-time work, where we 
can observe a strong negative relationship between part-time work and probability of under-
employment.  
Tables 6.5 to 6.7 provide information about the relationship between job mismatch and 
economic sector, where we observe that workers in the manufacturing and service sectors are 
more likely to be under-employed compared to those in the agricultural sector. The only 
exception is for urban women, where we observe that in both categories, they are less likely to 
be under-employed compared to the reference group. In terms of over-employment, we also 
observe that that for both men and women in either region, workers in the agricultural sector 
are mostly affected by over-employment.  
Finally, Simic (2002) suggestsa job mismatch may arise due to the cyclical pattern of 
economic growth. For instance, when the economy is growing fast, over-employment may rise 
and then decrease if economic growth slows down. For under-employment, we would expect the 
opposite cyclical pattern. In order to capture such effects, we include a variable for year, where 
we see that this variable is significantly related to most of our categories. According to Table 6.5, 
the probability of under-employment rose in 2009 and 2010, for both areas and for both men 
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and women. However after 2010, workers are less likely to be under-employed. We can see the 
same trend in over-employment. For 2009 and 2010, workers were less likely to be over-
employed; however, after 2010 they are more likely to be over-employed. These results suggest 










Table 6.5: Ordered Probit Model Results (Urban and Rural Areas) 
All Men All Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
Female 0.098*** 0.042*** -0.141*** . . . . . .
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Rural -0.005*** -0.002*** 0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.005*** -0.014**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Age Catgory(Reference:16-19)
20-29 -0.0.27*** -0.013*** 0.040*** -0.038*** -0.013*** 0.052*** -0.007** -0.004*** 0.012**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
30-39 -0.020*** -0.009*** 0.029*** -0.031*** -0.010*** 0.041*** -0.004* -0.002* 0.007*
(0.00) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
40-49 -0.003* -0.001*** 0.004* -0.012* -0.002*** 0.014*** 0.005* 0.003* -0.008*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
50-59 0.028*** 0.004*** -0.033*** 0.023*** 0.001*** -0.025*** 0.019*** 0.007*** -0.027***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
60-65 0.088*** -0.002*** -0.085*** 0.090*** -0.010*** -0.080*** 0.033*** 0.010*** -0.044***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) (0.009)
Qualification (Reference:Primary Education)
Secondary Education 0.003 0.001*** -0.004*** 0.005*** 0.002*** -0.008*** -0.011*** -0.006*** 0.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
High School 0.067*** 0.010*** -0.077*** 0.084*** 0.005*** -0.090*** 0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.009)
Pre University 0.007*** 0.003*** -0.011*** 0.013*** 0.004*** -0.018*** -0.022*** -0.014*** 0.037***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Foghe Diplom 0.021*** 0.007*** -0.028*** 0.029*** 0.008*** -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.014*** 0.036***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Bachelor 0.016*** 0.006*** -0.022*** 0.033*** 0.008*** -0.042*** -0.027*** -0.020*** 0.048***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)




Table 6.5 (Continues): Ordered Probit Model Results (Urban and Rural Areas) 
All Men & Women All Men All Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
Masters 0.022*** 0.008*** -0.031*** 0.048*** 0.009*** -0.058*** -0.043*** -0.041*** 0.085***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012)
PhD 0.056 0.011*** -0.067*** 0.080*** 0.006** -0.087*** -0.006 -0.003 0.010
(0.012) (0.000) (0.012) (0.017) (0.000) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.025)
Adult Studies 0.003** 0.001*** -0.005** -0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003)
Maritial Status ( Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.014**** -0.007*** 0.022*** 0.007 0.002* -0.009 -0.015*** -0.009** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Divorce -0.013*** -0.006*** 0.019*** 0.005 0.001 -0.007 -0.018*** -0.011** 0.029***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Not Married -0.008*** -0.004*** 0.013*** 0.009 0.000* -0.000 -0.018*** -0.011*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Employment Status (Reference: salaried)
Self-employed 0.026*** 0.013*** -0.040*** 0.031*** 0.011*** -0.043*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 0.029***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Employer 0.026*** 0.013*** -0.040*** 0.027*** 0.010*** -0.038*** 0.012* 0.009* -0.022***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Unpaid Family Worker 0.079*** 0.019*** -0.099*** 0.053*** 0.014*** -0.067*** 0.045*** 0.020*** -0.065***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
Establishment Size: Reference  (1 to 4)
5 to 9 0.012*** 0.005*** -0.017*** 0.015*** 0.005*** -0.020*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
10 to 19 0.030*** 0.009*** -0.040*** 0.036*** 0.008*** -0.044*** -0.003 -0.002 0.005
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006)
20 to 49 0.030*** 0.009*** -0.039*** 0.032*** 0.007*** -0.039*** 0.022*** 0.009*** -0.032**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006)  
250 
 
Table 6.5 (Continues): Ordered Probit Model Results (Urban and Rural Areas) 
All Men All Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
50 or more 0.018*** 0.006** -0.025*** 0.018*** 0.005*** -0.023*** 0.019*** 0.008*** -0.028***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005)
Fulltime 0.255*** 0.110*** -0.356*** 0.279*** 0.098*** -0.377*** 0.140*** 0.085*** -0.226***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Sector (Reference: Agriculture)
Manufacture -0.013*** -0.003*** 0.016*** -0.011*** -0.002*** 0.013*** -0.015*** -0.008*** 0.023***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Services -0.033*** -0.013*** 0.047*** -0.034*** -0.010*** 0.044*** -0.022*** -0.013*** 0.036***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004)
Year Controls(7 years) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
All Men & Women
 











Table 6.6: Ordered Probit Model Results (Urban Areas) 
Urban Men Urban Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
Female 0.078*** 0.022*** -0.100*** . . . . . .
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Age Catgory (Reference:16-19)
20-29 -0.033*** -0.010*** 0.044*** -0.038*** -0.008*** 0.046*** -0.007** -0.012** 0.026**
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
30-39 -0.027*** -0.007*** 0.035*** -0.031*** -0.005*** 0.037*** -0.004* -0.008* 0.018**
(0.00) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
40-49 -0.009*** -0.001*** 0.011*** -0.012* -0.001*** 0.013*** 0.005* 0.004* -0.010
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010)
50-59 0.023*** 0.000 -0.023*** 0.023*** -0.001*** -0.022*** 0.019*** 0.010*** -0.031**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012)
60-65 0.092*** -0.015*** -0.076*** 0.098*** -0.022*** -0.075*** 0.033*** 0.016*** -0.071***
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.018)
Qualification(Reference: Primary 
Education)
. . . . . . . . .
Secondary Education 0.007*** 0.002*** -0.009*** 0.008*** 0.002*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.009*** 0.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
High School 0.058*** 0.006*** -0.065*** 0.070*** 0.001* -0.072*** 0.001 -0.008 0.020
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017)
Pre University 0.014*** 0.004*** -0.018*** 0.017*** 0.004*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.013*** 0.032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Foghe diplom 0.027*** 0.006*** -0.034*** 0.032*** 0.005*** -0.037*** -0.021*** -0.012** 0.029***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
Bachelor 0.025*** 0.006*** -0.032*** 0.037*** 0.005*** -0.043*** -0.027*** -0.020*** 0.046***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007)




Table 6.6 (Continues): Ordered Probit Model Results (Urban Areas) 
Urban Men Urban Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
Masters 0.036*** 0.007*** -0.043*** 0.055*** 0.004*** -0.060*** -0.043*** -0.040*** 0.080***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.013)
PhD 0.069 0.004*** -0.074*** 0.089*** -0.002 -0.086*** -0.006 -0.007 0.017
(0.012) (0.000) (0.012) (0.017) (0.000) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011) (0.029)
Adult Studies 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.005* -0.002 0.007 0.000 0.004 -0.015
(0.017) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Maritial Status(Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.013** -0.004* 0.018** -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.015*** -0.017** 0.037***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.008) (0.000) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Divorce -0.009* -0.002* 0.012* 0.006 0.001 -0.007 -0.018*** -0.016** 0.036***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Not Married -0.007*** -0.002*** 0.009*** 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.018*** -0.019*** 0.041***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Employment Status (Reference:salaried)
Self-employed 0.022*** 0.006*** -0.029*** 0.025*** 0.005*** -0.030*** -0.014*** -0.029*** 0.057***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Enterpreneur 0.019*** 0.006*** -0.026*** 0.020*** 0.005*** -0.025*** 0.012* 0.003 -0.008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Unpaid Family Worker 0.080*** 0.004*** -0.085*** 0.057*** 0.004*** -0.062*** 0.045*** 0.017*** -0.073***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Establishment Size: Reference  (1 to 4) . . . . . . . . .
5 to 9 0.012*** 0.003*** -0.015*** 0.014*** 0.002*** -0.017*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
10 to 19 0.023*** 0.004*** -0.028*** 0.028*** 0.003*** -0.032*** -0.003 -0.004 0.010
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.008)
20 to 49 0.020*** 0.004*** -0.025*** 0.024*** 0.003*** -0.027*** 0.022*** 0.010** -0.024
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008)





Table 6.6 (Continues): Ordered Probit Model Results (Urban Areas) 
Urban Men Urban Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
50 or more 0.007*** 0.002** -0.009*** 0.010*** 0.002*** -0.012*** 0.019*** 0.004 -0.011
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Fulltime 0.276*** 0.080*** -0.357*** 0.298*** 0.064*** -0.363*** 0.140*** 0.119*** -0.266***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Economic Sector: Reference (Agriculture)
Manufacture -0.009*** -0.001*** 0.010** -0.015*** -0.000*** 0.016*** -0.015*** 0.005 -0.011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008)
Services -0.028*** -0.006*** 0.034*** -0.032*** -0.004*** 0.036*** -0.022*** 0.001 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
Year Controls(7 years) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Urban Men & Women
 

















Table 6.7: Ordered Probit Model Results (Rural Areas) 
Rural Men Rural Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
Female 0.109*** 0.064*** -0.173*** . . . . . .
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Age Catgory (Reference:14-19)
20-29 -0.025*** -0.016*** 0.042*** -0.038*** -0.020*** 0.058*** -0.004 -0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.009)
30-39 -0.018 -0.010*** 0.029*** -0.030*** -0.015*** 0.045*** -0.001 -0.000 0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.009)
40-49 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.010*** -0.003*** 0.014*** 0.004 0.001 -0.006
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.010)
50-59 0.031*** 0.009*** -0.040*** 0.025*** 0.005*** -0.030*** 0.018 0.005*** -0.024
(0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.012)
60-65 0.084*** 0.007*** -0.092*** 0.083*** 0.002* -0.085*** 0.017 0.005*** -0.023*
(0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.018)
Qualification(Reference :Primary 
Education)
Secondary Education 0.001* 0.001* -0.002* 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.005*** -0.006** -0.002* 0.009*
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
High School 0.077*** 0.016*** -0.093*** 0.093*** 0.014*** -0.108*** 0.012 0.003* -0.016
(0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.010)
Pre University 0.002** 0.001** -0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004*** -0.012*** -0.024*** -0.015*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Foghe diplom 0.018*** 0.009*** -0.027*** 0.030** 0.012*** -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.027** 0.063***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017)
Bachelor 0.012*** 0.006*** -0.019 0.031*** 0.012*** -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.027*** 0.063***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)




Table 6.7(Continues): Ordered Probit Model Results (Rural Areas) 
Rural Men Rural Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
Masters 0.008 0.004 -0.013 0.034* 0.012*** -0.046** -0.068*** -0.097* 0.165**
(0.011) (0.005) (0.017) (0.013) (0.004) (0.018) (0.011) (0.046) (0.060)
PhD 0.053 0.016* -0.070 0.072 0.016*** -0.088 0.038 0.004 -0.042
(0.094) (0.006) (0.139) (0.133) (0.004) (0.128) (0.147) (0.014) (0.132)
Adult Studies 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Maritial Status(Reference: Married)
Widowed -0.010* -0.006* 0.016* 0.013 0.006 -0.019 -0.014*** -0.006* 0.021*
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011)
Divorce -0.011* -0.006* 0.018* 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.021*** -0.011* 0.033**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.012)
Not Married -0.009*** -0.005*** 0.015*** -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.017*** -0.008*** 0.025***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Employment Status( Reference :salaried)
Self-employed 0.030*** 0.022*** -0.052*** 0.036*** 0.021*** -0.057*** 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Enterprenur 0.036*** 0.025*** -0.062*** 0.038*** 0.021*** -0.060*** 0.011 0.011 -0.023
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) (0.023)
Unpaid Family Worker 0.069*** 0.034*** -0.104*** 0.053*** 0.025*** -0.079*** 0.047*** 0.025*** -0.073***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
Establishment Size (Reference :1 to 4)
5 to 9 0.012*** 0.007*** -0.019*** 0.016*** 0.007*** -0.024*** -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006)
10 to 19 0.042*** 0.016*** -0.059*** 0.047*** 0.015*** -0.063*** -0.010 -0.005 0.016
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012)
20 to 49 0.047*** 0.016*** -0.064*** 0.047*** 0.015*** -0.062*** 0.013 0.004** -0.017
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.016)









Table 6.7(Continues): Ordered Probit Model Results (Rural Areas) 
Rural Men Rural Women
Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed Overemployed No mismatch Underemployed
50 or more 0.041*** 0.015** -0.056*** 0.036*** 0.013*** -0.050*** 0.033 0.006*** -0.039
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.014) (0.000) (0.014)
Fulltime 0.235*** 0.137*** -0.373*** 0.257*** 0.133*** -0.391*** 0.134*** 0.061*** -0.196***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Economic Sector(Reference :Agriculture)
Manufacture -0.009*** -0.004*** 0.014** -0.002* -0.000*** 0.003* -0.017*** -0.008*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Services -0.034*** -0.021*** 0.055*** -0.033*** -0.018*** 0.051*** -0.038*** -0.026*** 0.064***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Year Controls(7 years) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Rural Men & Women
Source: LFS 2008-2014
6. 6 Conclusion 
 
In this final empirical chapter of the thesis, we investigated the determinants of over- and 
under-employment in Iran, with special attention to urban/rural and gender differences. As 
mentioned previously, although unemployment and its consequences have received much 
attention from scholars of Iranian economy (such as Valadkhani, 2003; Moghaddam, 1995; 
Amuzegar, 2005), issues related to job mismatch have been largely ignored. Despite this, there is 
evidence of widespread under- and over-employment within the Iranian labour market; for 
example, evidence from our data suggests that over 32% of employed Iranians are either under- 
or over-employed. This proportion is significantly higher compared to other countries such as the 
UK, where under- and over-employment rates are approximately 19% (ONS, 2017). Therefore, 
studying determinants of under/over employment in Iran is important for both Iranian scholars 
and policy makers. Following this the contribution of this chapter is that it’s the first study that 
has been implemented on the determinants of over/under employment in Iran.  
Some of our findings in the result section were consistent with the existing literature, 
while some were contradicting previous studies. For instance, in line with existing literature 
(Wooden et al., 2009 for the USA; Reynolds and Aletraris, 2010 for Norway) we found that 
women are more likely to be overemployed, and the magnitude of women's over-employment 
is larger in rural areas. We also found out that, consistent with the existing literature (Ruiz-
Quintanilla and Claes 1996) younger individuals are more likely to be underemployed. Finally, our 
results on the impact of working status (such as establishment size, type of employment, etc.) 
were also consistent with existing studies (such as Cam, 2012). For instance, we found out that 
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workers in smaller companies are more likely to be underemployed which is consistent with 
findings of the Bell and Blanchflower (2011). We also found out that and unpaid family workers, 
and those in agricultural sector are more likely to be overemployed, which is also consistent with 
findings of existing studies (such as Caputo and Cianni, 2001). 
On the other hand, some of our findings (marriage and education) are in contradiction 
with the findings of existing studies in the literature. For example, in terms of marriage, we found 
out that the effect of marriage in terms of job mismatch is different for men and women, and 
being married is significantly related to the probability of job-mismatch for women, while it is not 
a significant determinant of men's job-mismatch. These results are in contrast with most studies 
(for example Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2003) that point out that marriage is significantly related to 
the probability of job mismatch for both men and women. Furthermore, we found that the 
likelihood of being underemployed rises for single and widowed/divorced women. We explained 
that this could be related to social and cultural aspects of Iranian society, where there is still 
discrimination against women who are not married. A further line of result which is in 
inconsistent with the existing findings (Bell and Blanchflower, 2011) is the different impact of 
educational status on the likelihood of being under/over employed for men and women. We 
found out that the probability of being underemployed increases for women (especially rural 
women) as their educational status rise, while for men the opposite is correct. This suggests that 
returns to human capital, in terms of less underemployment only exist for men.  
The findings of this chapter provide important policy implications. For instance, the 
magnitude of the existing job mismatch (32%) implies that policy makers need to take job 
mismatch in the Iranian labour market more seriously, otherwise its negative effects in terms of 
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health, job-satisfaction etc. (which was mentioned in the literature review) will affect workers in 
the long-term. Furthermore, significant effect of marital status, which was only for women, might 
suggest that women in the labour market might be judged by employers by their personal 
characteristics and not by their suitability to the job. Finally, the fact that more educated women 
are more likely to be underemployed, confirms findings of previous chapters, of the existence of 
possible discrimination. All these factors might be related to cultural, and traditional status of 
Iranian society that needs to be addressed by policy makers by appropriate enforcement laws 
















Chapter 7. Conclusion 
7.1 Overview 
 
The importance of education in economic and social development has been emphasized 
by many international conventions, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Programme of Action of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development 
(United Nations, 1996). For this thesis, we have conducted a systematic empirical study of the 
links between private education and the labour market in Iran, with a particular focus on 
uncovering the potential for different factors to function in rural and urban settings. The first 
empirical chapter sets out those factors that determine household/parental education 
expenditure on children’s education; the second stage of our investigation considers how the 
earnings returns to these educational investments manifest in urban and rural settings; and 
finally, we consider the extent to which those in employment can be considered under-, or over-
, employed – with our urban/rural distinction highlighting some particularly valuable policy 
insights.  
To some extent, these stages of our investigation overlap, and the factors at work are 
interrelated. For instance, parents might spend less/more on education for their children as a 
result of lower/higher perceived returns on education. For example, Tansel (2002a) for Turkey 
and Kamhampati (2008) for India suggest that due to higher returns on education for girls, 
parents are willing to spend more money to educate their daughters. On the other hand, high 
educational attainment is usually associated with better job opportunities (such as lower 
under/overemployment). In analysing each of the aforementioned factors, we have attempted 
to focus on different outcomes of education in urban and rural areas, as there seem to be varying 
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implications for the role of gender in these two geographical settings. This has been mentioned 
by both Iranian policymakers (Ministry of Education, Iran, 2014) and scholars (such as Iravani, 
2011), who recognise that there are still important disparities, both in terms of gender disparities 
and urban and rural inequalities, in the Iranian education system. For instance, a report on the 
Iranian education system by the World Education Forum suggests that one of the most important 
interventions that needs to be conducted in Iran is 'Planning to develop rural and less advantaged 
areas in order to promote educational indicators and eliminate disparities' (World Education 
Forum, 2015, p.34). The same report also suggests that one of the main obstacles in reforming 
the Iranian educational system is the prevalence of cultural viewpoints especially in rural 
communities which favour prevention of continuing girls’ education in junior high and high 
schools. This suggests that despite great achievements in girls’ schooling and considerable 
advancement towards regional equality in Iranian education (discussed in chapter 1), the battle 
is not yet over. This thesis has shown that both urban/rural and gender differences have 
significant effects on various factors that determine human capital investment in Iran, but the 
interaction between these is complicated. However, to date, the evidence for these matters in 
Iran has been sparse, and this thesis has sought to make a major contribution to filling that gap. 
The implications of each empirical chapter will now be further explained below. 
7.2 Determinants of Household Educational Expenditure 
 
In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we undertook the analysis of the determinants of 
parental/household educational expenditure on children, with a particular focus on urban/rural 
and gender implications. We used data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES) for 2009/10 and 2011/12, which provide a rich and up-to-date view of the factors affecting 
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households' expenditure in Iran. A study of private/household educational expenditure in Iran is 
important for both its policy and research implications because the role of the government as 
the main educational spender has decreased sharply over the past 30 years. For instance, the 
share for education in the government budget within the GDP dropped to 2.9% in 2011 from 
4.6% in 2000 (World Education Forum, 2015). Furthermore, since 2000, all Iranian development 
plans have stated eliminating regional and gender disparities in education as main objectives of 
the government. Hence, understanding what determines private/household spending on 
education will have important implications for policy makers (Kurd, 2014). This is because, 
according to the human capital theory, household characteristics are an important determinant 
of children's educational attainment, which is also true about Iran. For instance, a field study was 
jointly conducted by the Ministry of Education and UNICEF in areas of Tehran that have the 
highest gender gap in education. The study proposed that the most frequently stated issues that 
caused girls to drop out of school were as follows: cultural factors (traditional thinking that girls’ 
education is useless; prioritizing boys’ education over girls’); economic factors (financial poverty; 
mothers’ need for girls’ help with housework; families’ need for girls’ income-generating 
activities); and educational factors (absence of female teachers and co-educational schools).  
The results we report in this chapter suggest that in both urban and rural areas, a 
household's annual income, number of children, and children’s ages were key factors 
determining the decision to spend for education, the amount spent, and the proportion of 
household expenditure allocated. Further, we observe that in both areas, household annual 
income, and the gender, number, and age category of children, and most coefficients of both 
parents' age were significantly related to the probability that the family spent money on the 
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children’s education, while the father’s education level was only significantly related to the 
probability of spending for those who have a university degree or above. The only difference 
between the two types of areas (in terms of the probability of education spending) was that in 
rural areas, child gender was not significantly related to the probability of spending. For our 
second dependent variable (the amount of household educational expenditure), our results 
suggest that for urban areas, household income, maternal age, both parents’ education status, 
child age, and household size were significantly related to the amount of educational 
expenditure. As regards the amount of educational expenditure on children in rural areas, we 
observed three interesting differences. First, maternal education was no longer significantly 
related to the amount of expenditure. Only father’s education was significantly related to the 
amount of spending on children’s education. For instance, although in urban areas the mother’s 
university degree increases the amount of educational expenditure by 43%, in rural areas the 
increase is 24% and non-significant. Second, although in both areas there was a negative 
relationship between child’s gender (being a girl) and the amount of educational expenditure, 
this coefficient is only significant in rural areas. Third, although there was a strong positive 
relationship between household income and educational expenditure, this relationship was 
stronger in urban areas. For instance, in urban areas richer households spend 31% more on their 
children’s education, while richer rural household spends 15% more. Finally, our model for the 
proportion of household educational expenditure suggested that in both areas there was a 




The results of this empirical chapter suggest two possible shortcomings in observing 
household investment in children's education in Iran: first, the possible lack of intergenerational 
social mobility in both urban and rural areas (more predominantly in urban areas), and second, 
the possible existence of gender discrimination against girls in rural areas. According to our 
findings, wealthier parents, especially those in urban areas, spend more money on their 
children's education, which suggests that their children are more likely to achieve higher 
educational attainment (Acemoglu and Pishke, 2001) and earn more money in the future. This 
creates a continuous cycle, where inequality in urban areas diverges from that in rural areas. 
Further, our findings suggest that in rural areas, maternal education is not significantly related to 
the decision to spend on education, the amount spent, and the proportion of household 
expenditure allocated. This is a particularly interesting finding, and there can be many 
explanations for it. One reason could be related to traditional household structures that have 
remained more dominant in rural areas, where men are still the breadwinners and have the final 
decision regarding their children’s access to education. In this context, rural women have less 
authority in how resources are invested, including investment in their children's education. 
Therefore, their own education level is less relevant in influencing their children’s educational 
pursuits. However, in urban areas, the number of working mothers also contributing to their 
household income is higher, and so is their authority in determining their household’s 
educational spending on children. Another reason could be that education and its effect are 
perceived differently in urban and rural areas. For instance, Isfahani (2016) argues that parents 
in Iran invest in a daughter’s education not for its returns in terms of wages and employability 
but because they are aware that a highly educated woman has a higher chance of marrying well 
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and raising more intelligent children. In this way, they are contributing to society by raising more 
educated and engaged citizens. Another finding that suggests discrimination against women 
(especially in rural areas) is the significantly negative amount of educational expenditure for girls, 
which implies that in rural areas families spend less for their daughter’s education. This might be 
related to rural households’ traditional thinking, in which daughters’ education is less important. 
Alternatively, it may be related to the labour market structure of rural areas, where there is not 
much demand for women with high levels of education. These results suggest the possible 
existence of a cycle in rural areas, where girls suffer from educational underinvestment and 
mothers do not affect the decision regarding the schooling of their children; this is reflected in 
the probability of educational spending, amount of expenditure, or proportion of educational 
expenditure. This means that even the most able and educated girls, who then become mothers 
themselves, do not (or cannot) invest in their children’s education.  
Our findings suggest that policymakers need to address different challenges in urban and 
rural areas of Iran: the lack of intergenerational mobility in urban areas and the discrimination 
against women in rural areas. To address intergenerational mobility, public policy, such as 
providing easier access to schooling for less privileged households could be effective for example, 
redistributive policies, such as tax and transfer schemes (Reforms, 2010). Another possible 
solution is to provide subsidy schemes and scholarships for higher levels of education—which 
exist in most developed countries—especially for children from poor families. An alternative plan 
could be to provide a subsidy for private schools to accept more pupils from poorer households. 
However, our finding regarding gender discrimination in rural areas of Iran might have its roots 
in the cultural, religious, and political characteristics of the Iranian society, and, considering the 
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government's Islamic ideology, we are not sure it could be easily addressed, as it is the 
government itself that is not willing to encourage women's role in the society. However, both 
policymakers and activists can address these problems by educating households about the 
importance of parents’ investment in their daughters’ education, and the important role that 
women can play in the society. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the study conducted for this section is a first step at 
assessing a complex topic. However, there is room for further research in this subject. First, since 
our results suggest that household income is an important determinant of educational 
expenditure, the next step would be to examine the intergenerational effects of income 
inequality for both rural and urban areas, and for men and women. Secondly, since the Iranian 
economy has experienced a variety of shocks over the last thirty years, it would be interesting to 
add data from previous years, to see whether household behaviour has changed during that time. 
Finally, our results confirm the findings of studies that emphasise the low levels of educational 
expenditure by households in Iran; a similar study might investigate why these levels are so low. 
Is it because of the dominant role of the government in education, or are there other factors, 
such as low returns to education, that discourage Iranian households from investing heavily in it. 
The latter factor is investigated in the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter 5), where we examine 
returns to education, in terms of wages, for both men and women in urban and rural areas. 
7.3 Returns to Education 
Chapter 5 focused on returns to education, in terms of wages, for those aged between 16 
and 65, by differentiating between urban/rural and individuals’ gender. There is one study 
conducted on returns to education in Iran by Isfahani et al. (2009), which estimates returns to 
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average years of schooling for urban men. Here, a key contribution comes from differentiating 
between returns to education in urban/rural areas, while also examining gender differences. 
Another contribution of this chapter is that although most of the current studies on returns to 
education in the MENA region (Assaad, 1997; Dah and Hammami, 2002)—and the only existing 
study on Iran (Isfahani et al., 2009)—have sought to assess naive estimates of returns to 
education, we estimate both the naive and causal returns to education. 
In this chapter, we employ various methodological approaches to determine returns to 
education. First, we investigate the average returns to schooling in terms of wages by employing 
a Mincer function. Second, we examine the existence of non-linearity in returns to education by 
using educational levels instead of years of schooling. Finally, we investigate causal returns to 
education by employing two types of instruments: parental education, and educational 
expansion as a result of the Islamic revolution in 1979.Like the previous chapter, the results in 
this chapter were also obtained using data from HIES. 
Our naive results revealed that returns to education is similar for both urban and rural 
areas, and its higher for women (10%) than for men (5%). This is consistent with the existing 
literature on returns to education for most developed countries (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1994). On 
the other hand, our IV estimates are higher than OLS estimates, and lie between 1% to 29%. 
Many studies (Dickson, 2013, 2011; Walker, 1995, 2002) have also found IV estimates that are 
higher than OLS estimates. We should note that while our OLS results suggested that returns to 
education are similar in urban and rural areas, IV estimates suggest that returns to education in 
rural areas are lower than those in urban areas. Finally, we found evidence of a strong 
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nonlinearity in the rate of return on schooling, which is also consistent with most studies of 
returns to education in the MENA region (Elhamidi, 2006; Said, 2016; Salehi-Isfahani et al., 2009). 
This chapter’s findings suggest several interesting avenues for policymakers to intervene. 
In terms of regional differences, our OLS and IV results provide two different insights for returns 
to education in Iran. First, our OLS estimates suggest that returns to education in urban and rural 
areas of Iran are very similar, and there is equal opportunity (in terms of returns to wages) for 
those who continue their studies, regardless of their being a resident of rural vs. urban areas. 
This finding suggests that if the government wants to promote income equality in urban and rural 
areas, they could promote more rural inhabitants to continue their studies, via investing more 
on schooling facilities. On the other hand, our IV estimates reveal that returns to education in 
terms of wages are much higher in urban than in rural areas. These differences in terms of 
regional returns to wages can explain the mass rural to urban migration that occurred in Iran 
since the Islamic revolution in 1979,and has been mentioned by both researchers and 
policymakers as one of the most important challenges of the Iranian economy (Taleb and Anbari, 
2005;Mahmoudian, 2016). This suggests that raising returns to education in ruralareas can be 
used as a tool for reducing rural-to-urban migration. Regarding gender equality, the findings in 
this section suggest that returns to education are much higher for women than for men. There 
can be several explanations for these results; for instance, they might be related to characteristics 
of the Iranian labour market, and that it is segregated, with some jobs perceived as for women 
and some for men. Subsequently, a smaller supply of women into the labour market means that 
they are scarce, compared to the number of jobs perceived as being ‘for women’. Another 
explanation could be related to selection bias and the fact that women who enter the labour 
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market are taken from the top-end of the female ability distribution, whereas the men are from 
across their ability distribution. This suggests that if policymakers aim to improve women's status 
in the society, they could do so by pursuing women’s educational attainment. Lastly, the fact that 
returns to education are not linear in Iran has several policy implications. First, the higher-
returns-to-higher-education argument has often been used to justify allocating funds to expand 
primary education, as it implies that the forms of education accessed the most by the poorest 
(i.e. primary and lower secondary) bring the smallest rewards in the labour market. According to 
a report by UNICEF (2016), 'this is a common pattern in countries with highly selective school 
systems and rigid labour markets'. Second, non-linearity has implications in the form of an 
increase in education inequality; if private returns to schooling increase with higher education, 
poorer families who educate their children to only primary level will face lower returns, whereas 
wealthier families who educate their children to higher levels will reap higher returns. 
Consequently, the education and earnings differentials may widen across families. One important 
policy could be to provide funding for higher education for those from poorer households. This 
funding can be paid either to students themselves or directly to their Higher Education provider, 
on students’ behalf (e.g. in the case of tuition fee loans). Similar schemes, such as 'student 
support funding' and 'block grant funding' exist in the UK, which cover poorer students' tuition 
fees and costs associated with higher education attendance. 
Finally, there is room for further research on this subject. For instance, in this section, we have 
not discussed returns to education in terms of a life cycle, whereas there is evidence of life-cycle 
changes in the impact of education on wages (Heckman, Lochner, and Taber, 1996; Cattan et al., 
2013; Haider and Solon, 2006). However, the limitations of our data source render this type of 
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analysis unfeasible, as the current data source is not panel data and does not follow 
individuals/households through their life cycle. In recent years, the Iranian Statistical Centre has 
improved its data quality and made most of the data available online (Salehi-Isfahani, 2014); 
subsequently, the next step for the Centre is to assemble panel data that will enable researchers 
to follow individuals/households through their life-cycle. Another important recommendation 
for the Iranian Statistical Centre is to create a data source on education and schooling, to enable 
scholars of education economics to conduct research on various school-related topics (such as 
school quality, teacher-to-student ratio, and distance from home to school). Finally, in this 
chapter, we have only explored returns to education in terms of wages (although we have 
presented estimates regarding returns to education in terms of employability in Appendix D); the 
next step would be to examine other types of returns to education, such as employment, job 
mismatch, and probability of marrying. In the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter 6), we will 
examine determinants of job mismatch in terms of over/underemployment. 
7.4 Determinants of Under/Overemployment 
 
In the final empirical chapter of this thesis, we examine determinants of job mismatch in 
the form of under/overemployment by differentiating between both urban/rural and gender 
issues. We think that this topic is especially pertinent to the situation in Iran, as the government 
sees underemployment as a way of hiding the high rates of unemployment. On the other hand, 
in 2012, the Research Centre of the Iranian parliament highlighted the possible existence of 
overemployment among the self-employed and unpaid family workers, and according to our 
knowledge, no other studies have been conducted on the determinants of under-and 
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overemployment in Iran, hence our main contribution being the first study on such an important 
topic. Furthermore, the data analysed in this section of the thesis were from the Iranian Labour 
Force Survey (IRLFS) (2008–2014), which have only been available to researchers since 2015.  
In the study underlying this chapter, we employed several models to capture both under- 
and overemployment: a model to examine determinants of underemployment, a model to 
investigate the magnitude of existing over/underemployment, and a model to capture likelihood 
of being both under- and overemployed. Our dependent variables were desire to work more 
hours, and the difference between actual and desired working hours.  
In our results section, we reported that women, especially rural women, are more likely 
to be overemployed, whereas younger individuals are more likely to be underemployed. We also 
found out that workers in smaller companies are more likely to be underemployed whereas 
unpaid family workers, and those in the agricultural sector are more likely to be overemployed. 
All these findings were consistent with the findings in previous studies. We also reported the 
different effects of marriage for men and for women and that the likelihood of being 
underemployed rises for single and widowed/divorced women, whereas it is not significantly 
related to men's status in the labour market. For instance, single women are 3 percentage points 
more likely to be underemployed compared to married women; the coefficients for divorced and 
widowed women are also very similar (2.9 and 2.5 percentage points for divorced and widowed 
women, respectively), whereas single men are 0 percentage points less likely to be 
underemployed compared to married men. Nevertheless, none of the marriage coefficients for 
men were significantly related to the probability of over- and underemployment. We 
hypothesised that this relation might suggest possible discrimination against non-married 
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women within the Iranian labour market. However, the most interesting finding stated in this 
section was the impact of educational status on the likelihood of being under/overemployed, and 
that it differs between men and women. We reported that the probability of being 
underemployed declines for men as their educational status rises, whereas as women's 
educational level rise, their likelihood of being underemployed increases. For instance, compared 
to the reference group, men with a Bachelor’s degree are 4.2 percentage points less likely to be 
underemployed, whereas women with the same type of degree are 4.8 percentage points more 
likely to be underemployed. We observed the same trend in both urban and rural areas, albeit 
the stronger effects in rural areas. For instance, rural men with a Bachelor’s degree are 4.3 
percentage points less likely to be underemployed, whereas rural women with the same type of 
degree are 6.3 percentage points more likely to be underemployed. This suggests that returns to 
human capital, in terms of less underemployment only exist for men. We also reported the same 
opposite effects of education for men and women in terms of overemployment, where for men 
the probability of being overemployed rises with higher qualifications; for instance, men with a 
bachelor’s degree are 3.3 percentage points more likely to be overemployed, whereas women 
with the same degree are 2.7 percentage points less likely to be overemployed. Combining this 
evidence with our findings from the previous chapter, we can speculate that there are fewer 
opportunities for well-educated women in the labour market relative to the supply. This implies 
that although women seem to secure better wage returns than men, their higher level of 
education is often wasted, because they are not utilised by employers to their full productivity 
potential. One possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that women who pursue 
education are career-oriented; they have high expectations for their employability and ability to 
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secure high wages, as they are selected from the population of women of all working ages. 
However, they are disappointed by the opportunities available to them when they do secure 
work, and hence tend to feel underemployed.  
This chapter’s findings suggest several interesting areas for policymakers to intervene. 
Our results suggest that gender has the largest effect on the probability of job mismatch in the 
Iranian labour market (where the coefficient for overemployment is 0.098, and for 
underemployment is -0.141). The next largest effect comes from age, and education, while all 
other factors are significantly smaller than those three variables. Two of the three factors (gender 
and age) cannot be influenced by individuals so governments may have to intervene. For 
instance, our results suggest that there might be discrimination against non-married women, as 
they are more likely to be underemployed. This suggests that cultural and religious prejudice 
against women's marital status is still persistent in Iran. Considering the high rates of divorce 
(especially in urban areas of Iran), which has been mentioned by many sociologists (e.g. Afshar, 
2005), this could be an alarming point for policymakers, especially since the number of families 
with single mothers has been increasing substantially (Iranian Census, 2016). This means that 
discrimination against non-married women is not only going to directly affect them, but will also 
affect their children, and hence future generations. A second area for concern by policymakers is 
also related to the status of women and the fact that being more educated does not decrease 
the likelihood of being underemployed. This means that returns to education, in terms of less 
underemployment, have not been transferred to women. Thirdly, findings in this chapter suggest 
that education is a significant strong factor in explaining employment mismatch and should thus 
be seen as another positive educational outcome, on top of additional monetary returns. These 
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findings suggest that Iranian policymakers need to move beyond a simple ‘jobs counting’ 
assessment of unemployment and focus their efforts on also capturing the underemployment 
phenomenon. As Gallup rightly highlights, 'The Arab Spring uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt proved 
that a sole focus on classic economic measures such as GDP missed a crucial component of the 
social cohesion dynamic in each country, so too is the case with underemployment' (Gallup, 2013, 
p. 14). As of now, the issue of underemployment has been ignored (intentionally or 
unintentionally) by policymakers in Iran; however, the fact that young people are facing a 
particularly acute underemployment challenge highlights the urgency of changing this approach.  
Finally, there is room for further research in this subject. First, we have not examined the 
causal relationship between job mismatch and our variables; hence, there is room for 
improvement in terms of the methodological approach. Second, since our findings suggest the 
possible existence of discrimination against women in the labour market, further research is 
required to investigate why there such discrimination exists. Is it because of the inelasticity of 
the labour market? Alternatively, is it because of employers' discrimination against women?  
As a final note, we propose that the findings of this thesis confirm the systematic 
existence of gender discrimination in both the Iranian education system and its labour market; 
according to the findings reported in Chapter 4, Iranian girls receive less educational expenditure 
from their parents (despite high returns to education in terms of wages). This situation is even 
worse in rural areas, where even if they receive education, they still cannot influence their 
household’s decision regarding the educational expenditure for their children (most likely 
because the father is the main breadwinner and hence has the final word in the household’s 
decisions). In chapter 5 we found that women generally experience higher wage returns to 
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schooling than men but when such results were further dissected we found that poorly educated 
women– in both urban and rural areas – actually have lower returns than men. The high return 
thus only accrues to girls who gain appropriately high levels of education. On the other hand, the 
findings from Chapter 6 suggested that more educated women are more likely to be 
underemployed, in both urban and rural areas. All these factors suggest that policymakers and 
activists need to be alarmed, as it seems that any investment in women’s education may not fulfil 
its full potential. Another alarming point is the potential existence of low, or worsening, 
intergenerational mobility in Iran; for instance, Chapter 4 confirmed that wealthier parents spend 
much more on their children’s education, whereas Chapter 5 confirmed the non-linearity of 
returns to education. This suggests that policymakers need to provide financial support to less 
well-off families and encourage their children to continue their education through ‘student 
support funding’ and 'block grant funding', which cover students' tuition fees and costs 
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Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal EffectsStandard ErrorP-values
Continuous
Log family income last year (deflated) 0.341 0.009 0.000 0.014 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.012 0.002 0.000
Child gender 0.004 0.011 0.694 0.015 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.913 -0.013 0.002 0.000
Categorical
Father age
10 to 20 (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
20 to 30 0.154 0.051 0.002 0.062 0.008 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.033 -0.047 0.007 0.000
30 to 40 0.295 0.053 0.000 0.048 0.009 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.115 -0.037 0.008 0.000
40 to 50 0.317 0.055 0.000 0.033 0.010 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.252 -0.022 0.009 0.011
50 to 60 0.361 0.060 0.000 0.019 0.012 0.106 -0.002 0.001 0.297 -0.010 0.010 0.298
Missing 1.368 1.266 0.280 0.128 0.009 0.000 0.042 0.050 0.402 -0.107 0.008 0.000
Mother age
10 to 20 (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
20 to 30 0.183 0.023 0.000 0.048 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.303 -0.039 0.004 0.000
30 to 40 0.242 0.028 0.000 0.052 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.817 -0.043 0.006 0.000
40 to 50 0.252 0.036 0.000 0.058 0.008 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.308 -0.049 0.007 0.000
50 to 60 0.136 0.067 0.043 0.028 0.013 0.028 -0.002 0.001 0.190 -0.028 0.010 0.006
Missing -0.522 0.214 0.015 -0.043 0.039 0.261 -0.010 0.004 0.016 0.037 0.035 0.297
Father  education levels 
Level 1 (reference category)
Level 2 0.116 0.016 0.000 0.011 0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.178 -0.010 0.003 0.002
Level 3 0.284 0.018 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.013 0.003 0.000
Level 4 0.446 0.023 0.000 0.036 0.005 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.000 -0.030 0.004 0.000
Level 5 1.207 0.109 0.000 0.064 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.128 -0.060 0.010 0.000
Level 6 0.006 0.082 0.000 0.028 0.013 0.032 -0.003 0.002 0.092 -0.024 0.010 0.019
Missing -0.140 0.030 0.944 -0.038 0.008 0.000 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.031 0.007 0.000
Mother education levels
Level 1 (Primary School) - - - - - - - - -
Level 2 0.152 0.017 0.000 0.015 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.011 0.003 0.000
Level 3 0.315 0.018 0.000 0.009 0.004 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.003 0.110
Level 4 0.440 0.039 0.000 0.017 0.009 0.053 0.002 0.001 0.013 -0.012 0.007 0.113
Level 5 1.874 0.315 0.000 0.052 0.040 0.196 0.043 0.013 0.001 -0.037 0.033 0.264
Level 6 -0.646 0.124 0.000 -0.118 0.039 0.002 -0.010 0.002 0.000 0.107 0.037 0.004
Missing -0.333 0.046 0.000 -0.032 0.013 0.013 -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.011 0.009
Fathers overeducation
Normal (reference category)
Undereducated -0.008 0.018 0.673 0.004 0.004 0.353 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.003 0.451
Overeducated 0.054 0.022 0.014 -0.004 0.005 0.470 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.419
Proportion Zeroinflate
Heckman selection model urban areas Zero inflate beta model (selection model)





Table A1 continues 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal EffectsStandard ErrorP-values
Mother overeducation
Normal (reference category)
Undereducated -0.100 0.024 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.403 0.001 0.001 0.113 -0.003 0.005 0.488
Overeducated 0.107 0.042 0.000 -0.027 0.011 0.015 0.003 0.001 0.009 0.023 0.010 0.018
Father working status
Working (reference category)
Looking for job -0.085 0.040 0.033 -0.006 0.009 0.472 0.000 0.001 0.758 0.006 0.007 0.445
Inactive 0.073 0.018 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.012 0.003 0.000
Housekeeper -0.269 1.265 0.832 0.083 0.002 0.000 -0.012 0.019 0.509 -0.074 0.002 0.000
Other 0.005 0.076 0.948 -0.021 0.016 0.182 0.002 0.002 0.307 0.019 0.013 0.147
Mother working status
Working (reference category)
Looking for job -0.028 0.090 0.757 0.021 0.012 0.091 -0.004 0.002 0.043 -0.016 0.010 0.112
Inactive 0.006 0.052 0.911 0.008 0.010 0.401 0.002 0.001 0.105 -0.010 0.008 0.228
Housekeeper -0.015 0.025 0.539 -0.015 0.005 0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.007 0.012 0.004 0.005
Other -0.372 0.221 0.092 -0.181 0.071 0.011 -0.011 0.004 0.010 0.161 0.070 0.022
Number of children in household aged less than 22
1 (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
2 0.591 0.028 0.000 0.236 0.006 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.23 0.01 0.000
3 0.930 0.033 0.000 0.285 0.006 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 -0.27 0.01 0.000
4 1.145 0.037 0.000 0.288 0.006 0.000 0.020 0.001 0.000 -0.27 0.01 0.000
5 1.296 0.042 0.000 0.275 0.007 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.000 -0.26 0.01 0.000
6 or more 1.401 0.055 0.000 0.281 0.008 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.000 -0.27 0.01 0.000
Child age
0 to 5(refernce category) - - - - - - - - -
5 to 10 1.111 0.058 0.000 0.506 0.009 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 -0.496 0.011 0.000
10 to 15 1.685 0.062 0.000 0.543 0.010 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 -0.534 0.012 0.000
15 to 22 1.825 0.061 0.000 0.514 0.011 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.000 -0.505 0.013 0.000
Missing 2.094 0.065 0.000 0.510 0.012 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000 -0.503 0.013 0.000
Regional controls (22 regions) included included included included included included included included included included included included
N
 Mills Ratio/ln_phi 1.128 0.070 0.000 3.047 0.007 0.000
R
2
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Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal EffectsStandard ErrorP-values Marginal EffectsStandard ErrorP-values
Continuous
Log family income last year (deflated) 0.173 0.006 0.000 169,711.000 0.002 0.000 -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.015 0.002 0.000
Child gender -0.024 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.889 0.000 0.000 0.226 0.000 0.002 0.912
Categorical
Father age
10 to 20 (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
20 to 30 0.204 0.034 0.000 0.107 0.009 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.180 -0.092 0.008 0.000
30 to 40 0.287 0.035 0.000 0.076 0.011 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.015 -0.065 0.010 0.000
40 to 50 0.342 0.037 0.000 0.074 0.012 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.048 -0.063 0.011 0.000
50 to 60 0.271 0.041 0.000 0.058 0.013 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.050 0.012 0.000
Missing 0.032 0.807 0.969 0.082 0.123 0.502 -0.015 0.018 0.415 -0.069 0.107 0.518
Mother age
10 to 20 (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
20 to 30 0.091 0.016 0.000 0.072 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.065 0.006 0.000
30 to 40 0.058 0.020 0.005 0.074 0.008 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.071 -0.066 0.007 0.000
40 to 50 0.001 0.027 0.985 0.058 0.009 0.000 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.052 0.009 0.000
50 to 60 -0.069 0.049 0.154 0.035 0.014 0.011 -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.037 0.012 0.006
Missing -0.183 0.142 0.196 -0.011 0.033 0.747 -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.010 0.031 0.746
Father  education levels 
Level 1 (reference category) - - - - - - - - - - -
Level 2 0.034 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.004 0.400 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.466
Level 3 0.187 0.024 0.000 0.025 0.007 0.001 -0.008 0.001 0.000 -0.020 0.006 0.002
Level 4 0.357 0.026 0.000 0.053 0.007 0.000 -0.010 0.001 0.000 -0.046 0.006 0.000
Level 5 -0.123 0.326 0.707 0.107 0.009 0.000 -0.015 0.006 0.013 -0.092 0.012 0.000
Level 6 0.018 0.054 0.734 0.032 0.013 0.015 -0.004 0.001 0.003 -0.027 0.011 0.016
Missing -0.093 0.028 0.001 -0.037 0.011 0.000 -0.005 0.001 0.000 0.034 0.010 0.000
Mother education levels
Level 1 (reference category) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Level 2 0.092 0.015 0.000 0.021 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.156 -0.017 0.004 0.000
Level 3 0.053 0.048 0.271 0.029 0.012 0.018 -0.006 0.001 0.000 -0.022 0.010 0.034
Level 4 0.224 0.050 0.000 -0.045 0.018 0.014 -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.047 0.017 0.005
Level 5 1.204 0.497 0.015 0.105 0.007 0.000 -0.006 0.013 0.633 -0.095 0.006 0.000
Level 6 0.111 0.098 0.257 0.059 0.020 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.200 -0.049 0.017 0.005
Missing -0.244 0.049 0.000 -0.037 0.016 0.021 -0.004 0.002 0.008 0.032 0.014 0.022
Fathers overeducation
Normal (reference category) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Undereducated -0.009 0.015 0.560 -0.010 0.005 0.065 -0.001 0.000 0.080 0.007 0.005 0.117
Overeducated -0.021 0.025 0.383 -0.021 0.009 0.020 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.018 0.008 0.020
Heckman selection model rural araes Zero inflate beta model (selection model)







Table A2 continues 
Variable Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal Effects Standard Error P-values Marginal EffectsStandard ErrorP-values Marginal EffectsStandard ErrorP-values
Mother overeducation
Normal (reference category) - - - - - - - - - - - -
Undereducated -0.078 0.021 0.000 -0.004 0.007 0.605 0.000 0.001 0.424 0.005 0.006 0.411
Overeducated 0.127 0.048 0.008 -0.032 0.015 0.031 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.028 0.013 0.026
Father working status
Working (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
Looking for job 0.009 0.028 0.758 0.027 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.015 -0.021 0.007 0.002
Inactive 0.088 0.018 0.000 0.018 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.039 -0.016 0.004 0.000
Housekeeper -2.381 0.990 0.016 0.115 0.002 0.000 -0.017 0.015 0.255 -0.105 0.003 0.000
Other -0.051 0.057 0.365 -0.034 0.019 0.075 -0.002 0.002 0.172 0.032 0.017 0.067
Mother working status
Working (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
Looking for job -0.041 0.083 0.623 0.061 0.018 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.314 -0.050 0.015 0.001
Inactive 0.090 0.053 0.093 0.065 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.995 -0.050 0.010 0.000
Housekeeper 0.030 0.015 0.048 0.007 0.005 0.182 0.001 0.000 0.046 -0.005 0.004 0.296
Other -0.136 0.132 0.302 -0.010 0.037 0.792 -0.001 0.003 0.731 0.013 0.032 0.69
Number of children in household aged less than 22
1 (reference category) - - - - - - - - -
2 0.460 0.028 0.000 0.28 0.01 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 -0.28 0.01 0.000
3 0.799 0.033 0.000 0.36 0.01 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000 -0.35 0.01 0.000
4 1.042 0.036 0.000 0.38 0.01 0.000 0.023 0.001 0.000 -0.37 0.01 0.000
5 1.263 0.037 0.000 0.38 0.01 0.000 0.026 0.001 0.000 -0.36 0.01 0.000
6 or more 1.419 0.041 0.000 0.36 0.01 0.000 0.029 0.001 0.000 -0.34 0.01 0.000
Child age
0 to 5(refernce category) - - - - - - - - -
5 to 10 0.860 0.042 0.000 0.471 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 -0.461 0.011 0.000
10 to 15 1.273 0.045 0.000 0.496 0.010 0.000 0.025 0.001 0.000 -0.489 0.012 0.000
15 to 22 1.331 0.040 0.000 0.417 0.011 0.000 0.019 0.001 0.000 -0.413 0.013 0.000
Missing 1.759 0.046 0.000 0.421 0.013 0.000 0.021 0.001 0.000 -0.421 0.014 0.000
Regional controls (22 regions) included included included included included included included included included included included included
N
Mills Ratio/ln_phi 0.788 0.056 0.000 3.21 0.006 0.000
R
2
Source: HIES 2009/10-2011/12. Standard errors clustered on household. 
- -
63170 63170
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Table B1: Converting educational codes into years of schooling in the Iranian 
Household and Expenditure Survey.  
 
 
210 primary school more than5yrs
211 1st primary-not studying 6
212 2nd primary-studying 7
213 3rd primary-studying 8
214 finish primary 8
215 7th year, secondory school(6 year system) 10/old system
215 8th year, secondary school(6 year system) 9/old system
215 second grade of secondary school 8 old system 
215 first grade of secondary school 7-old system
216 First cycle of secondary school 8
216 Third grade of secondary school 11-old system
216 9th year 9-old system
221 second grade, introductary technical and vocational school9-old system
221 1st/Agricultural training 9-old system
221 2nd/Agricultural training 9-old system
222 3rd/agricultural training 9-old system
300 High school more than 8yrs
301 High school 11
302 High school 11
303 High school 11
311 1st high school/not studying 9
312 2nd high school/studying 10
312 3rd high school/studying 11
313 Diploma of high school 11
314 pre-university/studying 12
315 pre-university/studying 12
316 1st vilage teacher training 9
317 high school diploma 11
318 first grade of introductory teachers collge school 10
318 6 year secondary school 10 and 11
318 class 10/mathematics and litrature 10
318 class 10/mathematics and litrature and science 11
319 Diploma 11
319 Introductory teachers collge diploma 12
31A 1st high school 9
31C 2nd high school 10
31D 3rd high school/ 11
31G high school more than 8




Table B1 Continues: 
 
Standard Code Description years of schooling
314 pre-university/studying 12
315 pre-university/studying 12
316 1st vilage teacher training 9
317 high school diploma 11
318
318 10 and 11
318 class 10/mathematics and litrature 10
318 class 10/mathematics and litrature and science 11
319 Diploma 11
319 12
31A 1st high school 9
31C 2nd high school 10
31D 3rd high school/ 11
31G high school more than 8
321 2nd vocational and training courses 10
321 3rd vocational and training courses11
322 Diploma for vocational and training courses 11
323 High school 10
323 High school 11
324 High school 11






32A high school more than 8
32A high school more than 8
32C high school 9
32C high school 9
32C high school 9
32C high school 9
32C high school 9
32C high school 9
32D high school 10
32D high school 10
32D high school 10
32D high school 10
32D high school 10
32D high school 10
32G high school more than 8





Table B1 Continues: 
 
Standard Code Description years of schooling
511 1st year uni 13







512 university degree 16
512 university degree 16
512 university degree 16
512 university degree 16
512 university degree 16
512 university degree 16
513 masters/1st yr 17
513 masters/1st yr 17
513 masters/1st yr 17
513 masters/1st yr 18
513 masters degree 18
513 masters degree 18
514 masters degree 18
514 masters degree 18






521 university degree 2nd yr uni
521 university degree 1st yr uni
521 university degree 1st yr uni
521 university degree 2nd yr uni
521 university degree 2nd yr uni
521 university degree 1st yr uni
522 university degree 13
522 uni degree uni degree
522 pre-university/studying 12





603 above phd 20
604 above phd 20






Table C1: Summary Statistics Urban Areas for the samples the equations are estimated  
 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev.
Continuous
Age 65,577 37.69 11.48 9,060 36.05 9.64
Year of Schooling 65,175 8.69 4.376539 9,028 11.12 5.35
Experience 65,577 21.11 11.81 9,060 16.48 9.91
Hourly Pay($) 65,577 3.11 . 7,936 3.09 .
Categorical Variables
 Education Levels
No qualification 5,296 12.84 910 13.11
Primary 12,935 31.35 628 9.05
Secondary/High School 9,981 24.19 1,166 16.80
Vocational 3,341 8.10 216 3.11
BA Degree 8,452 20.49 3,625 52.24
Masters Degree 984 2.39 322 4.64
PhD Degree 267 0.65 72 1.04
Marital Status 
Marrried 51,706 78.85 5,747 62.37
Widowed 183 0.28 439 3.16
Divorced 380 0.58 346 3.75








Table C2: Summary Statistics rural Areas for the samples the equations are estimated  
 
Variable Frequency Mean std. dev. Frequency Mean std. dev.
Continuous
Age 86,356 37.74 12.74 18,305 39.08 12.86
Year of Schooling 85,217 6.14 3.98 18,213 4.08 4.32
Experience 86,356 19.75 12.76 18,305 18.71 11.59
Hourly Pay($) 79,038 23,824.10 . 6,534 17,976.44 .
Categorical Variables
 Education Levels
No qualification 16,231 36.94 7,873 73.69
Primary 15,889 36.16 1,299 12.16
Secondary/High School 6,701 15.25 717 6.71
Vocational 2,055 4.68 122 1.14
BA Degree 2,861 6.51 636 5.95
Masters Degree 180 0.41 26 0.24
PhD Degree 23 0.05 11 0.10
Marital Status 
Marrried 66,842 77.40 12,995 70.99
Widowed 282 0.33 1,244 6.80
Divorced 316 0.37 203 1.11







Appendix D: Results of Logit model 
 
All regions Urban Rural




























Female -0.181*** . . -0.126*** . . -0.227*** . .
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)




. . . . . . . . .
20-29 0.059*** 0.077*** 0.012** 0.062*** 0.071*** 0.013 0.062*** 0.085*** 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
30-39 0.040*** 0.057*** 0.008 0.042*** 0.050*** -0.004 0.045*** 0.067*** 0.009
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
40-49 -0.003 0.010*** -0.016** -0.000 0.006 -0.038*** 0.004 0.020*** -0.014*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
50-59 -0.063*** -0.055*** -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.078*** -0.063*** -0.055*** -0.046***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
60-65 -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.081*** -0.109*** -0.105*** -0.121*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.067***




. . . . . . . . .
Secondary Education -0.011*** -0.017*** 0.020*** -0.021*** -0.024*** 0.012* -0.005** -0.009*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
High School -0.089*** -0.108*** 0.001 -0.080*** -0.091*** 0.002 -0.100*** -0.121*** -0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010)
Pre University -0.019*** -0.030*** 0.040*** -0.035*** -0.040*** 0.018*** 0.003 -0.008*** 0.045***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Foghe diplom -0.051*** -0.064*** 0.026*** -0.062*** -0.066*** -0.001 -0.032*** -0.053*** 0.063***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017)
Bachelor -0.047*** -0.071*** 0.045*** -0.065*** -0.077*** 0.026*** -0.014** -0.041*** 0.065***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012)
Masters -0.062*** -0.108*** 0.111*** -0.080*** -0.112*** 0.099*** -0.002 -0.049* 0.159**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.057)
PhD -0.135*** -0.149*** -0.063** -0.143*** -0.146*** -0.094*** 0.007 -0.023 0.052
(0.011) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.026) (0.145) (0.178) (0.154)
Adult Studies -0.001 0.014*** -0.000 0.010* 0.023*** -0.003 -0.000 0.010* 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)  
320 
 
Table D1: Results of Logit model Continues 
All regions Urban Rural































. . . . . . . . .
Widowed 0.025*** -0.022* 0.042*** 0.014 -0.011 0.046*** 0.026* -0.036 0.042***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Divorce 0.020** -0.018* 0.062*** 0.013 -0.018 0.079*** 0.022* -0.013 0.053***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Not Married 0.003* -0.011*** 0.032*** -0.004* -0.015 0.047*** 0.009*** -0.007 0.027***




. . . . . . . . .
Sel -employed -0.050*** -0.061*** 0.036*** -0.038*** -0.046*** 0.067*** -0.063*** -0.076*** 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Enterprenur -0.068*** -0.071*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.082*** -0.089*** -0.040
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.023)
Unpaid Family 
Worker
-0.120*** -0.091*** -0.089*** -0.103*** -0.082*** -0.090*** -0.129*** -0.107*** -0.094***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Establishment 
Size:    
Reference(1-4)
. . . . . . . . .
5 to 9 -0.012*** -0.014*** 0.001 -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.007 -0.005* -0.009** 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
10 to 19 -0.051*** -0.059*** 0.004 -0.043*** -0.048*** 0.001 -0.057*** -0.069*** 0.028
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
20 to 49 -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.038*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.044*** -0.085*** -0.094*** -0.014
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.016)
50 or more -0.059*** -0.059*** -0.047*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.045*** -0.091*** -0.095*** -0.050***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013)
Full-time -0.356*** -0.372*** -0.195*** -0.343*** -0.349*** -0.256*** -0.364*** -0.397*** -0.152***




. . . . . . . . .
Manufacture 0.002 -0.009*** 0.020*** -0.006* -0.008** -0.039*** 0.004 -0.011*** 0.015***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Services 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.039*** -0.024* 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.048***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
N 787,613 687,182 100,431 407,366 368,096 39,270 380,247 319,086 61,161
Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses Standard errors in parentheses




Table D2: Results of OLS model 
All Areas Urban Areas Rural Areas
For ALL Men Women For ALL Men Women For ALL Men Women
Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch
Female -6.579*** . . -4.691*** . . -8.043*** . .
(0.050) (0.068) (0.068)
Rural 0.329*** 0.377*** -0.461*** . . . . . .
(0.030) (0.031) (0.098)




. . . . . . .
20-29 1.716*** 2.247*** 0.636*** 1.958*** 2.072*** 1.354*** 1.692*** 2.398*** 0.310*
(0.062) (0.070) (0.134) (0.096) (0.101) (0.298) (0.078) (0.092) (0.145)
30-39 1.441*** 1.988*** 0.454** 1.705*** 1.833*** 0.898** 1.417*** 2.118*** 0.275
(0.069) (0.078) (0.144) (0.103) (0.109) (0.307) (0.090) (0.107) (0.160)
40-49 0.605*** 1.044*** -0.097 0.897*** 0.995*** -0.055 0.507*** 1.041*** -0.036
(0.073) (0.082) (0.163) (0.107) (0.113) (0.328) (0.098) (0.114) (0.184)
50-59 -1.075*** -0.810*** -0.749*** -0.635*** -0.683*** -0.717 -1.390*** -1.070*** -0.713**
(0.081) (0.089) (0.200) (0.115) (0.121) (0.380) (0.112) (0.128) (0.231)
60-65 -3.866*** -3.838*** -1.227*** -3.484*** -3.691*** -2.091*** -4.172*** -4.081*** -0.532






. . . . . . .
Secondary Education -0.172*** -0.329*** 0.718*** -0.382*** -0.477*** 0.966*** -0.091 -0.218*** 0.438***
(0.033) (0.035) (0.107) (0.044) (0.045) (0.184) (0.047) (0.050) (0.125)
High School -3.544*** -4.310*** -0.197 -2.921*** -3.311*** 0.044 -4.300*** -5.143*** -0.430
(0.121) (0.132) (0.315) (0.180) (0.191) (0.566) (0.160) (0.176) (0.371)
Pre University -0.379*** -0.701*** 1.602*** -0.719*** -0.886*** 1.358*** -0.105 -0.473*** 1.750***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.118) (0.046) (0.047) (0.170) (0.060) (0.064) (0.161)
Foghe diplom -1.182*** -1.738*** 1.671*** -1.476*** -1.777*** 1.361*** -1.143*** -1.888*** 2.598***
(0.084) (0.088) (0.252) (0.091) (0.096) (0.284) (0.188) (0.198) (0.587)
Bachelor -0.711*** -1.835*** 2.169*** -1.243*** -1.935*** 2.000*** -0.594*** -1.817*** 2.815***
(0.072) (0.080) (0.180) (0.078) (0.085) (0.216) (0.164) (0.180) (0.395)
Masters -0.772*** -2.496*** 4.402*** -1.433*** -2.656*** 4.086*** -0.249 -2.126** 7.592***
(0.200) (0.213) (0.463) (0.197) (0.214) (0.454) (0.746) (0.748) (2.295)
PhD -2.689*** -3.963*** 1.151 -3.287*** -4.172*** 1.308 -2.353 -4.171 -0.044
(0.512) (0.584) (0.898) (0.493) (0.559) (0.934) (2.645) (3.492) (3.154)
Adult Studies -0.436*** -0.034 -0.115 -0.290* 0.195 -0.582* -0.242** -0.013 -0.064




Table D2: Results of OLS model Continues 
All Areas Urban Areas Rural Areas
For ALL Men Women For ALL Men Women For ALL Men Women
Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch Missmatch
Widowed 0.950*** -0.220 0.992*** 0.524* -0.086 1.257*** 0.972*** -0.314 1.011**
(0.180) (0.273) (0.235) (0.244) (0.377) (0.318) (0.265) (0.396) (0.349)
Divorce 0.975*** -0.337 1.478*** 0.506** -0.499 1.615*** 1.108*** -0.002 1.818***
(0.162) (0.205) (0.255) (0.195) (0.247) (0.313) (0.286) (0.366) (0.442)
Not Married 0.695*** 0.084* 1.440*** 0.545*** 0.039 1.851*** 0.764*** 0.160 1.298***







. . . . . . .
Self-employed -1.109*** -1.219*** 1.053*** -0.993*** -1.024*** 1.938*** -1.247*** -1.396*** 0.097
(0.032) (0.033) (0.114) (0.042) (0.043) (0.164) (0.049) (0.051) (0.163)
Employer -1.436*** -1.353*** -1.555*** -1.076*** -1.059*** -0.699 -2.024*** -1.933*** -2.715**
(0.065) (0.067) (0.342) (0.076) (0.078) (0.364) (0.126) (0.128) (0.913)




. . . . . . . . .
5 to 9 -0.621*** -0.771*** -0.181 -0.601*** -0.703*** -0.060 -0.646*** -0.834*** -0.160
(0.046) (0.048) (0.128) (0.060) (0.062) (0.201) (0.070) (0.076) (0.167)
10 to 19 -1.307*** -1.534*** 0.192 -1.060*** -1.297*** 0.334 -1.756*** -1.956*** 0.707
(0.064) (0.066) (0.207) (0.077) (0.080) (0.247) (0.116) (0.119) (0.393)
20 to 49 -1.318*** -1.459*** -0.830*** -0.979*** -1.205*** -0.494 -1.992*** -1.970*** 0.063
(0.074) (0.077) (0.246) (0.089) (0.093) (0.284) (0.135) (0.138) (0.520)
50 or more -0.955*** -0.992*** -0.768*** -0.465*** -0.696*** -0.089 -1.954*** -1.747*** -1.066*
(0.058) (0.060) (0.204) (0.068) (0.071) (0.233) (0.108) (0.111) (0.523)
Full-time -15.571*** -16.661*** -8.276*** -15.562*** -16.441*** -9.377*** -15.538*** -16.855*** -7.436***






. . . . . . .
Manufacture 0.286*** 0.310*** 0.376*** -0.034 0.365*** -0.551* 0.391*** 0.130 0.376***
(0.044) (0.050) (0.100) (0.082) (0.087) (0.256) (0.058) (0.068) (0.113)
Services 1.275*** 1.223*** 1.368*** 0.992*** 1.078*** 0.311 1.360*** 1.285*** 2.265***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.138) (0.077) (0.081) (0.267) (0.050) (0.052) (0.216)
Constant 21.118*** 15.194*** 4.363*** 19.012*** 15.040*** 4.836*** 23.284*** 15.878*** 4.269***
(0.105) (0.097) (0.222) (0.159) (0.144) (0.441) (0.141) (0.130) (0.249)
N 745520 646745 98775 385917 347403 38514 359603 299342 60261
r2 0.314 0.348 0.133 0.315 0.341 0.165 0.312 0.349 0.109
Standard errors in parentheses





Table E1: probability of finding a job in urban areas according to years of schooling 
 
 







Years of Schooling 0.076*** -0.042*** 0.308***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Experience 0.189*** 0.307*** 0.227***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008)
Experience Squared -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -2.966*** -1.402*** -7.414***
(0.060) (0.081) (0.190)
N 172,748 89,703 83,044
McFadden’s R2 0.082 0.231 0.020
Standard errors in parentheses


















Education Level . . .
Primary -1.512*** -0.527*** -3.792***
(0.110) (0.119) (0.186)
High School -1.791*** -0.655*** -3.283***
(0.088) (0.127) (0.142)
Vocational -1.116*** -0.606*** -2.879***
(0.128) (0.134) (0.213)
University -0.896*** -0.626*** -1.040***
(0.054) (0.132) (0.140)
Maters -0.701*** -0.676*** -0.681***
(0.043) (0.075) (0.153)
Experience 0.210*** 0.317*** 0.254***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Experience Squared -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.553*** -0.867*** -1.257***
(0.091) (0.157) (0.197)
N 88,988 48,491 40,496
McFadden’s R2 0.082 0.231 0.020
Standard errors in parentheses
















Years of Schooling 0.070*** -0.004 0.027***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Experience 0.153*** 0.302*** 0.098***
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Experience Squared -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -2.459*** -1.584*** -3.131***
(0.045) (0.056) (0.134)
N 143,828 73,337 70,491
McFadden’s R2 0.091 0.261 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses




















Primary -2.179*** -0.638 -4.974***
(0.474) (0.625) (0.764)
High School -2.386*** -0.728 -5.038***
(0.461) (0.586) (0.795)
Vocational -1.774*** -0.547 -4.671***
(0.477) (0.608) (0.784)
University -1.803*** -0.662 -3.617***
(0.431) (0.584) (0.784)
Maters -1.956*** -1.039* -3.869***
(0.326) (0.500) (0.941)
Experience 0.170*** 0.292*** 0.128***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Experience Squared -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.614 -0.478 1.721*
(0.482) (0.635) (0.834)
N 51,362 29,695 21,667
McFadden’s R2 0.082 0.231 0.020
Standard errors in parentheses
="* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001"  
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